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INSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT IN A
GLOBALIZING JUDICIAL SYSTEM
ERNEST A. YOUNG†
ABSTRACT
This article argues that the field of “Federal Courts” scholarship
ought to expand to consider the relations not just between state and
federal courts, but also between domestic courts and judicial
institutions operating at the international level. Both relationships
raise similar sorts of “interjurisdictional” problems—issues of
standards of review, abstention, procedural defaults, and the like.
Moreover, the study of supranational courts would benefit from the
Legal Process jurisprudence that dominates the field of domestic
Federal Courts law. In particular, I emphasize Henry Hart and Al
Sacks’ notion of “institutional settlement,” which holds that decisions
should be allocated to particular institutions on the basis of
institutional competence and that decisions by the primary institution,
once made, should generally be respected absent a sufficiently good
reason for overruling them.
I illustrate how a Legal Process approach to supranational courts
might work through two primary sets of examples. The first involves
the tug of war between American domestic courts and the
International Court of Justice over foreign nationals convicted of
capital crimes in state courts after failure by local authorities to notify
the accused of his rights to consular notification under the Vienna
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Convention on Consular Relations. This issue recently came to a head
in the Medellin case, which the Supreme Court elected not to resolve
last Term but is likely to see again. The central question in these cases
is whether the ICJ should respect domestic rules of procedural default,
which bar litigation of Vienna Convention claims in domestic habeas
corpus proceedings where those claims were not first presented to the
state trial court. The second set of examples involves arbitration
proceedings under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement. In the Mondev and Loewen cases, NAFTA panels
engaged in what was, for all practical purposes, appellate review of
state courts on questions of state law. The question here is whether
international law should sanction “denial of justice”-type claims that
make domestic law questions re-litigable at the supranational level,
and, if so, whether supranational tribunals should adopt a more
deferential standard of review. Institutional settlement, I argue, has a
good deal to say about both sets of questions.
The last part of the article speculates more generally about what a
Legal Process approach can tell us about supranational adjudication.
It considers some international law principles—like the “margin of
appreciation” in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights, as well as the principle of “complementarity” in the statute of
the International Criminal Court—that already incorporate norms of
institutional settlement. I argue that institutional settlement has
something to offer both skeptics and enthusiasts of supranational
adjudication: it can moderate the intrusiveness of such adjudication,
while at the same time increasing its legitimacy.
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International law . . . has at times, like the common law within states,
a twilight existence during which it is hardly distinguishable from
morality or justice, till at length the imprimatur of a court attests its
jural quality.
– Justice Benjamin Cardozo

1

There was a time when international lawyers had to defend their
discipline against the charge that “international law” is an oxymoron.
John Austin famously argued that international law can’t really be
“law” because there is no single sovereign to enforce it,2 and H.L.A.
Hart more recently reached much the same conclusion because,
among other deficiencies, international law lacks “secondary rules of
change and adjudication which provide for legislature and courts.”3

1. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934).
2. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 152 (David
Campbell & Philip Thomas eds., Dartmouth Publishing 1998) (1832).
3. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209 (1961).
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Even worse, political scientists in the Realist tradition argued that law
is practically irrelevant to international relations; that field, they
4
insisted, is instead dominated by national power and self-interest.
These debates seem to be fading now. Although international law still
confronts serious debates about its legitimacy, efficacy, and content, it
is increasingly clear that international law functions as law in many
5
important contexts. This is true in part because of the proliferation of
supranational institutions for the interpretation, application, and
enforcement of law, such as the European Court of Human Rights or
the tribunals established under the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and North American Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA).6
We are, indeed, increasingly surrounded by supranational courts.
Eight years ago, Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter spoke of
a “renewed millennial faith in the ability of courts to hold states to
7
their international obligations.” As Jenny Martinez recently pointed
out, “there are now more than fifty international courts, tribunals,
and quasi-judicial bodies, most of which have been established in the
past twenty years.”8 Professor Martinez goes on to observe that

4. See, e.g., GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1900–1950, at 89–101 (1951);
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE
244 (4th ed. 1967) (“Where there is neither community or interest nor balance of power, there is
no international law.”). For a more recent example of unabashed Realist thinking, see generally
JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001).
5. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations
Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 205 (1993) (arguing that doubts about the force
of international law have largely been resolved in the last several decades). This need not mean
the end of Realist thinking; what it does mean is that Realists, to be realistic, will incorporate
the operation of international law and institutions into their theories of power competition
among states. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 225 (2005) (“International law is a real phenomenon, [but] the best
explanation for when and why states comply with international law [is] simply that states act out
of self-interest.”); MEARSHEIMER, supra note 4, at 364 (“[S]tates sometimes operate through
institutions [and may use them to] maintain, if not increase, their own share of world power.”).
6. Perhaps the most successful example is the European Union’s Court of Justice, but it
may be better to think of that court as the supreme tribunal of an emerging federal state. But see
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 84 (2004) (“[L]eading national courts [in
the EU] . . . see themselves as still interacting with a supranational rather than a federal
tribunal.”). The critical point for my purposes is that unlike most supranational courts, the ECJ
is attached to a full-fledged government with executive and legislative functions, broad
regulatory powers of its own, and more developed lines of political accountability than other
supranational organizations.
7. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 387 (1997).
8. Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 430
(2003); see also id. at 436–44 (surveying many of these institutions).
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“[i]nternational courts are acting more and more like, well, courts:
They are convicting people of international crimes and sending them
to prison; they are exercising compulsory jurisdiction over trade
disputes; they are enforcing the rights of individuals against
9
governments.” Nor are these supranational bodies acting in a
vacuum; rather, we see “a growing pattern of transnational
interactions among courts,” including “a strong dimension of judicial
‘review’” of national courts.10 Although many of these supranational
adjudicatory bodies remain controversial, there is little doubt that
legal scholars must take them seriously.
But the acceptance of international law as law carries with it
certain difficult obligations and responsibilities. Discourse about
international law has often been aspirational in tone; the articulation
of broad human rights, for example, has sometimes been seen as a
method of progressive pressure on less enlightened governments
without any real expectation that the rights in question will be
implemented immediately or directly. In these situations, the
mechanics of implementation—for instance, the relationship among
various national and supranational adjudicatory bodies that must
administer the rights in question—tend to get relatively little
attention. Moreover, the discussion of implementation that does
occur tends to be compartmentalized within categories like human
rights or international trade, with relatively little cross-fertilization.11
As Cesare Romano has observed, “[t]o date, the international judicial
process and organization has not been considered as a field of study
in itself.”12
That needs to change. The more international law operates as
law, the more we are going to have to think about these issues of
institutional detail—the structure and composition of supranational
bodies, and their relationships to one another and to domestic courts.
9. Id. at 432.
10. Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National
Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2032 (2004).
11. See Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of
Deference, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 675, 795 (2002) (noting this problem and providing a rare
counterexample of synthesis across subject matters).
12. CESARE P.R. ROMANO, PROJECT ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS,
MATERIALS AND PUBLICATIONS: MATRIX: INTRO (1999), at http://www.pictpcti.org/matrix/matrixintro.html. The research matrix itself is a very cool interactive graphic
displaying the characteristics of a variety of supranational adjudicatory bodies. MATERIALS
AND
PUBLICATIONS: MATRIX: RESEARCH MATRIX (2000), at http://www.pictpcti.org/matrix/Matrix-main.html.
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This is necessary on the level of theory if international law is to meet
H.L.A. Hart’s challenge to develop “secondary rules of change and
adjudication.” But it is even more essential on the level of practice.
As international law begins to have a real impact on the internal
workings of societies, like the United States, that had basically seen
themselves as legally self-sufficient, that law is beginning to generate
real opposition. Proponents of the death penalty and opponents of
gay rights, for example, have protested the use of international law to
forbid forms of capital punishment or prohibitions on sodomy;13
likewise, but from a very different political perspective,
environmentalists and other critics of globalization have criticized the
impact of free trade agreements on domestic regulation.14 Developing
doctrines and institutional practices to mediate conflict between
supranational and domestic institutions may be a key to international
law’s ability to weather these sorts of storms.
American lawyers have seen similar sorts of problems before.
For over two centuries we have operated a dual judicial system: two
parallel systems of courts, each with generally concurrent jurisdiction
to apply two parallel systems of law.15 Many of the great political
conflicts of our history have had important echoes in the ebb and flow
13. See, e.g., Phyllis Schlafly, Whom is the Supreme Court Listening To?, eagleforum.org,
(Nov. 10, 2004), at http://www.eagleforum.org/column/2004/nov04/04-11-10.html (discussing the
Supreme Court’s references to the European Court of Human Rights and other foreign sources
in its famous sodomy ruling, Lawrence v. Texas). The Supreme Court’s recent decision
invalidating the juvenile death penalty, which relied in part on international views on the capital
punishment, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198–1200 (2005), is likely to further galvanize
this opposition. See, e.g., Jonah Goldberg, Justice Kennedy’s Mind, NAT’L REV. ONLINE,
(Mar. 9, 2005) at http://www.nationalreview.com/goldberg/goldberg200503090749.asp (criticizing
references to foreign law in constitutional cases generally, and in Roper in particular).
14. See, e.g., Public Citizen, “GATT-Zilla vs. Flipper” Dolphin Case Demonstrates How
Trade Agreements Undermine Domestic Environmental, Public Interest Policies (Apr. 11, 2003),
at http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/ENVIRONMENT/articles.cfm?ID=9298 (arguing that trade
agreements “lead to the erosion of domestic public interest policies”).
15. For the first century of our history, the state courts were in fact the primary forum for
litigating claims under federal law, because the lower federal courts lacked general jurisdiction
over cases raising a federal question prior to 1875. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J.
MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 320 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. There is still a strong
presumption that state courts are competent to hear federal claims. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493
U.S. 455, 458 (1990); see also Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1947) (holding that state
courts generally cannot refuse to recognize claims under federal law). Likewise, the federal
courts have broad jurisdiction over questions of state law in cases that involve parties from
different states or where plaintiffs plead both federal and state claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(2000) (covering diversity jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (authorizing supplemental
jurisdiction over state claims in federal question cases).
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of authority and jurisdiction between these two judicial systems. The
first great expansion of federal court jurisdiction was repealed in 1802
as a threat to the Jeffersonian Republican revolution of 1800; the
creation of broad federal question jurisdiction and the expansion of
federal remedies for violations of federal civil rights were key
components of Reconstruction in the late Nineteenth Century; and
much of the reaction against the Warren Court’s revolution in
criminal procedure found its expression in new limits on the ability of
federal courts to review state criminal proceedings via the writ of
16
habeas corpus. Throughout this history, these two judicial systems
worked out ways to live together by developing an intricate web of
interjurisdictional doctrines and statutory provisions.
These doctrines are at the center of the field of legal inquiry
known, somewhat misleadingly, as “Federal Courts” law. A better
term would be closer to the title of the leading treatment of the
subject, Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler’s pathbreaking
casebook/treatise The Federal Courts and the Federal System.17 This
field, existing at the intersection of constitutional law and procedure,
once enjoyed great prestige in the legal academy; more recently,
however, some of its leading lights have worried that the field is
18
stagnant or dead. The central point of this Article is to propose a
new research agenda for the discipline. We need to extend the
“Federal Courts” idea outward, to encompass not only the way that
domestic institutions relate to one another but also how those
institutions relate to supranational courts and organizations.
It is not just the subject matter of federal courts law that is
critical, however. In American law, that field remains dominated by a
particular jurisprudential paradigm: the “Legal Process School”
pioneered by Hart, Wechsler, Albert Sacks, and others in the 1950s. I
argue here that the development of interjurisdictional rules relating
supranational courts to domestic courts should likewise reflect this
Legal Process approach. In particular, such rules must pay heed to the
Legal Process principle of “institutional settlement,” which holds that
law should allocate decisionmaking to the institutions best suited to

16.
17.
18.

See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 34–36, 1296–97.
See id.
See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wechsler Hotel, 47
VAND. L. REV. 993 (1994); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler
Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 954–55 (1994) (noting a “restiveness . . . among many Federal
Courts teachers” toward the “Hart and Wechsler paradigm”).
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decide particular questions, and that the decisions arrived at by those
institutions must then be respected by other actors in the system, even
if those actors would have reached a different conclusion.
This will strike some readers as an elementary, even banal
principle, but I contend that it is far too often ignored or discounted
in debates about the allocation of authority between domestic and
supranational courts. Indeed, the most distinctive thing about the
present Article in the emerging literature on supranational courts is
that I write from a perspective of what Ken Anderson has called
“democratic sovereignty.”19 That view holds that “[s]overeignty is
justified as a means of expressing and respecting the democratic will
of a particular political community”; it emphasizes “the fidelity of the
state to its own internal democratic processes” over “any exterior
structure of rules, law, or commands from larger global institutions.”20
This perspective does not necessarily preclude a high degree of
respect for and involvement in supranational institutions. It insists,
however, that those institutions respect the “settlement” of important
prerogatives in domestic bodies.
Someone needs to write a sequel to the Hart and Wechsler
casebook called something like The Federal Courts and the Global
System. I hasten to add that this Article does not attempt to write that
sequel—it simply presents an argument for why it should be written.
My goal is not to press for particular conclusions, but rather to point
out directions for future scholarship. The argument has four parts.
The first Part briefly surveys the interjurisdictional problem as it
appears both in foreign affairs law and in American federal courts
law; I also present an overview of the Legal Process approach, with
particular emphasis on the principle of institutional settlement.
Although a “Legal Process” school of international law scholarship
already exists, I suggest that this school has not emphasized either the
interjurisdictional sorts of questions upon which Professors Hart and
Wechsler focused or the principle of institutional settlement.
Part Two develops two examples of interjurisdictional problems
in foreign affairs: recent litigation in the federal courts and the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) involving federal habeas corpus
remedies for state violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular

19. Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global
Governance through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1261 (2005) (book
review).
20. Id.
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Relations and two decisions by NAFTA arbitral tribunals conducting
what is, in essence, review of state court decisions on questions of
state law. I bring the Legal Process notion of institutional settlement
to bear on these questions in Part Three, indicating several different
aspects of supranational adjudication in the Vienna Convention and
NAFTA contexts that are problematic from this perspective. Part
Four offers some tentative suggestions for promoting institutional
settlement in relationships between supranational and domestic
courts.
I. BACK TO THE FUTURE: SUPRANATIONAL
ADJUDICATION AND THE LEGAL PROCESS SCHOOL
The “Federal Courts” model that I want to apply to
supranational adjudication has two components: First, it identifies a
set of legal issues that may seem widely varied but that share a
common element—that is, they all involve the allocation of decisional
authority among different judicial and quasi-judicial institutions.
Second, it approaches that set of questions through the
jurisprudential lens of the Legal Process School that originated as a
response to American Legal Realism during the 1950s. This
introductory Part develops an initial view of both these components.
A. The Interjurisdictional Problem in Foreign and Domestic Affairs
The central “problem” motivating this Article is the peaceful
coexistence of courts and other adjudicatory institutions operating at
both the domestic and international level.21 As Anne-Marie Slaughter
has observed, “a rough conception of checks and balances, both
vertical and horizontal,” is an “organizing principle[]” of an emerging
global “community of courts.”22 But this “rough conception” stands in
need of both refinement and institutional support. Two critical
developments have brought international law to a place where it
needs a “Federal Courts” course of its own. The first involves changes
in the character of international law itself; the second has to do with
the expansion of institutions at the supranational level.
21. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and
Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1863 (2003) (“Two leading systems exist today for
protecting the fundamental rights of individuals: constitutional law and human rights law. Both
systems assert an ultimate authority to evaluate whether governmental practices comply with
fundamental rights, and each system sits potentially in judgment over the other.”).
22. SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 68.
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Many scholars have noted the changing concerns of international
law. Jack Goldsmith, for example, has written that while “[f]oreign
relations was traditionally understood to be relations among the
national governments of sovereign nation-states,” more recently “the
traditional agenda of foreign relations has been replaced by a variety
of issues formerly the concern of domestic governance alone.”23 These
issues include human rights, migration and asylum, environmental
protection, drug trafficking and other forms of international crime,
epidemics and other health issues, and trade.24 Modern international
law thus replicates many central concerns of the domestic regulatory
state. Time has also expanded the set of actors with whom
international law is concerned: where before that law primarily dealt
with relations among states, it now takes a keen interest in the way
states treat their own citizens.25
Even in areas where international law retains a more traditional
focus on a state’s treatment of foreigners, modern international law
tends to confer rights more broadly than in the past. International law
has always recognized that one state has an interest in another state’s
26
treatment of the first state’s citizens, but a combination of
widespread travel and immigration with broad rights-creating treaties
like the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations means that these
issues seem to come up more often. More importantly, international
law now sometimes permits the affected foreign citizen to raise claims
against a state, rather than having to persuade her home government
to espouse her claim for her.27 That development tends to minimize

23. Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
1617, 1670–71 (1997).
24. Ivo D. Duchacek, Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors in
International Relations, in FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE ROLE OF
SUBNATIONAL UNITS 1, 2 (Hans J. Michelmann & Panayotis Soldatos eds., 1990); see also
Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 1671–72.
25. Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 1672.
26. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 497
(6th ed. 2003) (citing EMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS [THE LAW OF NATIONS]
bk. 11, ch. 6, ¶ 71 (Joseph Chitty ed. & trans., Phila., T. & J.W. Johnson 1876) (1758)).
27. See Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of
Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights,
15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 391, 438–39 (2001) (discussing individual claim mechanisms under
several human rights treaties); Renée Lettow Lerner, International Pressure to Harmonize: The
U.S. Civil Justice System in an Era of Global Trade, 2001 BYU L. REV. 229, 244 (“[The] concept
of the state alone having a legal personality in international fora began to crumble with the
advent of international arbitration conventions in the 1950s and 60s.”).
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political and inertial checks on litigation, as the domestic experience
28
with “private attorneys general” amply demonstrates.
The second development is the advent of institutions at the
international level that make and apply law. For much of its history,
the lawmaking and law-applying organs of international law were the
states themselves along with their domestic institutions. H.L.A. Hart’s
critique argued that international law was not a legal system because
it lacked law-making and law-applying institutions of its own: “The
absence of these institutions,” he argued, “means that the rules for
states resemble that simple form of social structure, consisting only of
primary rules of obligation, which . . . we are accustomed to contrast
29
with a developed legal system.” But this situation is changing. Our
globalizing world order increasingly features “vertical networks” that
“replicate the governing functions that states exercise regarding their
citizens.”30 Any number of supranational courts now apply
international law, and in the wake of Legal Realism we know that
such “application” of the law is often tantamount to making it. It is
harder to find overt examples of supranational legislation,31 although
the WTO’s power to adopt binding interpretations of its open-ended
trade agreements by a three-fourth’s vote of its members would seem
to come close.32 In any event, modern international law is hardly
institution-less in the way that it once was.
These developments, especially in combination, drive an urgent
need for principles to govern the interaction of supranational and
domestic institutions. For example, Professor Helfer and Dean
Slaughter have discussed the impact of private rights of action in
28. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein,
91 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1810–22 (1993) (arguing that “private attorneys general” undermine
accountability).
29. HART, supra note 3, at 209.
30. SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 20.
31. The European Union would provide an obvious and dramatic example, but in my view
integration has progressed to the point that the EU institutions are no longer “supranational” in
the same sense as the WTO or the United Nations. See Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a
Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 56 (2003) (“[T]he
Union is in so many respects a constitutional system and not a construct governed by classical
principles of international law.”); Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the
European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612,
1641–42 (2002) (suggesting that the EU is best viewed as a form of federal system).
32. See Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and NonSelf-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1574 (2003) [hereinafter Bradley, International
Delegations] (“The WTO has the power to adopt binding interpretations of the various trade
agreements by a three-fourth’s vote.”).
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conjunction with supranational judicial institutions in Europe. They
observe that
The provisions for such jurisdiction in the founding documents of
[the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human
Rights] provide a point of departure for penetrating the surface of
the state, allowing the tribunals to interact directly with the principal
players in national legal systems. Further, stripping the state of its
unitary facade creates the possibility of direct relationships between
the tribunals and different governmental institutions such as courts,
33
administrative agencies, and legislative committees.

Helfer and Slaughter go on to note that “the right of individual
petition is spreading rapidly, both to other human rights tribunals and
34
to various entities charged with resolving trade-related disputes.”
Such developments put a premium on addressing the ways in which
relationships between supranational and domestic legal institutions
should develop.
The “Federal Courts” paradigm offers a good place to start.
America’s parallel judicial systems may be viewed as an early
35
example of Dean Slaughter’s “disaggregated state.” Once our
Founders “split the atom of sovereignty,”36 the states and the national
government have not confronted one another as sovereign “black
boxes”; rather, they have developed complex vertical networks
relating state and national actors in the legislative, bureaucratic, and
judicial spheres. The judicial aspects of those relations are the central
concern of Federal Courts doctrine and scholarship.
Federal Courts law has addressed these interjurisdictional issues
through a variety of statutory and judge-made rules. I list a few
examples here in order to suggest the sort of interjurisdictional rules
that foreign affairs law may need to develop:
Rules of justiciability: A key limit on the power of the federal
courts to interfere with the workings of other governmental

33. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 7, at 277; see also Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2154
(“[I]ndividual access can be expected to enhance international court influence, both by creating
a domestic constituency for the Court’s rulings and eliminating discretionary barriers to the
review of sensitive cases.”).
34. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 7, at 281.
35. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 5; Kal Raustiala, Transgovernmental Networks and
the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 10–11 (2002).
36. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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institutions—both state and federal—has been the confinement of the
37
power of judicial review to “cases and controversies.” Doctrines of
standing, ripeness, and mootness determine who can seek judicial
review and at what point in a dispute; in consequence, they constrain
the opportunities of courts to exercise power.38
Rules of abstention, exhaustion, and noninterference: Federal law
has long barred federal courts from issuing “a writ of injunction . . . to
stay proceedings in any court of a state.”39 The courts have
embroidered this statutory principle with a variety of judge-made
doctrines designed to protect state court proceedings from federal
interference.40 Other principles require that, in some instances, federal
claims be presented to state authorities prior to bringing suit in
federal court.41
Standards of review and limits on collateral attack: Federal courts
review state court decisions both when federal questions are appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court and when state criminal convictions are
attacked collaterally under federal habeas corpus.42 Both statutory
and judge-made rules have limited the scope of this review and

37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
38. See generally Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881
(1983); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, ‘Injuries’, and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992).
39. Act of March 2, 1793, § 5, 1 Stat. 335. The present version of the Anti-Injunction Act
provides that “[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000). See generally
Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970). On the state side, the
Supreme Court has held—without any statutory analog to the Anti-Injunction Act—that state
courts generally lack the power to enjoin federal court proceedings. See Gen. Atomic Co. v.
Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1977) (per curiam); Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
40. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (holding that federal courts should
generally abstain from interference with pending state criminal proceedings); Rooker v. Fid.
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (holding that the federal courts lack jurisdiction to
“entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify” a state court judgment).
41. See, e.g., Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985) (concluding that federal courts may not hear takings challenges to state or local action
until the plaintiff has first sought relief from the relevant governmental agency); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (holding that a petitioner’s failure to present his federal claims to the
state courts in accordance with state procedural rules generally bars federal habeas review).
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000) (covering direct appeals from state courts to U.S. Supreme
Court); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) (providing federal habeas corpus for state prisoners).
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provided for deference to the state courts’ rulings, especially (but not
43
exclusively) on questions of state law.
Remedial doctrines and governmental immunities: Federal Courts
law concerns not only the relation of different judicial systems to one
another but also the relations of courts to other political institutions.
One critical variable is the ability of courts to provide remedies
enforceable by private individuals;44 another concerns their ability to
impose liability on governmental entities or compel them to
45
undertake or forego certain policies.
Res judicata and recognition of judgments: Federal law requires
both federal and state institutions to give “full faith and credit” to one
another’s public acts and judicial proceedings.46 Because state and
federal courts have developed their own preclusion rules, judges have
had to grapple with complicated questions concerning which
preclusion principles apply to judgments rendered in other courts.47
Horizontal and vertical choice of law: Horizontal choice of law is
familiar to international lawyers, but federal systems have also had to
grapple with vertical choice of law where disputes arise as to whether
state or federal law governs a case. The most important questions
have involved preemption, that is, determining the extent to which
43. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (barring habeas relief unless the state court
adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law”); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 626
(1875) (limiting the Supreme Court’s inquiry on direct appeal to questions of federal law).
44. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002) (discussing private rights of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for federal statutory violations); see also Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275, 286–90 (2001) (discussing availability of implied private rights of action under
federal statutes); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688–95 (1979) (same).
45. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) (holding that Congress
may not generally abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity from suits for money damages under
federal law); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148–49 (1908) (holding that federal courts may issue
injunctive relief against state officers to prevent them from violating federal law).
46. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (requiring states to give full faith and credit to other
states); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000) (requiring the federal courts to give full faith and credit to state
court proceedings). The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, effectively requires state
governments to give full faith and credit to federal acts and judgments. See generally Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
47. See, e.g., Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (discussing
the preclusive effect of federal court judgments in diversity cases on future state court
litigation). See generally Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal Preclusion Law after Semtek,
72 U. CIN. L. REV. 527 (2003).
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48
federal law on a question ousts state law on the subject, and the
power of federal courts to fashion common law rules where federal
enacted law does not apply.49

Principles of avoidance and judicial restraint: American courts
have developed prudential principles designed to narrow the scope of
judicial decisions and, in particular, to avoid decisions of
constitutional matters.50 Prominent examples include canons of
construction that disfavor readings of ambiguous statutes that raise
51
difficult constitutional problems and order of operations rules that
counsel resolution of cases on nonconstitutional grounds if possible.52
International law has given more thought to some of these areas
than others. Recognition of foreign judgments, for example, has
drawn extensive attention in private international law,53 whereas the
ability of a supranational tribunal like the ICJ to enjoin governments
from taking particular actions pending resolution of a case remains
much disputed.54 This is an important time to address such questions:
many supranational courts are in their formative stages, and they
ought to be structured in such a way as to ensure their ability to

48. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000) (holding that federal
airbag regulations preempted state product liability rules); see generally Louise Weinberg, The
Federal-State Conflict of Laws: “Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743 (1992); Ernest A.
Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 41–45, 130–34 (2004).
49. See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that federal courts
generally lack power to fashion common law rules in the absence of federal statutes or
regulations). See generally Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964).
50. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (listing various doctrines in this vein).
51. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). See generally Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85
GEO. L.J. 1945 (1997).
52. See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 348 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The Court will not pass
upon a constitutional question . . . if there is also present some other ground upon which the
case may be disposed of.”). See also R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1941)
(holding that a federal court should abstain altogether from deciding a case involving difficult
constitutional issues where a state court might be able to resolve the case on state law grounds).
53. See generally Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial is Our Need for a JudgmentsRecognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
167 (1998).
54. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 49, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371
(1998) (Nos. 97-1390, 97-8214) (noting “substantial disagreement among jurists as to whether an
ICJ order indicating provisional measures is binding”).
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develop workable interjurisdictional rules. Moreover, doctrines that
mitigate conflict between supranational and domestic institutions may
offer the best hope of preserving a role for supranational adjudication
in the face of attacks on its basic legitimacy.
I do not suggest that the field has lain fallow until now. Jenny
Martinez recently outlined an ambitious vision of an “international
judicial system,” and that vision included some of the same sorts of
55
intermediary doctrines that I discuss here. Likewise, the Helfer and
Slaughter study of supranational adjudication considers some aspects
56
of interjurisdictional relations. Nonetheless, I find myself a good bit
more skeptical of supranational institutions than many of these
scholars. In particular, I think that scholars with a primary focus on
international law have been too driven by a perceived need to “build
up” international law and institutions57 and not focused enough on the
need to preserve institutional arrangements at the domestic level.
Equally important, the American study of interjurisdictional conflict
and cooperation at the domestic level offers not only a laundry list of
issues but also a particular jurisprudential orientation that may well
be central to the success of institutional accommodation. I discuss that
orientation in the next section.
B. Institutional Settlement and the Legal Process Tradition
Perhaps more than any other field of law, Federal Courts law is
dominated by a particular jurisprudential paradigm. That paradigm
derives from Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler, who authored what
remains the dominant casebook in the field.58 As Richard Fallon has
observed, “Hart and Wechsler defined the field as we now know it,
and . . . their definition links the subject matter of Federal Courts

55. See generally Martinez, supra note 8.
56. See generally Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 7; see also Alford, supra note 11
(surveying the question of deference by domestic courts to supranational ones across a wide
variety of subject areas).
57. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty Obligations, and the States,
92 AM. J. INT’L L. 679, 683 (1998) [hereinafter Henkin, Provisional Measures] (criticizing the
Supreme Court’s decision in Breard v. Greene on the ground that it “did not contribute to the
rule of law in international affairs” and “did not strengthen the place of international law in the
law of the United States”).
58. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953). Akhil Amar has described the book as “probably the most important
and influential casebook ever written.” Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688,
688 (1989) (book review). Except where otherwise noted, I will refer to the present edition that
appeared in 2003. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15.
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inquiries almost inextricably to the Legal Process methodology that
59
they likewise pioneered.” The “Legal Process,” of course, refers not
only to a jurisprudential school but to another influential set of
60
teaching materials authored by Henry Hart and Al Sacks in 1958. In
this Article, I urge that the law of foreign affairs should both focus on
the sorts of interjurisdictional problems that characterize the Federal
Courts course and adopt the basic jurisprudential approach that the
Legal Process School brought to those problems.
The allocation of decision-making authority is central to the
61
Legal Process tradition. Professors Hart and Sacks distinguished
between “substantive understandings or arrangements about how the
members of an interdependent community are to conduct
themselves” and “constitutive or procedural understandings or
arrangements about how questions in connection with arrangements
of both types are to be settled.”62 They argued that “[t]hese
institutionalized procedures and the constitutive arrangements
establishing and governing them are obviously more fundamental
than the substantive arrangements in the structure of a society . . .
since they are at once the source of the substantive arrangements and
the indispensable means of making them work effectively.”63 More
fundamentally, Hart and Sacks found implicit in these constitutive
and procedural understandings a principle of “institutional
settlement.” They recognized that the basic facts of social living give
rise both to disputes and to differing ideas about how those disputes
should come out. Under these conditions, “[t]he alternative to
disintegrating resort to violence is the establishment of regularized
and peaceable methods of decision.”64 The principle of institutional

59.
60.

Fallon, supra note 18, at 956.
HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds.,
1994). For an account of these materials, see the introductory essay by Professors Eskridge and
Frickey. Id. at xi. On the Legal Process School generally, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205–99 (1995).
61. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 58, at 691 (“The legal process school focuses primary
attention on who is, or ought, to make a given legal decision, and how that decision is, or ought,
to be made.”). For a somewhat different account, stressing the school’s commitment to
“reasoned elaboration” of the grounds for judicial decisions, see G. Edward White, The
Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, reprinted in G.
EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 136 (1978).
62. HART & SACKS, supra note 60, at 3–4.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 4.
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settlement reflects the respect that members of the society owe to the
outcome of these agreed-upon procedures; as Hart and Sacks put it,
institutional settlement “expresses the judgment that decisions which
are the duly arrived-at result of duly established procedures of this
kind ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless
and until they are duly changed.”65
In the Legal Process tradition, domestic notions of federalism
and separation of powers are simply manifestations of this idea of
institutional settlement. A central task of governance is to assign
particular decisions to particular institutions, like the President, or
Congress, or federal administrative agencies, or state courts.66 Once a
decision is assigned to an institution, that institution’s decisions are
taken as settled absent some particularly powerful reason for
changing them.67 “Settled” need not mean conclusive; there may be
varying degrees of weight or deference. But at least some of the time,
we must accept an institution’s resolution of an issue even though we,
as observers or participants in some other institution, might have
68
resolved the matter differently. The class of cases in which this is
true may vary in size, depending on how much deference we accord to
the original decisionmaker. What remains constant is that the
argument for overruling the initial institution’s decision must include
something more than the mere contention that the initial
decisionmaker got that decision wrong on the merits.
In assigning tasks to particular institutions, the Legal Process
school emphasized considerations of comparative institutional
competence.69 We determine which institution should be assigned a
particular task, and how much deference that institution’s decisions
should get, by considering the particular capacities and liabilities that
each institution brings to the task. In an area where technical
expertise is at a premium, for example, a court may defer to the
superior competence of an expert administrative agency by applying a

65. Id.
66. See DUXBURY, supra note 60, at 255.
67. Cf. White, supra note 61, at 148 (noting that the Legal Process School “favored
institutional conservatism in the judiciary”).
68. See Fallon, supra note 18, at 962 (“[A]uthority to decide must at least sometimes
include authority to decide wrongly.”).
69. The Hart & Sacks materials thus put as central questions, “What is each of these
institutions good for? How can it be made to do its job best? How does, and how should, its
working dovetail with the working of the others?” HART & SACKS, supra note 60, at 158.
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70
very lenient standard of review to the agency’s actions. The role of
courts in the Legal Process tradition is often similar to that of a point
guard on a basketball team: the court takes provisional responsibility
for a dispute, but may well decide to pass it off to other actors in the
system, either through mechanisms of direct referral or, more likely,
by deferring to prior judgments by legislative, executive, or private
actors.71 The key point, however, is that these decisions about who
gets the ball are made according to assessments of comparative
institutional strengths and weaknesses in dealing with particular sorts
of problems.
Another important Legal Process insight is that the means of
institutional settlement include not only the classic constitutional
principles of limited powers, but also the host of more interstitial
doctrines about jurisdiction, justiciability, standards of review, choice
72
of law, and remedies that I identified earlier. Professors Hart and
Wechsler argued that these more “technical” doctrines would often
surpass overt limits on governmental power in terms of their practical
importance.73 Those sorts of technical rules governing the interactions
of judicial bodies at various levels are my focus here. Although much
of the literature on supranational adjudication has focused on what
Hart and Wechsler called questions of “ultimate power”—that is, on
what tasks the Constitution does or does not permit our government
to assign to supranational institutions74—I want to emphasize instead

70. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (“The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court
is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”).
71. I am indebted to Bill Powers for the “point guard” metaphor.
72. See supra notes 37–52 and accompanying text.
73. The first Preface to the Hart and Wechsler casebook argued that “[f]or every case in
which a court is asked to invalidate a square assertion of state or federal legislative authority,
there are many more in which the allocation of control does not involve questions of ultimate
power”; in the latter cases, “[C]ongress has been silent with respect to the displacement of the
normal state-created norms, leaving courts to face the problem as an issue of the choice of law.”
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 58, at xi.
74. See generally Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 32; Brian F. Havel, The
Constitution in an Era of Supranational Adjudication, 78 N.C. L. REV. 257 (2000); Julian G. Ku,
The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old
Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000); Chantal Thomas, Constitutional Change and
International Government, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2000). This work is important; there may well be
constitutional limits on the ability of the United States to accede to various forms of
supranational adjudication. I want to suggest, however, that the most important issues will be
played out in the details of interjurisdictional interactions.
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questions of how those institutions should behave in relation to the
domestic legal system.
It may seem strange to suggest that one of the most cutting-edge
legal developments of our time—globalization and the advent of
supranational decisionmaking—should be addressed by recourse to a
jurisprudential approach developed in the 1950s. The Legal Process
school in general, and the Hart and Wechsler paradigm in Federal
75
Courts law in particular, have had their critics. I tend to agree with
Richard Fallon, however, that “no one has yet advanced a better
paradigm for the study of Federal Courts issues than the Legal
Process paradigm pioneered by Hart and Wechsler.”76 The principle
of institutional settlement, moreover, is based on the judgment that
members of a society are unlikely to agree on many primary questions
of law and morality; hence, the best we can hope for is agreement on
a process for resolving these disputes, and the results of that process
should then be accepted as legitimate.77 That insight seems even more
compelling in an international environment featuring vast
disagreements of morality and policy and lacking any sovereign able
to compel agreement on contested questions.
To be sure, the Legal Process school has not lacked adherents in
78
international legal circles. Harold Koh coined the phrase
“Transnational Legal Process” back in 1995 in his Pound Lecture at
79
the University of Nebraska. His lecture, however, was concerned
with rebutting the claim that international law is not law; the term
“transnational legal process” refers to a process-based account of why
nations obey international law.80 Abram and Antonia Chayes’
important work on “The New Sovereignty” likewise stressed the

75. See generally Michael Wells, Busting the Hart & Wechsler Paradigm, 11 CONST.
COMMENT. 557 (1994–95); White, supra note 61, at 153–61 (arguing that, by the 1970s, the Legal
Process model prescribed an overly modest role for courts in society).
76. Fallon, supra note 18, at 971; see also DUXBURY, supra note 60, at 208 (noting the
Legal Process school’s continuing relevance).
77. Fallon, supra note 18, at 964.
78. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES, THOMAS EHRLICH & ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD,
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE (1969); Mary
Ellen O’Connell, New International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 334 (1999).
79. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183 (1996).
80. See id. at 205 (“Once nations begin to interact, a complex process occurs, whereby
international legal norms seep into, are internalized, and become embedded in domestic legal
and political processes.”); O’Connell, supra note 78, at 351 (“Chayes, Ehrlich and Lowenfeld
developed international legal process to demonstrate that law does play a role in international
affairs.”); see also Burley, supra note 5, at 213.

110305 YOUNG.DOC

2005]

12/19/2005 3:04 PM

GLOBAL INSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT

1163

importance of process as a spur to compliance, without focusing on
how that process should be structured to ensure the continued
81
viability of domestic constitutional arrangements. The international
law version of Legal Process thus has not tended to stress the value of
82
institutional settlement.
My task here is to apply the Legal Process model to the questions
that arise once we take Dean Koh’s case as largely proven: assuming
that international law is law and will generally be obeyed, how should
the various supranational and domestic institutions that make up the
resulting legal structure interact? My focus diverges from the
“International Legal Process” of Professor Chayes, Dean Koh, and
others in two principal respects: First, I emphasize the value of
institutional settlement as a component of the Legal Process
perspective. Second, my attention is directed not so much at the
interactions of state actors and supranational institutions on the
international plane, but rather on the relationship between
supranational and domestic judicial institutions, that is, the problem
of parallel judicial structures. These are the sort of concerns that have
traditionally preoccupied the Hart and Wechsler branch of Legal
Process; they are the place where Federal Courts scholars may,
perhaps, make their own contribution.
II. TWO EXAMPLES OF THE INTERJURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM
I want to explore these questions through two different
examples. The first concerns the remedies for breach by American
state officials of our treaty obligations under the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations.83 That issue came to a head in two recent
cases: the Avena decision by the International Court of Justice in
84
2004, and the Medellin case heard by the U.S. Supreme Court in
2005.85 Avena held that the U.S. had violated its obligations under the
Convention and ordered “review and reconsideration of the
81. See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).
82. See O’Connell, supra note 78, at 338–39 (observing that “confidence in institutional
settlement” was “not originally incorporated” into international legal process and that more
recent scholarship has focused on supplementing traditional legal process perspectives with a
greater emphasis on normative values).
83. Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
84. Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), (Mar. 31, 2004),
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm [hereinafter Avena].
85. Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005).
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convictions and sentences” of approximately 50 Mexican nationals.
Medellin, a federal habeas corpus suit brought by one of those
Mexican nationals, asked the U.S. Supreme Court to determine the
87
appropriate response of domestic courts to the Avena ruling.
The second example arises out of international arbitrations
under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Chapter 11 guarantees the rights of foreign investors against
“expropriation” by NAFTA parties, and it provides individual
investors with a private right of action against the host state before a
88
NAFTA tribunal. In two recent cases, Loewen and Mondev, such
tribunals effectively have conducted appellate review of state court
89
decisions resolving questions of state law.
Each of these examples raises difficult questions concerning the
relations between supranational and domestic adjudication. I cannot
hope to deal with those questions in any sort of comprehensive way
here. These examples should, however, indicate the need for a web of
statutory and doctrinal mechanisms to mediate the developing
conflicts between these two levels of courts.
A. Avena, Medellin, and the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations
José Ernesto Medellin was tried and convicted of capital murder
in a Texas state court in 1994. His confession related that, as part of a
gang initiation in Houston, he participated in the brutal gang rape of
fourteen-year-old Jennifer Ertman and sixteen-year-old Elizabeth
Pena. Medellin recounted that, following the rape, he strangled the
90
two girls with one of his shoelaces. A jury sentenced him to death.
Medellin had spent most of his life in the United States, attended
American schools, and was fluent in English. Indeed, he was no
stranger to the American justice system, having once been a juvenile

86. Avena, supra note 84, at ¶ 153.
87. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2089 (discussing the questions on which the Court granted
certiorari).
88. See infra notes 119–24 and accompanying text.
89. See Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States (Can. v. U.S.), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2
42 I.L.M. 85 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002) [hereinafter Mondev]; Loewen Group, Inc. v.
United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 42 I.L.M. 811 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003)
[hereinafter Loewen].
90. See Medellin v. State, Order, No. 71997 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 1997), reprinted in
Joint Appendix to Petition for Certiorari in Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-5928, at 4a-6a; Joint
Appendix for Certiorari in Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-5928, at 14–18 (on file with author).

110305 YOUNG.DOC

2005]

12/19/2005 3:04 PM

GLOBAL INSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT

1165

91

probationer. Nonetheless, he remained a Mexican national. As such,
he was entitled to important rights under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. Article 36 of the Convention provides that “if
[the accused] so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending
State if . . . a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison
or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.”92
Moreover, the host country’s officials must “inform the person
concerned without delay of his rights” under the Convention.93
There is no dispute that Texas failed to meet this treaty
obligation, although the State did provide Medellin with American
counsel as required by domestic law.94 Medellin failed to raise this
treaty claim, however, as an objection at his trial or as an appellate
issue on direct review of his conviction. The issue appeared for the
first time in his state habeas petition filed four years after the initial
conviction. The state courts rejected this claim, but Medellin tried
again in a federal habeas petition filed in 2001.95 The federal district
court denied relief on all of Medellin’s claims, including the Vienna
Convention argument. Because Medellin had failed to raise that
91. See Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 275–76 (5th Cir. 2004).
92. Vienna Convention, supra note 83, art. 36(1)(b).
93. Id.
94. Like many habeas petitioners, Medellin argued that his appointed counsel were
ineffective at the original trial. Space does not permit discussion of the grounds of the alleged
ineffectiveness, but to this observer—as to the district court and the Fifth Circuit—they were
distinctly underwhelming. See Medellin, 371 F.3d at 275–79. While concerns about the quality of
counsel in capital cases persist, the Supreme Court has tightened up application of the Sixth
Amendment standard considerably in recent years. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510
(2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
95. For readers unfamiliar with the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq.,
federal law since 1867 has provided for federal review of state criminal convictions and/or
sentences alleged to have been imposed in violation of federal law. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 499 (1953) (plurality opinion) (Frankfurter, J.). Because treaties are the supreme law of the
land under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, Medellin’s claim under the Vienna
Convention was a federal one cognizable on habeas review. Such review constituted a new civil
proceeding wholly separate, as a procedural matter, from Medellin’s trial and conviction in state
court. It was thus also independent of, and in addition to, Medellin’s right to appeal his state
court conviction or sentence to the U.S. Supreme Court on any alleged error of federal law. See
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000). Habeas review is a “second bite at the apple” with few analogs in other
legal systems. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
Many states, including Texas, provide state habeas procedure in the state courts, which
typically takes place between the state direct appeal and the filing of the federal habeas petition.
These state collateral review proceedings are most often of limited significance. But see infra
notes 115–17 and accompanying text (discussing a new round of state collateral proceedings now
pending in Medellin).
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argument in the Texas trial court, the district court held, it was barred
96
by the doctrine of “procedural default.”
The procedural default doctrine holds that a habeas petitioner
must first present his federal law argument to the state courts in
compliance with state procedural rules. Failure to do so will bar any
attempt to present that argument to the federal courts on collateral
97
review. A petitioner may evade this bar only by showing “cause”
and “prejudice” for the default—that is, by stating a good reason for
98
not presenting the federal claim to the state courts, and by showing
that the federal error worked to the petitioner’s “actual and
substantial disadvantage.”99 Medellin seems not to have pressed any
argument for cause and prejudice under domestic law.
While Medellin’s federal habeas appeal was pending in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the International Court of
Justice rendered its holding in the Avena case. That decision
concerned 54 Mexican nationals—of whom Medellin was one—held
on death rows in various American states. Mexico asserted that each
of these persons had been denied their rights of consular notification
or consultation under the Vienna Convention, and that they were
therefore entitled to “restitutio in integrum”—that is, to a new trial
and exclusion of any evidence obtained by interrogation prior to
100
consultation with the consulate. With respect to the overwhelming
majority of the prisoners—again including Medellin—the ICJ agreed
that the U.S. had violated the relevant treaty requirements and
ordered that the U.S. provide “review and reconsideration” of each

96. See Medellin, 371 F.3d at 279 (describing the district court’s unpublished ruling).
97. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84–85 (1977) (discussing the rule in the
context of admissibility of inculpatory statements). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 15.5.2, at 905–21 (4th ed. 2003).
98. The Supreme Court has interpreted “cause” narrowly. In general, a habeas petitioner
may establish cause by showing (1) that he is relying on a “novel” constitutional claim, see, e.g.,
Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 12–16 (1984); but see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315–16 (1989)
(holding that habeas petitioners may not generally rely on “new” rules of constitutional law), (2)
that his lawyer’s failure to raise the federal issue in state court amounted to ineffective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488
(1986), or (3) that the State created an “external impediment” to the presentation of the
petitioner’s claim, see Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988).
99. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). A state court procedural default can
also be excused in certain circumstances where the petitioner makes a strong showing of “actual
innocence” of the underlying offence. E.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992); Schlup v.
Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
100. Avena, supra note 84, ¶ 13. “Restitutio in integrum” means, literally, “restoration to
original condition.” WIKIPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Restitutio_in_integrum.
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101
prisoner’s conviction and sentence in the domestic courts. The ICJ
also made clear that, in its view, application of procedural default
rules to bar the Mexican prisoners’ claims would violate the
Convention’s requirement that domestic law “must enable full effect
to be given” to consular rights.102
One state governor, in Oklahoma, responded to Avena by
commuting the capital sentence of a Mexican national to life
103
imprisonment. Texas, however, continued to contest Medellin’s
entitlement to relief. The Fifth Circuit rejected Medellin’s argument
that Avena required it to disregard his procedural default and
reconsider his conviction and sentence in light of the treaty
104
violation. The court relied on a prior Supreme Court decision,
Breard v. Greene,105 which had held a similar Vienna Convention

101. Avena, supra note 84, ¶¶ 106, 133–134, 139–141. The ICJ rejected Mexico’s argument
that restitutio in integrum was required, directing American courts to instead consider whether
the prisoners were actually prejudiced by the treaty violations. See id. ¶¶ 120–125. On the other
hand, the ICJ also rejected the U.S.’s suggestion that adequate “review and reconsideration”
could be provided through executive clemency proceedings. See id. ¶¶ 142–143.
102. Id. ¶¶ 108–113, 134 (citing Art. 36, ¶ 2 of the Convention). On this point, the ICJ relied
on its earlier rejection of procedural default rules in the LaGrand case. (F.R.G. v. U.S.) 2001
I.C.J. 466, 514–517 (June 27), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm.
103. See Press Release, Gov. Henry Grants Clemency to Death Row Inmate Torres, May 13,
2004, at http://www.governor.state.ok.us/display_article.php?article_id=301&article_type=1. Mr.
Torres’s case for clemency was a relatively strong one, because he was not the “trigger man” in
the murder for which he was sentenced to die. See id. The Governor’s action came on the same
day that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals issued a stay of Torres’ execution, also in
light of the Avena ruling. See id.
104. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279–80 (5th Cir. 2004).
105. 523 U.S. 371 (1998). Angel Breard was convicted of capital murder in Virginia state
court, notwithstanding state authorities’ failure to notify him of his rights under the Vienna
Convention. As in Medellin, Breard failed to present his treaty argument to the state trial court,
and his federal habeas petition was accordingly barred by procedural default. Paraguay sued the
U.S. in the ICJ, which issued a “provisional measures” order requiring the U.S. to stay Breard’s
execution pending a final ruling by the ICJ on the merits. See Case Concerning the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9). The Supreme Court,
however, accepted the Clinton Administration’s position that such orders were not binding and
that the president lacked power to compel Virginia to stay the execution. See id. at 378.
Although Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote a letter to Virginia Governor James
Gilmore requesting that he postpone the execution in the interests of comity, see Letter from
Madeleine K. Albright to James S. Gilmore III (Apr. 13, 1998), attached as Appendix F to Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (Nos. 97–1390,
97–8214), Gilmore declined that request. Breard died by lethal injection on April 14, 1998. See
Paraguayan
National
Executed
After
Appeals
Fail,
(Apr.
15,
1998),
at
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9804/15/paraguay.execution.on/. Much of the literature
on consular convention claims and the domestic effect of ICJ judgments addresses this earlier
litigation. For an introduction, see Agora: Breard, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 666 (1998).
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claim barred by procedural default. As an alternate ground, the court
also relied on circuit precedent holding that the Convention “does not
106
create an individually enforceable right.” The Fifth Circuit panel
noted that the ICJ had held to the contrary in the LaGrand case, but
107
found itself bound by prior precedent.
The Supreme Court granted Medellin’s ensuing petition for
certiorari in order to consider “[f]irst, whether a federal court is
bound by the International Court of Justice’s [Avena] ruling . . . and
second, whether a federal court should give effect, as a matter of
judicial comity and uniform treaty interpretation, to the ICJ’s
108
judgment.” It thus seemed likely that the Court would issue an
important decision on some of the basic interjurisdictional questions
109
that it had largely avoided in Breard.
In February of 2005, however, President Bush issued a
memorandum stating that
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as
President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, that the United States will discharge its international
obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice
in the [Avena case] by having State courts give effect to the decision
in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the
110
51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.

Although the memorandum avoided mandatory language, the United
States’ accompanying brief to the Supreme Court characterized the
memo as a “binding federal rule” and stated that state procedural

106. 371 F.3d at 280 (citing United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir.
2001)).
107. Id.
108. Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005) (citing the original grant at 125 S. Ct. 686
(2004)).
109. The key difference between the cases was that, in Breard, there was only a provisional
order from the ICJ; in Medellin, the ICJ had issued a final judgment. See Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at
2106 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting the potential importance of this difference). Breard also
raised yet another interjurisdictional question because it involved not only a habeas petition by
the prisoner but also a separate federal civil action by Paraguay against the Commonwealth of
Virginia. See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff’d, 134
F.3d 622, 627 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied per curiam, 521 U.S. 371, 378 (1998); Carlos Manuel
Vazquez, Night and Day: Coeur d’Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of the ProspectiveRetrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1, 8–22 (1998).
110. George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General, Feb. 28, 2005, attached as
Appendix 2 to Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent in No. 045928, Medellin v. Dretke (Feb. 2005).
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default rules “must give way,” under the Supremacy Clause, to the
111
required reconsideration of the Mexican prisoners’ claims. The
Administration paired its effort to mandate compliance with the
Avena ruling with an announcement that the U.S. was withdrawing
from the Optional Protocol consenting to ICJ jurisdiction in Vienna
Convention cases.112 The Avena story thus bears out the prediction
that aggressive interference by supranational bodies with domestic
institutional arrangements risks a domestic backlash against
international law and institutions.113
In light of the President’s order, a divided Supreme Court
dismissed the writ of certiorari in Medellin as improvidently granted
in a per curiam opinion.114 The action has now shifted to the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, where Medellin has filed a new
application for a writ of habeas corpus under state law.115 Although
state procedural default rules probably still bar Medellin’s petition, he
has argued that both the ICJ’s order, of its own force, and the
President’s memorandum override those rules.116 The State of Texas,
on the other hand, has argued that the ICJ’s order lacks direct effect
and that the President lacks constitutional power to mandate
compliance by the state courts, absent some valid act of Congress
117
delegating such power. If the Texas court rules against Medellin, the

111. Brief for the United States, supra note 110, at 42, 43.
112. See id. (noting that “[i]n a two-paragraph letter dated March 7, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice informed U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan that the United States ‘hereby
withdraws’ from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations”).
113. See, e.g., Defensible Diplomacy, WASH. POST, March 16, 2005, at A22 (approving the
President’s decision “not to continue to submit to the jurisdiction of an international court with
so little regard for U.S. constitutional norms and procedures”).
114. 125 S. Ct. at 2092. For an account of the Court’s action, see The Supreme Court, 2004
Term—Leading Cases, 119 HARV. L. REV. 169, 327 (2005).
115. See Order on Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus in No. AP-75,207, June 22, 2005
(on file with author).
116. Brief of Applicant Jose Ernesto Medellin on Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
No. AP-75,207 (July 29, 2005), available at http://www.debevoise.com/publications/pdf/
MeritsBriefofPetitionerJoseErnestoMedellin.pdf.
117. See State’s Brief in Response, in Ex parte Jose Ernesto Medellin, No. AP-75,207, Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals (filed Aug. 31, 2005), at 21–30, 39–41. In the interest of full
disclosure, I note that I have filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of several interested state
governments arguing that the President’s Memorandum does not actually order state courts to
do anything, and that if it did, it would be unconstitutional. See Brief of the States of Alabama,
Montana, Nevada, and New Mexico as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Ex Parte Jose
Ernesto Medellin, No. AP-75,207, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (filed Aug. 31, 2005),
available at http://www.debevoise.com/publications/pdf/CCA%20State%20Amicus.PDF.
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case will likely return to the Supreme Court for decision of the issues
118
that were avoided the first time around.
B. NAFTA Chapter Eleven and the Loewen and Mondev Cases
My second example is really two cases, both decided by
119
international arbitration panels under Chapter 11 of NAFTA. That
chapter protects a broad class of “investments” in several distinct
ways. Article 1102 imposes a “national treatment” obligation; it
requires that each party, as well as states or provinces of a party,
“accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than
that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors . . . .”120
Article 1105, on the other hand, sets out a nonrelative, “minimum
standard of treatment,” requiring that each party treat the others’
investors “in accordance with international law, including fair and
121
equitable treatment and full protection and security.” Finally,
Article 1110 generally prohibits nationalization or “expropriation” of
investments.122 Chapter 11 is unusual among major trade treaties in
that it provides a private right of action for investors against signatory
governments, rather than requiring would-be plaintiffs to persuade
their home countries to espouse their claims in a more traditional
123
state vs. state action. Not surprisingly, this decoupling of Chapter 11
enforcement from the political discretion of the signatory states
themselves has given rise to considerable litigation and controversy.124

118. It is possible that the State court will reject Medellin’s petition on the ground that he
was not prejudiced by the Consular Convention violation, without passing on the binding effect
of the Avena judgment or the President’s memorandum. That resolution might raise difficult
interjurisdictional problems of its own, concerning the proper standard for prejudice under the
Convention, that the Supreme Court would still need to resolve. See The Supreme Court, 2004
Term, supra note 114.
119. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 107 Stat. 2057,
32 I.L.M. 289, 605.
120. Id. art. 1102(1); see also id. art. 1102(3) (imposing this obligation on states and
provinces).
121. Id. art. 1105.
122. Id. art. 1110. Specifically, Article 1110 permits “taking” an investment only if the taking
is “(a) for a public purpose; (b) on a nondiscriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process
of law and the general principles of treatment provided in Article 1105(1); and (d) upon
payment of compensation [as set out in the treaty].” Id. art. 1110(1). See also arts. 1103 (most
favored nation treatment), 1106 (performance requirements), and 1109 (capital transfers).
123. The WTO agreement, for instance, retains the traditional requirement that only states
may initiate litigation. See Lerner, supra note 27, at 289.
124. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2056–57. The provision for individual rights of action
tends to make interjurisdictional problems more urgent. See supra text accompanying notes 33–
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The Chapter 11 cases both involve what is, functionally speaking,
appellate review of domestic state court decisions by arbitral panels
125
Mondev126 concerned an urban
constituted under NAFTA.
redevelopment scheme gone bad in Boston’s infamous “Combat
Zone.” Mondev International, a Canadian corporation, entered into a
complicated agreement with the City of Boston and the Boston
Redevelopment Authority to build a shopping mall, parking garage,
and hotel in the area; the deal eventually foundered, however, on
disagreement over the price for a parcel of land that the City was to
transfer to Mondev as part of the project. Mondev sued the City and
the Authority for breach of contract and also for tortious interference
with Mondev’s contractual relations with Campeau Massachusetts,
Inc., another Canadian developer to whom Mondev had eventually
leased its rights. Although Mondev prevailed on both counts before a
jury in state court, the trial judge entered judgment notwithstanding
the verdict on the tort claim, holding that the Authority—a public
entity—was immune from suit under the Massachusetts Tort Claims
Act. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), in an opinion
by then-Justice (now Harvard Law professor) Charles Fried, affirmed
the lower court on the immunity question and reversed on the
contract issue, holding that the City and Authority had not breached
the agreement. The SJC thus rejected both of Mondev’s claims and
entered judgment for the defendants.127
Because the events underlying Mondev’s claim occurred prior to
NAFTA’s entry into force on January 1, 1994, Mondev could not
128
have brought its initial suit as a Chapter 11 arbitration. Instead,
Mondev argued that the Massachusetts SJC’s rejection of its claims
was itself a NAFTA violation—as the NAFTA tribunal put it, “that
by the decisions of its courts, the United States effectively
expropriated the value of the rights to redress arising from the failure
34. That is not to deny, however, that the WTO and other trade agreements that impose broad
obligations on signatory governments and create supranational dispute resolution mechanisms
may raise many of the same problems. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2152 (noting that
“GATT/WTO tribunals have exhibited at least some willingness to review national courts”).
125. See NAFTA, supra note 119, arts. 1115–1138 (detailing the arbitral mechanisms for
settlement of disputes under Chapter 11).
126. Mondev, supra note 89.
127. See Lafayette Place Assocs. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 694 N.E.2d 820, 836–37
(Mass. 1998). For further background on the facts and legal arguments in Mondev, see Dana
Krueger, Note, The Combat Zone: Mondev International, Ltd. v. United States and the
Backlash Against NAFTA Chapter 11, 21 B.U. INT’L L. J. 399 (2003).
128. See Mondev, supra note 89, ¶¶ 57–58.
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129
of the project.” The tribunal accepted this theory as pleading a
“denial of justice” under Art. 1105(1)—the minimum standard of
treatment provision—of NAFTA. “Denial of justice” is a
130
longstanding but somewhat vague concept in international law. In
the NAFTA context, it implicates both “improper procedures and
unjust decisions.”131 The principle “recognizes that not only flagrant
procedural irregularities and deficiencies may justify diplomatic
complaint, but also gross defects in the substance of the judgment
itself.”132 The rationale for this principle, as Renée Lettow Lerner has
explained, is to use “the substantive injustice as indirect evidence of
133
partiality . . . in the tribunal.”
Mondev’s NAFTA claim focused on this substantive element.
The argument, in essence, was that the Massachusetts courts got the
relevant state law so wrong that they denied justice to the Canadian
investors under Art. 1105. The most important thing about the
Mondev panel’s ruling is that it accepted this basic theory of a
NAFTA violation. In so doing, however, the panel insisted that it was
not conducting appellate review of the Massachusetts SJC’s decision:

It is one thing to deal with unremedied acts of the local constabulary
and another to second-guess the reasoned decisions of the highest
courts of a State. Under NAFTA, parties have the option to seek
local remedies. If they do so and lose on the merits, it is not the
134
function of NAFTA tribunals to act as courts of appeal.

This disavowal of an appellate function did not, however, prevent the
arbitral panel from reviewing the state court’s decision on its merits.
Instead, the tribunal asserted that it would apply a more deferential
standard than an appellate court would ordinarily employ:
In the end the question is whether, at an international level and
having regard to generally accepted standards of the administration
of justice, a tribunal can conclude in the light of all the available

129.
130.

Id. ¶ 59.
See, e.g., Charles de Visscher, Le déni de justice en droit international, 52 RECUEIL DES
COURS 369, 369 (1935) (calling the doctrine “one of the oldest and one of the worst elucidated
in international law”) (quoted and translated in Lerner, supra note 27, at 248 n.89); Ahdieh,
supra note 10, at 2128–33 (surveying the development of denial of justice claims).
131. Lerner, supra note 27, at 251.
132. ALWYN V. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL
OF JUSTICE 309 (1938).
133. Lerner, supra note 27, at 262.
134. Mondev, supra note 89, ¶ 126.
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facts that the impugned decision was clearly improper and
discreditable, with the result that the investment has been subjected
135
to unfair and inequitable treatment.

The tribunal acknowledged that this was “a somewhat open-ended
standard,” but despaired of offering a “more precise formula . . . to
136
cover the range of possibilities.”
Applying this standard, the tribunal ultimately found that the
Massachusetts SJC had not breached the United States’ NAFTA
obligations. Three aspects of the tribunal’s opinion are important for
present purposes: First, as I have already noted, the tribunal accepted
the basic contention that a domestic court’s decision may be so
wrong, as a matter of domestic law, as to amount to a violation of
137
NAFTA’s Chapter 11. Second, the tribunal engaged in what most
lawyers would consider to be pretty searching review of the
Massachusetts SJC’s reasoning on the contract claim.138 Despite the
tribunal’s protestations, it is hard to see how its opinion would have
looked much different on this point if it had forthrightly admitted that
it was conducting an appellate review of the SJC’s decision. Finally,
the tribunal came perilously close to holding that the state statutory
immunity of the Redevelopment Authority—a fairly common form of
governmental immunity in the United States139—violated NAFTA’s
140
guarantee of “treatment in accordance with international law.” The
tribunal rejected that conclusion only after extensive consideration of

135. Id. ¶ 127.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. ¶¶ 129–138.
139. A number of states have abolished the common law doctrine of municipal immunity,
see, e.g., Jackson v. City of Florence, 320 So. 2d 68, 74 (Ala. 1975); Vanderpool v. State, 672 P.2d
1153, 1156–57 (Okla. 1983), but some have not, see, e.g., Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Auth.,
544 A.2d 1185, 1188–89 (Conn. 1988). One frequently sees a pattern in which state courts
acknowledge a traditional doctrine that municipalities are immune for acts taken in the
performance of all governmental functions, later abolish that doctrine, but then uphold
legislative acts providing for municipal immunity in more limited contexts or for claims above a
certain amount. See, e.g., Dickey v. City of Flagstaff, 66 P.3d 44, 47–49 (Ariz. 2003) (upholding
statute providing for immunity for recreational activities); Zimmerman ex rel. Zimmerman v.
Village of Skokie, 697 N.E.2d 699, 706–08 (Ill. 1998) (rejecting argument for exception to the
state Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act); Wilson v.
Gipson ex rel. Gipson, 753 P.2d 1349, 1351–53 (Okla. 1988) (upholding the state Political
Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, which waives municipal immunities only up to certain limits). The
immunity challenged in Mondev was one of these statutory immunities, limited only to
intentional torts.
140. Mondev, supra note 89, ¶¶ 139–156.
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European jurisprudence and other comparative sources, and it stated
that “circumstances can be envisaged where the conferral of a general
immunity from suit for conduct of a public authority affecting a
NAFTA investment could amount to a breach of Article 1105(1) of
141
NAFTA.” If a subsequent NAFTA panel were to take this next
step, such a holding would require a fairly extensive restructuring of
remedies against American public entities whenever the plaintiff is a
Canadian or Mexican investor.
142
The Loewen case likewise began life as a business tort case in
state court. The suit involved feuding funeral homes in Mississippi.
Loewen was a large Canadian concern that had undertaken to acquire
funeral homes all across North America. Its expansion into the Gulf
Coast region brought it into conflict with Jeremiah O’Keefe, Sr.,
whose family owned a much smaller group of funeral homes in the
area. The O’Keefe clan ultimately ended up suing Loewen in state
court for breach of contract, common law fraud, and violations of
Mississippi antitrust law.143
The technical term for what happened to Loewen over the
course of a seven-week trial in Mississippi state court is “home
cooking.” Although both parties tried to ingratiate themselves to the
local, largely African-American judge and jury by hiring prominent
African-American lawyers, the O’Keefes were much more effective.
Moreover, the O’Keefes’ lawyers repeatedly appealed to the jury’s
patriotism and antiforeign sentiment, contrasting Mr. O’Keefe’s
American military service with Loewen’s Canadian origins. Although
the O’Keefes had only requested $5 million in compensatory
damages, the jury awarded them $500 million, including $75 million
for emotional distress and $400 million in punitives. To make matters
worse, state law required Loewen to post a bond equal to 125 percent
of the judgment in order to stay execution pending appeal. When the
Mississippi courts refused to reduce the appeal bond, Loewen felt
forced to settle the case for $175 million.144

141. Id. ¶ 151.
142. Loewen, supra note 89.
143. See id. ¶¶ 30–38. The state proceedings are unreported. For a helpful discussion of the
Loewen litigation in both the state courts and the NAFTA tribunal, see generally William S.
Dodge, Loewen v. United States: Trials and Errors under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 52 DEPAUL
L. REV. 563 (2002). For a fascinating journalist’s account of the events and personalities
underlying the state court trial, see Jonathan Harr, The Burial, NEW YORKER, Nov. 1, 1999, at
70.
144. See Loewen, supra note 89, ¶¶ 4–7.
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Loewen then turned to NAFTA arbitration. It did not argue that
its investment in its Mississippi funeral homes had been expropriated
by state executive or legislative action; rather, it challenged the state
court proceedings as an independent NAFTA violation. Loewen
asserted that the trial court’s allowance of anti-Canadian testimony
violated Art. 1102’s prohibition of discrimination and Art. 1105’s
145
“duty of full protection and security” for foreign investors; that the
excessive verdict and the bonding requirement likewise violated Art.
1105; and that the discriminatory conduct of the trial, the excessive
verdict, and the bonding requirement amounted to an expropriation
of Loewen’s investment under Art. 1110.146 Although the challenge to
the damages verdict implicated the same substantive aspect of denial
147
of justice at issue in Mondev, most of Loewen’s claims focused on
the conduct of the trial and the bonding requirement. They thus
raised the procedural aspect of denial of justice.148 Loewen claimed
149
$725 million in damages from the United States.
The NAFTA panel, which included Judge Abner Mikva,
formerly of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, largely accepted Loewen’s arguments on the
merits. The panel found the O’Keefes’ trial strategy outrageous, and
it chastised the state trial judge for failing to put a stop to O’Keefe’s
appeals to what the tribunal saw as xenophobia and class or racial
prejudice. “Having read the transcript and having considered the
submissions of the parties with respect to the conduct of the trial,” the
panel wrote, “we have reached the firm conclusion that the conduct
of the trial by the trial judge was so flawed that it constituted a
miscarriage of justice amounting to a manifest injustice as that
150
expression is understood in international law.”

145. The failure of Loewen’s counsel to object to most of the allegedly prejudicial
arguments and testimony at trial meant that Loewen could probably not have sought appellate
review of those matters in the state courts. See Dodge, supra note 143, at 565. The Loewen case
thus raises many of the same “procedural default” issues that I discuss in connection with
Medellin. See infra notes 168–89 and accompanying text.
146. See Loewen, supra note 89, ¶¶ 39–40.
147. See Lerner, supra note 27, at 264–65.
148. See id. at 251–61.
149. See Notice of Claim, The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Oct. 30, 1998, at 67, at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB65/claim1.pdf.
150. Loewen, supra note 89, ¶ 54. It is always difficult to gauge the impact of different
arguments on a trial after the fact. Interestingly, the New Yorker account of the trial, while
extensive in its discussion of the lawyers’ strategies, does not mention the appeals to nationalism
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Ultimately, the United States avoided liability in Loewen, but on
technical grounds that seem unlikely to impede future challenges to
151
state court judgments in similar cases. Loewen’s first problem was
that it had failed to pursue available local remedies, including a
152
petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. There was also a
jurisdictional pitfall: Loewen had gone into bankruptcy, partly as a
result of the Mississippi verdict, and the entity that ultimately
emerged from bankruptcy was organized as a United States
corporation. Finding that “there must be continuous national identity
from the date of the events giving rise to the claim . . . through the
date of the resolution of the claim,” the panel found that Loewen was
no longer entitled to pursue its NAFTA remedies and accordingly
dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.153
Notwithstanding the panel’s ultimate rejection of Loewen’s
claims, the striking thing about the panel’s opinion is the extent to
which it was willing not only to second-guess a state court judgment
on state law issues but to condemn that court’s entire course of
154
proceeding as a violation of international law. As in Mondev, the
NAFTA tribunal began by insisting that it “cannot under the guise of
a NAFTA claim entertain what is in substance an appeal from a
domestic judgment.”155 But, as in Mondev, that is exactly what the
NAFTA tribunal did. The panel’s critique of the trial proceedings
occupies 43 pages in the opinion preceding the ultimate dismissal of
the claim on jurisdictional grounds, making that discussion one of the

and xenophobia that the NAFTA panel found so significant in the transcript. See Harr, supra
note 143, at 86–92.
151. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2041 (noting that the “technical and . . . perhaps
fortuitous nature” of the grounds of dismissal “offers little reason to believe that liability for
U.S. judicial conduct will not be imposed in the future”).
152. See Loewen, supra note 89, ¶ 149 (citing the “local remedies rule,” which “requires a
party complaining of a breach of international law by a State to exhaust the local remedies in
that State before the party can raise the complaint at the level of international law”). Notably,
the NAFTA panel declined to find that a cert petition was an adequate remedy—rather, it held
that Loewen had simply failed to carry its burden of presenting evidence explaining its business
decision to settle the case rather than to pursue the petition. Id. ¶¶ 207–17.
153. Id. ¶ 225, ¶ 240.
154. The panel may have felt emboldened to castigate the state courts precisely because the
panel’s ultimate resolution avoided the need to frame any relief. But the panel’s dictum now
stands available for the next case, where jurisdictional avoidance may be more difficult. This is
the sort of behavior one might fear from a “court” that is constituted for one case only, and thus
relieved of the need to live tomorrow with its rulings of today. See infra notes 277–83 and
accompanying text.
155. Loewen, supra note 89, ¶ 51.
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156
most impressive displays of dictum since Marbury v. Madison. And
while one can readily share the panel’s discomfort with some aspects
of the state court proceedings, it seems likely that losing defendants
could make similar arguments in any number of cases—provided that
they can qualify as foreign investors under NAFTA Chapter 11.
John Echeverria has described NAFTA proceedings like
Mondev and Loewen as “the biggest threat to United States judicial
independence that no one has heard of and even fewer people
157
understand.” Although the issues on the merits in such cases—and
their political valences—are quite different from cases like Medellin
and Avena, both sets of cases raise similar and fundamental questions
about the relationship between international tribunals and domestic
courts. I survey some of those questions in the next Part.

III. TAKING TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS SERIOUSLY
Cases like Medellin, Mondev, and Loewen replicate the classic
concerns of Federal Courts law at the supranational level. In
Medellin, a federal court conducted collateral review of a state court
proceeding for compliance with international law. A supranational
court then construed the relevant treaty and issued an order seeking
to impose its interpretation on the state and federal institutions
involved. In Mondev and Loewen, a supranational tribunal tried to
discern whether state courts had construed their own law in such a
way as to violate supranational treaty rights. Each case involved
multiple layers of both law and courts, and the potential for conflict
and misunderstanding between these layers is obvious.
Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler famously developed the
“Federal Courts” curriculum to deal with just these sorts of conflicts.
The heart of the course concerns the intricate web of constitutional,
statutory, and doctrinal rules needed to allow two parallel judicial
systems—state and federal—to live with one another in at least
relative harmony. Constitutional and prudential rules of justiciability,

156. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 154–167 (1803) (opining that Madison illegally refused to deliver
Marbury’s commission, and that the federal courts had power to require senior executive
officials to perform such duties, before ultimately holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the case).
157. Adam Liptak, Review of U.S. Rulings by NAFTA Tribunals Stirs Worries, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 18, 2004, at A20 (quoting Professor Echeverria); see Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and
Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2025 (2004) (characterizing NAFTA and WTO
panels as a “threat to self-government”).
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state-federal conflict of laws, the Anti-Injunction Act and abstention
doctrines, federal deference to state courts on state law questions, and
the intricate rules of federal habeas corpus are all designed to mediate
a relationship between state and federal courts that is not strictly
158
hierarchical. Both constitutional values of federalism and the
practical realities of the system—in particular, the inability of the
federal courts to handle even all cases raising questions of federal
law—mandate an emphasis on preserving both sets of courts as viable
and respected institutions.
If we are now to graft another layer of courts onto this system—
the ICJ, NAFTA and WTO panels, perhaps an International
Criminal Court (ICC)—then we will need to develop a comparable
set of tools to mediate the new set of conflicts that will surely arise.
Even a skeptic of supranational institutions cannot help but relish
that prospect; after all, the globalization of the Federal Courts field
seems likely to function as a full employment act for Federal Courts
scholars. It is important for such scholars to seize this opportunity: if
the interaction between domestic and supranational courts is left to
specialists in international law, then the field will likely develop in
ways that are relatively less concerned with maintaining the integrity
of domestic structures.
This Article does not attempt a comprehensive analysis of these
questions. I want simply to highlight some implications of the Legal
Process notion of institutional settlement in cases like Medellin,
Mondev, and Loewen. I hope to provide some concrete examples of
what a Legal Process approach to foreign affairs law might look like
and point out some directions in which a globalized Federal Courts
literature needs to go next.
A. International Law and Institutional Settlement
Institutional settlement means entrusting certain institutions to
make particular decisions and deferring to those decisions even in
situations in which other institutions might have decided the same
issue differently. That deference may have—for lack of better
terms—both substantive and procedural dimensions. The federal
habeas statute, for example, provides that a federal court may
overturn a state court’s application of law to fact only if the state

158. See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954).
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court’s ruling “involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly
159
established federal law,” and the Supreme Court has made clear
“that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an
160
This deference to the
incorrect application of federal law.”
substance of the state court’s ruling exists alongside deference to the
state court’s procedural arrangements under rules of exhaustion and
161
procedural default. These rules ensure that state courts will have the
opportunity to rule on federal issues in the first instance by providing
that federal courts will not consider grounds for habeas relief that
have not first been presented to the state courts in accord with state
procedures. The effect is to “settle” in the state courts the primary
authority to adjudicate federal defenses in state criminal prosecutions.
The most successful supranational institutions have thrived
because they have achieved the respect and deference inherent in this
notion of institutional settlement. Richard Kay has said that the
widespread acceptance of judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights “cannot be attributed to their often quite disputable
results, nor to the sometimes uneven logic of the reasons the Court
gives for them. Rather they are accepted now . . . simply because the
Court has earned acceptance as the authoritative interpreter of
binding legal rules.”162 And yet, international law—and international
lawyers—often have little patience for the sort of rules designed to
respect domestic institutional settlements. As Dean Slaughter has
acknowledged, deference to domestic institutions “is a radical
departure for most international lawyers and diplomats, who are
accustomed to operating on the international plane as something
apart from and presumably superior to the particularities and
prejudices of domestic institutions.”163
In this spirit, international lawyers have frequently reacted to
American courts’ application of the procedural default doctrine in
consular relations cases by insisting that domestic law may not excuse

159. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
160. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000); accord Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694
(2002).
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2000) (requiring exhaustion of remedies available in state
court); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977) (holding that state-court procedural default
bars federal habeas relief).
162. Richard S. Kay, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Authority of Law,
8 CONN. J. INT’L L. 217, 220 (1993).
163. SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 149–50.
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164
a violation of rights under international law. Likewise, the NAFTA
panels in Mondev and Loewen were relatively unwilling to defer to
the state courts’ construction of state law in those cases.165 And in
both the trade and human rights contexts, internationalists have
argued for loosening the formal institutional constraints on federal
lawmaking in order to facilitate the creation and enforcement of
166
international agreements. I argue in this Section that each of these
developments undermines both domestic institutional settlements and
the attempt to develop a viable system of supranational adjudication.

1. Domestic Law “Excuses” for International Law Violations.
The best support for the notion that domestic law may not “excuse”
an international law violation comes from the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. Article 27 states that “[a] party may not invoke
the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty.”167 That language might mean at least two different
things, however. Doctrines like procedural default are not
“justifications” for violations of federal law in the sense that, say, selfdefense can be a “justification” for homicide. Rather, such doctrines
simply limit the remedies available when the federal right-holder fails
to meet certain procedural requirements. The federal courts’
invocation of procedural default, in other words, was not a ruling that
Texas officials had no obligation to notify Medellin of his treaty
rights. The Treaties Convention thus may have no application at all to
such doctrines; indeed, that interpretation would be consistent with

164. See, e.g., Henry J. Richardson III, The Execution of Angel Breard by the United States:
Violating an Order of the International Court of Justice, 12 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 121, 127
(1998) (“It is basic that neither the United States, nor any other state, can plead the authority of
its internal law to mitigate its international legal obligations.”); Jordan J. Paust, Breard and
Treaty-Based Rights under the Consular Convention, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 691, 693 (1998) (calling
Breard’s holding that treaty compliance must respect domestic procedural rules “a miserly
misstatement of the law of treaties”).
165. See supra notes 138–41, 150 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Henkin, Provisional Measures, supra note 57, at 680–81 (arguing that
executive pronouncements should have the force of law in the context of Vienna Convention
cases); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303
cmt. e (1987) (“The prevailing view is that the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used
as an alternative to the treaty method in every instance.”).
167. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 27,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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the international norm that treaty implementation is governed by the
168
procedural rules of the forum state.
The Court’s critics seem to read the Treaties Convention more
broadly, however. The idea seems to be that domestic rules are
irrelevant in determining whether a signatory nation has breached its
169
obligation under international law to “comply” with the treaty.
Once the Houston police failed to tell Medellin that he could speak to
the Mexican consulate, the Consular Convention obliged the United
States to rectify this mistake. And while the U.S. could use whatever
procedural vehicles it liked to afford redress—e.g., state court
appeals, federal habeas corpus review, perhaps even a presidential
stay of execution—the only way to avoid a treaty violation was if
those vehicles in fact provided Medellin with redress. Compliance
with local procedural rules could not itself have prevented such a
violation of international law; treaty compliance is measured only by
outcomes of domestic processes.
That strikes me as an overly simplistic vision of “compliance”
with international law in the context of a complex domestic legal
system. Consular Convention obligations may fall on any of the over
one million state and local law enforcement personnel in the United
States.170 The United States cannot “guarantee” compliance by all of
those people in the way that it might “guarantee” compliance with a
more traditional form of agreement—say, to withdraw its armed

168. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (noting that “the Vienna Convention
itself . . . provides that the rights expressed in the Convention ‘shall be exercised in conformity
with the laws and regulations of the receiving State,’ provided that ‘said laws and regulations
must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
Article are intended’” (quoting Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36(2), 21 U.S.T.
at 101)).
169. See, e.g., Amnesty International, The Execution of Angel Breard: Apologies Are Not
Enough, May 1, 1998, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510271998?open&
of=ENG-392 (“[N]ational constitutional, legislative or regulatory norms cannot be invoked to
avoid or modify the fulfillment of international obligations.”); Rett R. Ludwikowski, Supreme
Law or Basic Law? The Decline of the Concept of Constitutional Supremacy, 9 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 253, 267 (2001) (“From the international community’s perspective, the
superiority of international legal order over domestic law seemed to be less questionable than
ever. The states could disregard or violate international obligations and rules but they could not
appeal to their domestic regulations to justify such conduct.”).
170. See Brian A. Reaves & Matthew J. Hickman, Census of State and Local Law
Enforcement Agencies, 2000, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Oct. 2002, at 1. The
overwhelming majority of U.S. law enforcement personnel work for state and (mostly) local
governments, rather than for national agencies. See William J. Stuntz, Terrorism, Federalism,
and Police Misconduct, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 665, 665 (2002).
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forces from a particular territory or to destroy a certain number of
nuclear missiles. Before the ICJ, the United States asserted a quite
modest version of “compliance,” noting programs to educate state
171
and local law enforcement on the Consular Convention. Mexico and
other nations have instead argued that the Convention creates rights
enforceable by foreign nationals in the U.S. courts.172 But even the
latter view does not necessarily—and cannot practically—entail a
right to a new trial every time the Convention is violated. Even if the
Convention creates enforceable individual rights, it is quite another
thing to say that those rights must prevail even where they are not
asserted in the way required by domestic legal processes.
Two examples may help illustrate the point. Consider what
would have happened to Mr. Medellin in a much simpler procedural
system without collateral review for criminal convictions. Medellin
completed his direct appeals in the Texas courts without mentioning
his Consular Convention claim. In most court systems, that would be
the end of the matter; courts generally only respond to defenses that
are argued to them, and final judgments generally remain final. The
procedural default doctrine arises because American judicial
arrangements provide—somewhat unusually—for multiple layers of
collateral review that supervise enforcement of federal criminal
173
Is the claim that all countries are required, under
rights.
international law, to have collateral review procedures, or at least
some means of reopening a case after final judgment, whenever
someone later discovers a possible treaty violation?
That may, in fact, be the argument. If it is, though, then
international lawyers should be clear that they are asking not only for
the basic treaty obligation of notification, but also for a procedural
restructuring of many countries’ judicial systems. American-style
habeas review is hardly a universal practice, and legal systems vary in
the extent to which they will reopen criminal judgments to take
174
account of new arguments. If such proceedings are not required,

171. Counter-Memorial of the United States (Mex. v. U.S.), (Nov. 3, 2003), at http:www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imuspleadings/imus_20031103_c-mem_06.pdf.
172. See, e.g., Avena, supra note 84, ¶ 126 (noting Mexico’s argument for an “exclusionary
rule” barring use at trial of statements made by foreigners prior to consular notification).
173. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533–34 (1953) (noting that habeas corpus is an
exception to ordinary rules of res judicata).
174. While many legal systems permit some sort of postconviction review or collateral
attack, most of these procedures seem considerably more limited than the American habeas
corpus regime. Several permit relief only under a “miscarriage of justice” standard. See Kent W.
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however, then it is hard to see why the United States should be
faulted for failing to be more generous in its treatment of Medellin’s
claims on collateral review when it had no obligation to provide
collateral review in the first place. In any event, the extra complexity
of procedures for collateral attack or reopening of judgments imposes
significant costs on a judicial system, in terms of both inefficiency and
interjurisdictional conflict. Institutional settlements like the
procedural default doctrine are designed to mitigate those costs while
maintaining some of the advantages of a second bite at the apple, and
people who wish to take that second bite—like Medellin—should
have to follow the ordinary rules governing the procedure.175
A second illustration would compare Medellin’s case to that of
someone with an analogous claim under domestic law. Consider a
habeas petitioner who claims that his murder confession has been
beaten out of him by the police. That petitioner would state an
extremely serious claim under the Fifth Amendment, and yet, if he
fails to object when his confession is introduced against him at his
state court trial, then he will have procedurally defaulted the claim; as
a result, he will be foreclosed from raising it on federal habeas review.
Our Fifth Amendment claimant is, in other words, in exactly the same

Roach, Canada, in CRAIG W. BRADLEY, ED., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY
53, 78 (1999) (describing Canada’s system for postconviction review by the Minister of Justice);
Eliahu Harnon & Alex Stein, Israel, in BRADLEY, supra, at 217, 236 (discussing Israeli petitions
for a new trial). Others seem to allow relief only for errors that go to the actual innocence of the
defendant, which a Consular Convention claim would not. See Richard S. Frase, France, in
BRADLEY, supra, at 143, 184–85 (describing petitions in the Court of Cassation based on
“certain post-trial events or newly discovered evidence”); Rachel VanCleave, Italy, in
BRADLEY, supra, at 245, 281–82 (describing “requests for revision” available “only when there
is new evidence which . . . demonstrates that the convicted person must be absolved, or the
conviction was based on false or fabricated evidence”); Richard Volger, Spain, in BRADLEY,
supra, at 361, 393 (describing “revision” proceedings available “[i]n the event that new evidence
is discovered casting doubt on the conviction”); see also German Criminal Procedure Code, §
359 StPO (Federal Ministry of Justice trans.), at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/
StPO.htm#359 (last visited January 26, 2005) (permitting relief only for errors going to guilt or
for violation of the European Convention on Human Rights). Some systems have regimes that
permit habeas review in principle but make it a “dead letter” in practice. Daniel H. Foote, “The
Door That Never Opens?”: Capital Punishment and Postconviction Review of Death Sentences in
the United States and Japan, 19 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 367, 416 (1993) (describing the Japanese
system).
175. Likewise, where the Supreme Court has forced reopening of criminal convictions based
on new evidence, it has adopted a standard of review very deferential to the judgment. See
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (suggesting that federal habeas relief would be
available where the petitioner could show new evidence indicating his innocence and the state
provided no avenue for the claim, but that the threshold for such claims would be
“extraordinarily high”).
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176
procedural boat as Mr. Medellin. The debate over Consular
Convention claims often overlooks that they are treated precisely the
same in our system as claims by U.S. nationals raised under our
fundamental law.
What I am suggesting would be something like “national
treatment” for treaty rights—that is, a treaty signatory must afford
equivalent procedural protections and remedies for rights asserted
under a treaty as it does for similar rights protected under domestic
law. In many areas, the fundamental aspiration of international law
has been to be incorporated directly into domestic legal systems.
Debate currently rages, for example, over whether customary
177
international norms have direct effect in American courts, and
similar disputes have arisen about the self-executing effect of
treaties.178 It is more than a little odd in the Consular Convention
context, then, to hear international lawyers argue that treaty norms
should not be treated similarly to other well-established norms of
federal law.
This gets back to what we should take to be a violation of a treaty
norm. I want to distinguish between whether the Houston police
“violated” the Convention and whether the United States can be said
to be “in violation” of the treaty on the international plane. There is
little question that the first sort of violation occurred, but did the
second? Suppose, for example, that the United States conceded that
the Consular Convention creates rights enforceable by private
individuals and provided that those rights should be treated by
domestic courts in exactly the same manner that those courts would

176. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (observing that “although treaties are
recognized by our Constitution as the supreme law of the land, that status is no less true of
provisions of the Constitution itself, to which rules of procedural default apply”).
177. Compare, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 817 (1997)
(arguing that customary international law is not directly effective as federal law and may not be
applied by courts without legislative authorization), with Harold Hongju Koh, Is International
Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1827 (1998) (defending the conventional
wisdom among American international lawyers that customary international law is federal law).
For my own entry, see Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International
Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 369 (2002) [hereinafter Young, Customary International Law]
(arguing that customary law is not federal law but that courts may sometimes give it effect even
without specific legislative authorization).
178. Compare, e.g., John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-SelfExecution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1961 (1999) (arguing
against self-execution), with Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
2154, 2154–55 (1999) (arguing for self-execution).
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treat violations of the Fifth Amendment or other basic constitutional
179
rights. Does it make sense to require more than that?
In answering this question, it may help to distinguish between
two different goals in crafting remedies for violations of treaty rights.
Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer—Federal Courts scholars writing
in the Legal Process tradition—have distinguished between Marbury
180
v. Madison’s principle of an individual remedy for every right and
“[a]nother principle, whose focus is more structural, [that] demands a
system of constitutional remedies adequate to keep government
generally within the bounds of law.”181 The former principle demands
justice in each individual case, but it is often compromised by
sovereign immunity, jurisdictional limits, and the like. The latter
principle “is more unyielding in its own terms, but can tolerate the
denial of particular remedies, and sometimes of individual redress.”182
One way to approach treaty obligations like the Consular Convention
might be to say that although the Houston police “violated” Mr.
Medellin’s treaty right, the U.S. is not “in violation” of the treaty so
long as it provides a general system of remedies that is adequate to
ensure reasonable compliance with international law. One might then
sketch a division of labor between national and supranational courts,
such that national courts would be responsible for providing remedies
in individual cases, while the ICJ would determine the structural
adequacy of the remedial system provided by national law.
Providing “national treatment” for treaty rights will not always
satisfy this structural standard. A totalitarian regime might sign on to
the Consular Convention, then forbid any claims under it in the
regime’s own courts on the ground that those courts respect no rights
under domestic law, either. Under my proposed division of labor,
these sorts of structural inadequacies would remain a proper concern
for supranational courts. And, in fact, the problem in cases like Avena

179. In fact, I wonder if the Constitution would permit more than that. If the Consular
Convention were treated as a “super right” not subject to procedural default on habeas review, I
would think that the American citizen in the cell next door to Medellin’s on Texas’s death row,
who might well have had a federal constitutional claim that failed on procedural default
grounds, would have a very interesting equal protection claim.
180. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The government of the United States has been
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this
high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”).
181. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1778–79 (1991).
182. Id. at 1779.
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may lie not with the requirement that persons raising treaty rights
comply with local procedural rules, but rather with the specific
procedural rules in question. The procedural default doctrine has
183
and many
gone through different iterations over the years,
American scholars believe that current law on the subject is fairly
harsh.184 That judgment seems implicit in the ICJ’s ruling in Avena
that the default doctrine prevents U.S. courts from giving full effect to
185
the Consular Convention; after all, it was the very nature of the
treaty violation by local authorities that the breach deprived the
foreign defendants of information about their legal options, so that
those defendants may not have been aware of their rights.
One may or may not find the ICJ’s analysis of procedural default
186
persuasive. For present purposes, I want to make three broader
points. The first is that once we acknowledge any notion of
procedural default—that is, the strict version applied by the Fifth
Circuit in Medellin or a more liberalized one—at the international
level, we have considerably undercut the broad principle that
domestic rules are irrelevant in determining whether a signatory
nation has breached its obligation to “comply” with the treaty.
Although the ICJ’s discussion suggests an intention to police the basic
adequacy of domestic remedies, it nonetheless also seems to
acknowledge that domestic rules are critical in the following way: a
treaty “violation” in the basic sense (Texas’s failure to read Medellin
his consular rights) may nonetheless not lead to a “violation” in the
broader sense (that the U.S. would be out of compliance with the
Convention) if the treaty right-holder fails to comply with domestic

183. Compare, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 487 (1953) (“A failure to use a state’s
available remedy, in the absence of some interference or incapacity . . . bars federal habeas
corpus.”), with Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504
U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (excusing state court procedural defaults absent a showing that the petitioner
“deliberately bypassed” state court procedures), with Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90–91
(1977) (state court procedural default bars habeas review absent a showing of “cause” and
“prejudice” for the default). See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal
Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128 (1986).
184. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1652 (2003)
(complaining of “the extraordinarily harsh doctrinal framework of habeas ‘procedural
default’”). I take no position here on whether the current rules for overcoming such defaults are
unfair; the important point is simply that some doctrine of procedural default is essential to a
viable dual system.
185. See Avena, supra note 84, ¶ 113.
186. One may legitimately ask whether ICJ judges—most of whom have been trained in
unitary legal systems lacking collateral review—have any particular expertise on the question.
Certainly their conclusory pronouncements do not display any serious analysis of the issue.
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procedural and remedial rules. Acknowledging that principle, in
itself, would be an important step.
The second point is that the need for a procedural default
doctrine arises chiefly from the effect that not having one has on the
judicial system being reviewed. The Supreme Court has observed that
liberal default rules for federal habeas review undermine the finality
of state court judgments and encourage state courts to disregard their
187
own procedural rules in the first instance. After all, if a state court
knows that the federal courts will review a defendant’s claim on
collateral attack notwithstanding a procedural waiver in state court,
the state tribunal has a strong incentive to go ahead and hear the
claim; otherwise, its resolution of the other issues in the case may
become irrelevant. Collateral review by the ICJ of both state and
federal courts in cases like Medellin seems likely to have similar
effects. In fact, the mechanism is considerably simpler: the ICJ’s
Avena decision simply ordered the U.S. courts to ignore the violations
of state procedural rules in Consular Convention cases.188 If the U.S.
courts comply, they may face pressure to “level the playing field” by
ignoring procedural defaults in cases involving American nationals
with wholly domestic claims.
Finally, there is the question whether the procedural default
rules and similar principles governing review of domestic courts by
international tribunals should themselves be established as a matter
of international or domestic law. I focus on this question at greater
length in Section C, but the argument can be stated briefly here:
doctrines like procedural default are calibrated to an assessment of
the relative institutional competences of the reviewing and reviewed
courts. Hence, debates about the scope of federal habeas corpus
review of state court criminal convictions have been centrally
concerned with the issue of “parity” between state and federal courts:
to what extent do we trust state courts to be the front-line enforcers
of certain federal rights?189 Consular Convention claims confront a
similar question of parity: to the extent that we trust domestic courts
187. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747–51 (1991); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107, 126–29 (1982); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
188. Likewise, the Justice Department interpreted the President’s memorandum as ordering
the state courts to ignore their own procedural rules and grant new hearings. See supra note 111.
189. Many forests have perished over parity. For a sampling of the debate, see HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 322–26; Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1105 (1977); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and
State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983).
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as generally competent and fair institutions, we will be willing to
establish rules of review that are generally deferential. If we don’t
trust domestic courts in this way—as the ICJ apparently did not trust
the American courts—then we will be inclined to disregard domestic
procedures and the like. My point, however, is that our trust level
may well vary from one domestic legal system to another. If so, then it
will be hard to establish the rules of deference as a matter of uniform
international law. While some sort of international law floor may be
desirable, most doctrines governing the relationship between
domestic and international tribunals will likely have to be worked out
as part of the foreign affairs law of individual nations.
The view that internal law and structures are irrelevant to the
application of international law seems rooted in the fiction that states
190
are monolithic entities. One need not go all the way with Dean
Slaughter’s notion of “disaggregated” sovereignty—that is, the notion
that “individual national government institutions could become
bearers of the rights and responsibilities of sovereignty in the global
191
arena” —to think that international law must increasingly take
account of internal domestic structures. After all, it is precisely the
operation of those internal institutions agreements like the Consular
Convention regulate. As I have already suggested, the U.S.’s recent
decision to withdraw consent to ICJ jurisdiction in Consular
Convention cases after Avena demonstrates that, if supranational
institutions show no inclination to respect domestic institutional
settlements, domestic actors are likely to reciprocate.
2. Second-Guessing Domestic Courts on Domestic Law.
Mondev and Loewen raise a different problem. Domestic law is not
irrelevant to the international law issue in those cases—indeed, it is
the alleged misconstruction of domestic law or the procedural
inadequacies of domestic proceedings that is the basis of the treaty
violation. The whole notion of denial-of-justice claims in these sorts
of cases is that the complaining party has been denied—presumably
because it is a foreigner—rights that are substantively provided by
domestic law. In Mondev and Loewen, that meant that the state

190. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 13 (insisting that this fiction entails the “willful
adoption of analytical blinders”).
191. See id. at 34; see also Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs)
Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L. J. 649, 652–53 (2002) (arguing that “exclusion of state governments
from foreign relations activity . . . should be reexamined in globalization’s wake”).
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courts were alleged to have erred so badly in the application of state
law as to trigger the treaty’s protections.
For present purposes, I want to focus on the substantive aspects
of the denial-of-justice claims. We have no precise analogue to such
claims in American law, but we do have a principle that state courts
may not manipulate state law so as to “deny” a federal right. The
issue arises in a wide variety of situations in which vindication of a
federal right may depend, at least in part, on how a state court
answers a question of state law. The question then arises to what
extent the U.S. Supreme Court—which is supreme only on federal
questions and generally lacks power to authoritatively interpret state
192
law —may second-guess a state court’s construction of the state-law
predicate to a federal claim.193
194
A leading early example is Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee,
which involved federal rights under the treaties that ended the
Revolutionary War. Land belonging to Denny Martin Fairfax, a
British subject, was seized during the war by the State of Virginia and
ultimately granted to Hunter. The treaties ending the war provided
that seizures before a certain date would be honored but that seizures
after the effective date would not. Fairfax’s right to the land, a federal
right under the treaty, thus depended on the effective date of the
seizure, a question of state law.195 Although the decision of a state’s
highest court is ordinarily conclusive on state law questions, there was
some reason to fear that the Virginia Court of Appeals was hostile to
the federal peace treaties and might manipulate the state law question
196
to avoid vindicating federal treaty rights. In this sort of situation, the
Hart & Wechsler authors argue, “some review of the basis for the
state court’s determination of the state-law question is essential if the
federal right is to be protected against evasion and discrimination.”197
192. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
193. For two recent treatments, see Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State
Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919 (2003);
Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-Court State-Law
Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2002).
194. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813).
195. See id. at 617–20.
196. See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 39 (4th ed. 2005)
(noting that the Virginia Court of Appeals “was headed by Spencer Roane, an ardent states’
righter and bitter foe of [John] Marshall”).
197. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 493; see also Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and Logistics of Direct Review, 34
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1054 (1977) (“[T]he state court does not speak the final word on
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Hence, in Fairfax’s Devisee, the Supreme Court reviewed—and
reversed—the Virginia Court of Appeals’ determination, as a matter
of state law, that title to the land had vested in Virginia prior to the
198
treaties’ effective date.
Similar problems have arisen in more recent cases. Under the
Contracts Clause, for instance, a state legislature may not “impair[]
199
the Obligation of Contracts”; whether a contract exists at all,
however, is generally a question of state law. The Court has thus
occasionally reviewed a state court’s decision that no contract existed
in order to ensure that federal law rights under the Contracts Clause
are not evaded.200 Similarly, a claim that the State has deprived
someone of liberty or property without due process of law in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, or taken their property without just
compensation, depends on liberty and property interests typically
201
created and defined by state law, and the Court could review state
court determinations of such interests. Most recently, the
controversial decision in Bush v. Gore202 involved a claim that the
Florida courts had altered state election law in a way forbidden by
Article II of the Federal Constitution, which provides that rules for
choosing presidential electors must be made by the state legislature.203

the state question” where the “existence, application or implementation of a federal right turns
on the resolution of a logically antecedent issue of state law.”).
198. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 627–28. The Virginia Court of Appeals then defied that ruling,
arguing that the statutory provision giving the U.S. Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over
state court rulings was unconstitutional. That dispute was resolved by the Court’s well-known
ruling in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 362 (1816). Justice Story’s opinion in
Martin defended the Court’s earlier review of the Virginia land title issue in Fairfax’s Devisee.
See id. at 358 (“From the very necessity of the case, there must be a preliminary inquiry into the
existence and structure of the title.”); see also Smith v. Maryland, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 286, 305
(1810) (defending the Court’s independent review of state law in another treaty case on the
ground that “[t]he construction of [state] laws . . . is only a step in the cause leading to the
construction and meaning of this article of the treaty”).
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
200. See Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938):
[I]n order that the constitutional mandate may not become a dead letter, we are
bound to decide for ourselves whether a contract was made, what are its terms and
conditions, and whether the State has, by later legislation, impaired it obligation. This
involves an appraisal of the statutes of the State and the decisions of its courts.
See generally Monaghan, supra note 193, at 1976–83.
201. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031–32 (1992) (takings); Bd. of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 567 (1972) (due process); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602
n.7 (1972) (same).
202. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
203. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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The concurring justices who relied on this ground thus had to
consider whether the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of state
election law had departed so greatly from the “correct” interpretation
of those statutory rules as to amount to forbidden judicial
204
lawmaking.
This sort of review is quite controversial. When the U.S.
Supreme Court reverses a state court on state law grounds, it
threatens the supremacy of state courts over state law. That principle,
most clearly established in the Reconstruction-era case of Murdock v.
205
Memphis, is one of the pillars of our federalism. Martha Field has
explained that if the federal Supreme Court were allowed to
substitute its own view of state law for that of the highest state court,
“it would not be possible to identify any body of law as ‘state law.’ It
is thus because of Murdock that the whole concept of state law as
distinct from federal law is a meaningful one.”206
The trick, then, is to allow enough federal oversight to foreclose
hostile state courts from manipulating state law to thwart federal
rights, but not so much federal second-guessing as to eliminate state
court supremacy over state law. The Supreme Court has walked this
line by according substantial deference to state court interpretations
of state law, even when the state law question is antecedent to a
federal right. Hence the Court said in Indiana ex rel. Anderson v.
Brand that “we accord respectful consideration and great weight to
204. See 531 U.S. at 112–20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also Monaghan, supra note
193, at 1928–34 (framing the review of state law issue in Bush v. Gore). For additional cases
reviewing state-court determinations of state law, see Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347,
354 (1964) (reviewing a state court’s determination that, contrary to state precedent, a state
trespass law applied to black sit-in demonstrators); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 466–67 (1958) (reviewing the Alabama Supreme Court on a point of state appellate
procedure, in a case involving a contempt judgment entered against the NAACP for civil rights
activities). Both Bouie and Patterson are surely best explained by the Court’s warranted
skepticism that state courts in the South during the Civil Rights Movement would give a fair
hearing to black protesters.
205. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). Murdock interpreted the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional
statute generally to permit review only of federal issues in cases on direct appeal from the state
supreme courts, leaving the state issues as settled by the state courts’ opinions. The Court
offered this interpretation in part to avoid the constitutional question that would have been
presented by a statutory attempt to extend the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction to cover
all state law issues in a case. Id. at 633. Whether Murdock is a statutory or constitutional
principle, however, it has become “such a fundamental part of our way of thinking about the
boundary between state and federal power that many of our suppositions, constitutional and
otherwise, are built upon it.” Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common
Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883, 920 (1986).
206. Field, supra note 205, at 922.
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207
the views of the State’s highest court” on state law questions. One
leading case described the Court’s inquiry as limited to determining
whether the state court’s construction of state law had “fair support”:

Even though the constitutional protection invoked be denied on
non-federal grounds, it is the province of this Court to inquire
whether the decision of the state court rests upon a fair or
substantial basis . . . But if there is no evasion of the constitutional
issue, and the nonfederal ground of decision has fair support, . . . this
Court will not inquire whether the rule applied by the state court is
right or wrong, or substitute its own view of what should be deemed
208
the better rule, for that of the state court.

This “fair support” standard has been challenged, and it seems likely
that the precise level of deference may vary depending on the
situation and the nature of the underlying federal right at issue.209 But

207. 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938).
208. Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944) (quoting Broad River
Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930)).
209. Henry Monaghan has argued that “the fair support rule should be viewed as a rule of
practice only,” and that “the Court possesses ancillary jurisdiction independently to determine
the content of state law whenever the Federal Constitution directly constrains its operation or
incorporates it.” Monaghan, supra note 193, at 1964. Although Professor Monaghan has found
instances of such independent review, the predominant weight of case law seems to
acknowledge some obligation of deference. Monaghan’s argument is particularly inapplicable to
denial-of-justice claims under international law for several reasons. First, Monaghan discusses a
relatively narrow class of situations in which some specific norm of federal constitutional law
implicates or incorporates a state law question. A less deferential standard might be tolerable in
this limited range of cases, but denial of justice applies to any application of state law, so long as
a foreigner is involved. Second, one important argument for Monaghan’s position is that
independent review of state law questions would avoid the need for the U.S. Supreme Court to
attribute “bad faith” or “intellectual incompetence” to state judges in order to reverse them;
instead, the Court could simply invoke honest disagreement on the merits. See id. at 1965. But
the denial-of-justice principle always requires the imputation of bad faith, with an additional
patina of xenophobia thrown in for good measure. Third, in the context of supranational review
of the decisions of state courts or the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court itself stands
available as an alternate forum to review the application of state law to foreigners. To the extent
that current jurisdictional arrangements foreclose such review, they could be amended if a more
rigorous inquiry into “denial of justice” claims really seems necessary. Such review would be
preferable to (and more acceptable politically than) nondeferential review by alien tribunals. In
any event, Monaghan acknowledges that “‘fair support’ or deference review . . . should mark the
ordinary measure of the [Supreme] Court’s appellate review,” id. at 1926, and I doubt he would
disagree that it likewise should be the standard for denial-of-justice claims before supranational
courts—if such claims are to be permitted at all.
The more compelling argument against “fair support” as an across-the-board standard is
that the cases in fact reflect different degrees of deference in different situations. The Bush v.
Gore concurrence, for example, was less deferential, suggesting that the Court should
“undertake an independent, if still deferential, analysis of state law,” 531 U.S. 98, 114
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more important than the language used to describe the standard is the
rarity of its application. State law questions are antecedent to federal
ones in a vast range of cases; indeed, the application of the adequate
and independent state grounds doctrine to block U.S. Supreme Court
review of a federal claim on appeal from the state courts depends on
this antecedent relationship. And yet the Supreme Court refuses to
accept state court interpretations of state law as binding in only a
small fraction of cases.210
The NAFTA decisions in Mondev or Loewen replicated this
211
pattern and raise similar concerns. The legitimate fear from the
international perspective is that domestic courts may manipulate
domestic law—the rules of contract or municipal immunity in
Mondev, the rules of trial and appellate procedure in Loewen—so as
to deny the treaty rights of foreigners to fair and equal treatment. For
that reason, supranational tribunals have inquired into the correctness
of domestic court constructions of domestic law, in the same way that
the U.S. Supreme Court might probe the plausibility of state court
interpretations of state law in cases like Fairfax’s Devisee. But the
risks are also similar. Too much supranational review of domestic

(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring), but suggested that this lesser deference was necessary to protect
“the constitutionally prescribed role of state legislatures. To attach definitive weight to the
pronouncement of a state court, when the very question at issue is whether the court has
actually departed from the statutory meaning, would be to abdicate our responsibility to enforce
the explicit requirements of Article II.” Id. at 115. The key points for present purposes,
however, are that reduced deference in such cases is generally occasioned by some specific
constitutional constraint on state law in a particular area, e.g., law governing presidential
elections, and that nearly all the cases command some level of deference to state court
interpretations.
210. The adequate and independent grounds doctrine nowadays is enforced primarily at the
stage when the Supreme Court decides to grant or deny certiorari; thus, when the Court
determines that a state law ground blocks review of a federal issue, the ordinary result is an
unexplained denial of certiorari rather than an opinion construing the adequate and
independent state grounds doctrine or affirming the plausibility of the state court’s
interpretation of state law. See generally ROBERT L. STERN, EUGENE GRESSMAN, & STEPHEN
M. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 170 (6th ed. 1986). For that reason, the criteria by
which the Court decides, in the unusual case, to review an antecedent state law question remain
somewhat opaque. And because the Court only takes the cases in which it has decided not to
respect the antecedent state law ground, simply reading the reported decisions like Fairfax’s
Devisee or Brand or Bush v. Gore could create the impression that the Court routinely reverses
state courts on state law questions. But that is hardly the case.
211. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2059–62 (demonstrating the extent to which NAFTA
panels exercise power over domestic courts and noting strong similarities to appellate review).
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court decisions on domestic law would threaten domestic courts’
212
control over the content of their own law.
It is worth noting that, although both Mondev and Loewen
involved supranational review of state court decisions, federal court
rulings are equally vulnerable. One can imagine, for example,
NAFTA panel review of a federal court’s ruling that a Mexican or
Canadian company was liable to an American plaintiff under the
213
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) or some
214
similar federal statute. Supranational review thus threatens not only
the control of state courts over state law, but also the control of
federal courts over federal law. There is no reason in principle why a
NAFTA panel could not consider a denial-of-justice claim involving
even a federal-law decision of the U.S. Supreme Court.
One obvious objection is that Mondev and Loewen are only two
cases, and cases that the U.S. won at that. It is not obvious that this
sort of supranational review will ever become sufficiently frequent to
threaten the integrity of domestic law. I am not all that reassured by
this for two reasons. The first is that Supreme Court review of state
court decisions is also relatively rare: the Court grants certiorari in a
relatively small fraction of the cases in which review is sought, and
those cases in turn reflect only a fraction of the cases in which review
could be sought.215 And yet the threat of Supreme Court revision of
state-law interpretations by state courts has been thought sufficiently
serious to warrant relatively strong rules of deference.
The second point is that the additional bite at the apple afforded
by denial-of-justice claims seems like an incredibly attractive option

212. The risks actually seem greater in the supranational context. As Jed Rubenfeld has
noted, American courts “remain interwoven with the nation’s processes of democratic selfgovernance” in a variety of ways. Rubenfeld, supra note 157, at 1997–98. Those processes,
however, hold little sway over supranational tribunals.
213. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (2000). Although the RICO statute was originally created to
combat organized crime, it has become a frequent weapon in commercial disputes. See, e.g.,
PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 402–03 (2003) (featuring RICO claims in
a suit over managed health-care reimbursements).
214. Indeed, since the same diversity of citizenship that is a predicate for NAFTA
jurisdiction will generally permit federal court jurisdiction even over cases involving state law
claims, one would expect to see many of the same sorts of state-law contract and tort claims
considered in Mondev and Loewen initially adjudicated in the federal courts.
215. In the October 2002 Term of Court, for example, the Court granted review in 91 cases
out of 8340 requests, for a grant rate of 1.1 percent. See The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: The
Statistics, 117 HARV. L. REV. 480, 487 (2003). The grant rate was identical in the 2001 Term. See
The Supreme Court 2001 Term: The Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453, 460 (2002).
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for litigants who can meet the jurisdictional requirements of
216
NAFTA. If a Canadian or Mexican plaintiff thought it had a
sufficiently plausible claim under domestic law to bring suit in the first
place, or a defendant thought it had a sufficiently plausible defense to
file a domestic appeal, why not pursue those arguments one
procedural stage further—especially under a trade regime designed to
protect the interests of foreigners and under which the judges are
likely to have more concern for free trade than for local substantive
or procedural rules?217 William Dodge has suggested, moreover, that
“because Chapter 11 review is less determinate and less accountable
than domestic court review, it is likely to be most attractive to those
foreign investors with the weakest claims.”218 To be sure, NAFTA
litigation will involve considerable trouble and expense, but that may
often be a plus for parties with greater resources than the opposition.
I suspect that the chief reason we do not currently see considerably
more cases like Mondev and Loewen is that the availability of
supranational remedies has yet to fully penetrate the legal
consciousness.219
If I am right, then we need to think hard about the viability of
denial-of-justice theories and the appropriate standards of review.
Two problems are especially salient: the lack of a screening process
for claims and NAFTA panels’ insufficient deference to domestic
courts. In the American system, the Supreme Court screens out most
cases in which parties seek review of state law questions antecedent to
federal rights by simply denying certiorari; the Court may take a quick
look at the state law issue based on the cert petition and opposition,
but if it finds the state court’s decision plausible it will simply get rid

216. Because the volume of Canadian and Mexican trade with and investment in the United
States is so high—and NAFTA is intended to increase it—this is a nontrivial category of
litigants.
217. Article 1121(1)(b) ordinarily requires parties to challenge a domestic measure either in
a domestic proceeding or in a NAFTA proceeding; initiating the latter requires a waiver of the
former. But the Loewen panel gutted this requirement by accepting the argument that denial-ofjustice claims challenge the domestic adjudication itself, counting that adjudication as a new
NAFTA violation. See Loewen, supra note 89, ¶ 164. It thus should be possible in most
instances to litigate the initial claim in domestic court, then—if unsuccessful—challenge the
domestic court’s adverse decision as a denial of justice under NAFTA.
218. Dodge, supra note 143, at 575.
219. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2141 (suggesting that “the limited volume of Chapter 11
review of national courts can largely be ascribed to the relative youth of Chapter 11 and limited
awareness of its potential application to judicial conduct”); see also id., at 2041–43 (giving
reasons why such claims “are likely to proliferate” in the future).
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of the case without further comment. The NAFTA process, on the
other hand, seems to lack such a screening mechanism. Instead, the
unilateral decision of a party may invoke a full-dress arbitration
proceeding with a panel constituted solely for the purpose of hearing
220
that case. Not only is the mere convening of a panel likely to have
distorting effects on domestic litigation, but the perspective of a panel
devoted to the particular dispute is quite different from that of a busy
court trying to allocate its limited time among many different cases
that compete for its attention. The latter perspective is more likely to
take a screening function seriously; by contrast, it is hardly surprising
that the conscientious NAFTA panel members convened to hear
Mondev and Loewen were reluctant to simply dismiss the claims out
of hand.221
The apparent standard of review applied in those cases is
likewise troubling. Although both panels denied that they were
engaged in appellate review of the state court decisions in question, it
is hard to read the opinions as anything other than that—and not very
deferential appellate review, for that matter. Loewen actually found a
denial of justice based on the Mississippi court’s conduct of the trial;
only technical failures averted a substantial award against the United
222
And although Mondev ultimately affirmed the
States.
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s construction of state contract
law, its discussion of the issues strikes this reader, at least, as
relatively searching.223 This may be attributable to an understandable
wish of panelists convened to decide only a single case to do a
thorough job, but that is part of my point: a court existing for only
one case will likely be biased toward getting the “right answer” in that
case, rather than toward deferring to a plausible answer advanced by

220. NAFTA, supra note 119, art. 2008, 32 I.L.M. at 695; see also David A. Gantz,
Government-to-Government Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA’s Chapter 20: A Commentary on
the Process, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 481, 491 (2000) (“If the Free Trade Commission is not able
to assist in resolving the dispute within thirty days, the aggrieved party may issue a written
request to the Commission for the establishment of an arbitral panel; once the request is made,
the Commission ‘shall establish an arbitral panel.’”).
221. See Ray C. Jones, Notes & Comments, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Dispute
Resolution: A Shield to be Embraced or a Sword to be Feared? 2002 BYU. L. REV. 527, 546
(advocating a screening mechanism for Chapter 11 cases).
222. See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.
223. Accord Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2116 (pointing to “[t]he Mondev tribunal’s seeming
willingness to police, albeit at the margins, the lawmaking of common law courts”).
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the domestic court. The systemic concerns that counsel deference
224
seem likely to be felt more strongly by repeat players.
3. Supranational Adjudication and Domestic Lawmaking.
Finally, supranational adjudication may put pressure on nonjudicial
domestic institutional settlements. President Bush has reacted to the
ICJ’s Avena ruling by ordering the state courts to provide “review and
reconsideration” of the Mexican prisoners’ treaty claims.225 That order
ignores our Constitution’s settlement of legislative authority in
Congress; indeed, it flies in the face of Congress’s earlier codification
of the rule of procedural default in habeas cases.226 Similarly, when a
virtually identical Consular Convention claim arose in the Breard
case, Louis Henkin insisted that a letter from Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright to Governor James Gilmore of Virginia,
requesting a stay of execution, was itself an expression of supreme
federal law that bound the State to comply.227 That Secretary

224. Many NAFTA panelists will be repeat players if they are called upon to arbitrate in
future cases. But it is not clear how often this occurs in fact, and the likelihood of such a call
may well be a function of how sympathetic they are to the interests of foreign investors. More
importantly, the panel itself lacks any form of institutional continuity; it is not a court with a
continuing existence that must take account of its relationship to other courts.
225. See supra text accompanying note 111. As I have suggested, the President’s action may
be interpreted as nonmandatory.
226. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (“In the
framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed
refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”). In Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998), the
Supreme Court construed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a), (e)(2) (2000), as codifying the rule of procedural default for habeas petitions like
Medellin’s, and the President lacks power to overturn that measure unilaterally. See
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb. . . .”).
227. Henkin, Provisional Measures, supra note 57, at 681. Secretary Albright stressed that
the United States had “vigorously defended Virginia’s right to go forward with the sentence
imposed,” and that the ICJ’s order was “non-binding”; she went only so far as to “request that
you exercise your powers as Governor and stay Mr. Breard’s execution.” Albright Letter, supra
note 105 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding Secretary Albright’s clear indication that she did
not think Governor Gilmore would be bound, however, Professor Henkin claimed that “the
Secretary’s letter was a clear expression of U.S. foreign policy . . . [and] the state of Virginia was
bound to give it effect.” Henkin, Provisional Measures, supra note 57, at 681.
Even if the Secretary had such power, she could not have exercised it by way of ordering
Governor Gilmore himself to issue the stay, as opposed to issuing a direct federal order
prohibiting the execution. Requiring the Governor of a state to exercise his clemency or
prosecutorial powers in such a way as to implement federal policy would be a clear violation of
the anticommandeering doctrine. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925–27 (1997). Of
course, international lawyers have little patience for Printz either. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty,
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Albright’s action was just a letter made no difference at all; according
to Professor Henkin, “[t]he states are bound by U.S. foreign policy
228
decisions even if they do not take any formal form.”
Our domestic institutional settlements, however, care a great
deal about “formal form.” Federal law is supreme by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause, which provides that “[t]his Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
and all Treaties made . . . under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”229 That Clause says nothing
about letters or general statements of foreign policy. It refers to three
particular forms of lawmaking—the Constitution, laws, and treaties—
and each of these forms comes with a specific and quite rigorous
process of formation set forth in the Constitution itself. Those
processes are designed to preserve the institutional balances of
separation of powers and federalism, which are in turn designed to
preserve liberty.230 Such “formal” requirements as the rule that a
measure must secure the support of a majority of both houses of
Congress and either presidential assent or a supermajority override in
order to become law, or that treaties must be ratified by two-thirds of
the Senate, are not simply details to be disregarded and replaced by
statements of policy by executive officials.231
To be sure, we have recognized alternative forms, such as
Executive agreements, administrative regulations, and judge-made
Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. “States’ Rights” in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1277, 1301–02 (1999).
228. Henkin, Provisional Measures, supra note 57, at 681; see also Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures,
92 AM. J. INT’L L. 683, 685 n.15 (1995) (asserting, with regard to a hypothetical presidential
order to the Virginia governor demanding postponement of the execution, that “a letter would
have differed from an executive order in form only, and I do not think anything in the
constitutional analysis would turn on this difference”). Professor Henkin and others would go
further and treat the ICJ’s orders as binding on both state and federal officials, rather than
simply as providing a basis for federal power to issue an order to the state of Virginia. See
Henkin, Provisional Measures, supra note 57, at 680–81. Professor Bradley has suggested that
treating the ICJ’s order in this way would raise serious constitutional questions involving the
delegation of legislative authority. See Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 32, at 1572.
229. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
230. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1403 (2001).
231. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439–40 (1998) (“The procedures
governing the enactment of statutes set forth in the text of Article I were the product of the
great debates and compromises that produced the Constitution itself . . . . [T]he power to enact
statutes may only ‘be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedure.’” (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983))).
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federal common law, as likewise binding the states under the
232
Supremacy Clause. But to recognize these exceptions is hardly to
say that form doesn’t matter. Most of them come with built-in checks
233
of their own, either statutory or doctrinal in nature. The less
constrained vehicles—such as executive agreements—at least require
the Executive to take political responsibility for his policy through an
explicit and public act; that is often the point of formal requirements.
And while vehicles like the executive agreement have undoubtedly
acquired some legitimate scope, if only through some sort of
constitutional adverse possession, their legitimacy is hardly so clear
and uncontested as to make them a secure base from which to argue
for the further erosion of institutional checks on executive
lawmaking.234 In any event, the point for present purposes is that a
Legal Process approach to supranational adjudication needs to
consider not only the relationship of supranational decisionmakers to
domestic courts, but also to the law-making and enforcement
institutions at the domestic level.

232. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (executive agreements);
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630–32 (1959) (federal
common law); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)
(administrative regulations).
233. The Administrative Procedure Act constrains agency rulemaking in a myriad of ways,
as does whatever remains of the nondelegation doctrine. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 320–21 (2000) (arguing that nondelegation has not died, but
instead now informs various rules of statutory construction). Executive agreements are less
constrained, but they are at least monitored by Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act. See 1
U.S.C. § 112b (amended 2004).
234. Compare, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108
HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995) (arguing that the congressional-executive agreement procedure
under which the NAFTA and WTO were approved is legitimate, but only because of an
“informal” constitutional amendment that took place in the 1940’s), with Laurence H. Tribe,
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1229 (1995) (rejecting both the legitimacy of
congressional-executive agreements and the “informal” approach to constitutional amendment).
These articles debate the legitimacy of congressional-executive agreements, which at least
follow the prescribed constitutional forms for statutes. The Court has also ascribed preemptive
effect to “sole” Executive agreements, which have no congressional involvement at all. See, e.g.,
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 222–25 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330–
33 (1937). But the Court’s most recent venture into this area was deeply controversial. See Am.
Ins. Ass’n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (featuring a sharp, 5–4 debate about the
preemptive impact of executive agreements). And, in any event, recognizing an additional form
is hardly the same as saying form doesn’t matter.
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B. The Problem of Substantive Overlap
One reason to expect more and more clashes between domestic
and supranational courts is that international law increasingly
replicates rights protected under domestic law. Investment treaties
include antiexpropriation provisions that overlap with the domestic
Takings Clause, for example, and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) purports to limit the death penalty in
ways similar to the Eighth Amendment. Similar instances of overlap
will occur in foreign legal systems that protect fundamental rights at
the domestic level. Such overlap gives unsuccessful litigants in
domestic courts an incentive to seek a second bite at the apple by
claiming a violation of the international standard in a supranational
court. And even where international law does not provide a
supranational forum to adjudicate international-law rights,
substantive overlap threatens to undermine the application and effect
of domestic law.235
Similar issues arise domestically in our federal system. Federal
habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions, for example, gives
criminal defendants a second opportunity to contest the result of their
state court trials; as Justice Jackson observed, “[c]onflict with state
courts is the inevitable result of giving the convict a virtual new trial
236
before a federal court.” One way to minimize these conflicts is by
limiting the scope of the substantive overlap between habeas review
and the initial state trial. For instance, the Supreme Court has made
clear that the basic issue of a state criminal defendant’s factual guilt
or innocence is a state law issue that should not be relitigated in
federal court.237 There is leakage around the edges of this principle: a
state petitioner may argue that the state court jury misapplied the
238
federal “no reasonable doubt” standard to the facts of his case, or
he may use a claim of “actual innocence” to overcome a procedural
default or other impediment to presenting other federal claims.239 But
235. See, e.g., Young, Customary International Law, supra note 177, at 381–84 (discussing
arguments that customary international law preempts state law).
236. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
237. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 429 (1993). The Court did “assume, for the sake of
argument . . . that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’” would
be cognizable on habeas “if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim.” Id. at 417.
But the Court said the standard for such a claim would be “extraordinarily high,” id., and no
subsequent case has found it to be satisfied.
238. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313 (1979).
239. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 301 (1995) (considering a claim of innocence of the
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these exceptions have been applied exceedingly narrowly based on
concerns that it is disruptive in a parallel judicial system to have both
240
sets of courts litigating the same issues.
Another example arises from federal claims that a state or a state
official has deprived someone of liberty or property without due
process of law. These claims have broad potential to replicate rights
under state law; virtually any breach of contract or tort by a state
actor, for example, may be said to deprive someone of liberty or
property. The problem is distinct from habeas in that there is no
“second bite at the apple”; ordinary res judicata rules will generally
not allow a plaintiff to sue first under state tort law in state court, then
bring a federal court action under the Due Process Clause if the state
suit fails.241 Rather, due process claims raise the possibility that
plaintiffs will bypass the substance of state tort or contract law by
relying on federal constitutional law, even if the federal claim is
brought—as it often is—in state court.242 If state and local officials
confront federal due process claims every time they do something
that affects a private liberty or property interest, then they must
structure their conduct according to federal standards rather than
state law.
Federal law has sought to mitigate this problem in three ways.
First, courts have been reluctant to recognize certain sorts of interests
as protected liberty or property for constitutional purposes, where to
do so would effectively federalize ordinary state-law contract or tort
claims.243 Second, the Supreme Court has required that due process
violations be intentional, ruling out overlap with state claims

underlying crime); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992) (considering a claim of
innocence of any aggravating factors supporting a capital sentence).
240. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 (recognizing “the very disruptive effect that entertaining
claims of actual innocence would have on finality in capital cases, and the enormous burden that
having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on the States”).
241. Compare, e.g., Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (“A final
judgment on the merits . . . precludes the parties . . . from relitigating issues that were or could
have been raised in that action.”), with Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Servs. Agency,
458 U.S. 502, 512 (1982) (“[H]abeas corpus is a major exception to the doctrine of res judicata,
as it allows relitigation of a final state-court judgment disposing of precisely the same claims.”).
242. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, Rethinking Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 52 U. PITT. L.
REV. 383, 415 (1991) (reporting on an empirical study of § 1983 claims in state courts).
243. See, e.g., Washington v. District of Columbia, 802 F.2d 1478, 1480–81 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(refusing to recognize a liberty interest in “an employee’s right to a safe workplace” because
“section 1983 must not be used to duplicate state tort law on the federal level”).
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244
requiring some lesser degree of intent. Finally, the Court has held
that there is no deprivation of liberty or property without due process
of law where the state provides adequate “post-deprivation
remedies,” at least in cases of random or unauthorized actions by
state officers that it would have been difficult for the state to
anticipate beforehand.245 Such postdeprivation remedies generally
consist simply of the opportunity to bring a state-law tort action in
state court. The doctrine thus tends to foreclose litigation of federal
claims with clear state-law analogs, reserving federal law for
situations that raise uniquely federal problems.
Developments in international law raise both the “second bite at
the apple” problem and the substantive replacement problem.
Denial-of-justice claims in NAFTA cases purport to recognize a right
distinct from those protected under domestic law—that is, the right of
foreigners to equal treatment in the domestic judicial system. But the
Canadian investor’s complaints in Loewen about prejudicial appeals
to the jury, excessive punitive damages, and even elected judges all
implicated rights recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Compare, for example, the NAFTA right to equal justice with
protections from discrimination against out-of-staters under domestic
law. These domestic protections arise primarily from the Commerce
246
Clause, which both empowers Congress to regulate such commerce
and (implicitly) restricts the States from regulating commerce in ways
247
that discriminate against out-of-state interests. The Commerce
Clause thus permits out-of-staters to challenge discriminatory laws
and practices; creating a parallel right on the international plane,
however, facilitates collateral attack when the domestic claim fails.
The international law standard barring nondiscriminatory regulation
that “burdens” foreign commerce, moreover, may be more rigorous
than its domestic analog.248
Loewen’s challenge to the damages award and the appeal bond
likewise had established domestic analogs. The Supreme Court has

244. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986).
245. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 135–38 (1990); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,
543–44 (1981).
246. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
247. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978).
248. The Court has occasionally invalidated nondiscriminatory laws on the ground that they
imposed an excessive burden on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways
Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 679 (1981). But this approach has been much more controversial and,
arguably, less successful than the antidiscrimination principle.
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recognized both substantive and procedural due process rights against
249
excessive or inadequately constrained punitive damages awards.
American courts have also considered challenges to appeal bond
250
requirements under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
In both instances, it may well be that Loewen would not have
prevailed under domestic constitutional law.251 But permitting
collateral attack in a supranational arbitration proceeding plainly
undermines the ability of the domestic courts to resolve these
questions. The concerns of international law completely overlap with
those of domestic law in denial-of-justice situations, and NAFTA’s
separate enforcement mechanism provides the second bite at the
apple that domestic law denies.
Recent trends in death penalty litigation illustrate the potential
for replacing domestic standards with international ones. In this
country, challenges to capital punishment have generally been
brought under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and
unusual punishments.” Despite the prevalence of capital punishment
at the Founding, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth
Amendment to embody “evolving standards of decency”;252 under this
standard, the Court has imposed extensive substantive and procedural
253
limitations on capital punishment. But the Court has stopped well
short of outlawing capital punishment altogether, and for many years
the Court refused to narrow it by forbidding execution of persons
who committed their crimes as minors.254 Death penalty opponents
have thus turned to international law,255 sometimes to argue that

249. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (conducting substantive due
process review for excessiveness); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 418 (1994)
(reviewing the procedures used in arriving at a punitive damages award).
250. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 27, at 271–72 (collecting cases).
251. See id. at 269–73 (reaching this conclusion).
252. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) (“A claim that punishment is
excessive is judged not by the standards that prevailed . . . when the Bill of Rights was adopted,
but rather by . . . ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.’” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))).
253. See, e.g., id. at 321 (holding that a state may not execute a mentally retarded person);
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (“[A] capital sentencing scheme must ‘genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder.’” (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983))).
254. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 385–86 (1989).
255. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Paying “Decent Respect” to World Opinion on the Death
Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1086–87 (2002) [hereinafter Koh, World Opinion] (urging
that American courts look to international law and abolish the death penalty); William A.
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capital punishment is illegal generally and more often to claim that
juvenile offenders may not be executed. These arguments sometimes
claim that international law preempts state death penalty rules
outright; more modestly, they have invoked both international law
and foreign domestic practice as persuasive authority for interpreting
the Eighth Amendment.256
No American court has accepted the preemption argument, but
the Supreme Court did recently invoke foreign practice in
interpreting the Eighth Amendment to bar the juvenile death
penalty.257 I have addressed both preemption and persuasion in other
work.258 The important point for present purposes is that these claims
under international law do not arise because domestic law lacks
individual rights provisions bearing on the subject of capital
punishment. Rather, the turn to international law results simply from
dissatisfaction with the content of domestic law and hope for a
“better” result under international principles.259 Likewise, as I discuss
further in the next Section, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 seems to offer
greater protection for property rights than would be available under
parallel provisions of domestic law, such as the Takings and Due
Process Clauses.260 And the denial-of-justice claim may provide an
avenue for rearranging the law on tort awards and judicial elections in

Schabas, International Law and Abolition of the Death Penalty, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 797,
799 (1998) (“While it is still premature to declare the death penalty prohibited by customary
international law, it is clear that we are somewhere in the midst of such a process, indeed
considerably close to the goal.”).
256. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of
International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 322–26 (arguing that customary international law
preempts state laws permitting execution of juvenile offenders); Koh, World Opinion, supra
note 255, at 1128 (arguing that foreign law should be used—as it in fact was in Atkins—to
establish a “consensus” against the execution of the mentally retarded).
257. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198–1200 (2005).
258. See Ernest A. Young, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Comment: Foreign Law and the
Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005) (contending that cases like Roper give
authoritative, not persuasive, weight to foreign law); Young, Customary International Law,
supra note 177, at 462–63, 474–77 (arguing that customary norms of international law cannot
trump state capital punishment laws).
259. According to a practicing civil rights lawyer, “The attraction of international human
rights law to me is simple: international human rights law promises more for my clients than
U.S. domestic legal standards in many instances.” Paul L. Hoffman, The “Blank Stare
Phenomenon”: Proving Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
181, 181 (1995–96).
260. See infra notes 284–89 and accompanying text.
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ways that neither American courts nor legislatures have been willing
261
to undertake.
The greater the overlap between domestic and international law,
the greater the potential for such arguments. And if this overlap
expands without development of doctrines designed to mitigate the
262
conflict, we should expect increasing controversy over the very
legitimacy of international norms. We already see conflict over use of
such norms as persuasive authority; for instance, the House and
Senate have considered multiple resolutions condemning the
Supreme Court’s citations to international sources in recent decisions
on gay rights and capital punishment.263 A holding that international
law binds domestic courts to supersede domestic law in important
areas is likely to escalate such controversy rather dramatically.
The source of these overlaps between domestic law and
international law is both obvious and commendable. In parts of the
world, international law may provide the only meaningful guarantees
of human rights; international protection of basic rules of free trade
may likewise provide needed stability for investments in countries
where domestic protections have been insufficiently reliable. These
situations create pressure for international law to offer a “complete”
system of rights rather than a set of interstitial supplements to
264
domestic norms. What we need is a way to enable international law
to continue its civilizing project in areas where domestic law fails to
offer adequate protections, without disrupting other domestic systems
that turned their attention to basic human and economic rights long
265
before international law did. That may mean that international law
261. See Lerner, supra note 27, at 267 (noting that NAFTA can be used to pursue these
ends, but arguing that domestic-based reform is a better alternative).
262. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (holding that a plaintiff may not bring a
federal due process claim for deprivation of liberty or property where state law provides an
adequate postdeprivation remedy).
263. See S. Res. 92, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (March 20, 2005); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Feb. 15, 2005); H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 17, 2004); Tom Curry, A Flap
Over Foreign Matter at the Supreme Court: House Members Protest Use of Non-U.S. Rulings in
Big Cases, MSNBC, March 11, 2004, at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4506232.
264. See, e.g., Donoho, supra note 27, at 428 (“Even a casual observer of the international
human rights system will discover a plethora of generally stated, abstract norms covering most
aspects of human behavior.”); see also Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 273, 337–41 (1999) (discussing the difference between “complete” and interstitial rule
systems).
265. Cf. Rubenfeld, supra note 157, at 1988–90 (observing that Americans pushed
international human rights norms after World War II to bring the rest of the world up to
American standards—not to change American domestic law).
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must abandon the claim to impose identical obligations on all
societies—a point that I develop in the next Section.
C. Comparative Institutional Competence
I have already discussed the Legal Process school’s pervasive
266
concern with institutional competence. The basic idea is to assess
the strengths and weaknesses that varied institutions—e.g., courts,
legislatures, executive agencies, private markets—bring to a task, and
then to “settle” primary authority over that task in the appropriate
place. This emphasis prefigured what Cass Sunstein and Adrian
Vermeule have described as the “institutional turn” in recent
American constitutional law scholarship.267 That concern can usefully
be applied to problems arising from supranational adjudication, and
this Article is hardly the first to do so. I want to make two points in
this regard: The first is a relatively conventional point about the
institutional weaknesses of many of our current supranational
institutions. These weaknesses counsel caution in assigning new
responsibilities to those institutions and deference by those bodies to
domestic institutions.
The second point may be somewhat less familiar. Many
practitioners of institutional analysis have insisted that such analysis
must always be comparative in nature. That is, it does little good to
say that this or that institution may be good or bad at a particular
task; rather, the real question is always whether that institution would
be better at it than the alternatives.268 The problem in international
affairs is that we must compare supranational institutions to domestic
ones that vary wildly in their competences and capacities. One may
think that the International Court of Justice compares rather poorly
to the European Court of Justice, for example, but that it looks pretty
good compared to local judicial institutions in Rwanda. This suggests
that it will be hard to have a uniform set of rules prescribing the
amount of deference that even a single particular supranational

266. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
267. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 885, 886 (2003); see also id. at 937–38 (describing recent work in this vein).
268. As Neil Komesar has observed, “[i]ssues at which an institution, in the abstract, may be
good may not need that institution because one of the alternative institutions may be even
better. In turn, tasks that strain the abilities of an institution may wisely be assigned to it anyway
if the alternatives are even worse.” NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 6 (1994).
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adjudicatory body must pay to domestic legal systems; instead, it may
be necessary to tailor those rules to the capacities of the domestic
system in question or, perhaps, simply allow those rules to be made as
part of each nation’s own domestic law of foreign affairs.
1. Institutional Capacities of Supranational Tribunals. This is not
the place for a comprehensive institutional analysis of particular
supranational judicial bodies. I do, however, want to offer a brief
sketch of the likely advantages and disadvantages that can be
expected in assigning responsibilities to such bodies. My purpose is to
illustrate the sorts of factors that should be considered in developing
doctrine to govern the relationship between supranational
adjudication and domestic judicial systems.
Supranational tribunals enjoy two obvious advantages over
domestic courts. The first is simply the legitimacy attributable to the
fact that they are not domestic courts. Mexico is much more likely to
accept an unsuccessful outcome in the case of its national, Mr.
Medellin, if it comes from the International Court of Justice than if
the same outcome issues from a domestic court in the United States.
Although the unwillingness of domestic judges to decide against their
269
own governments can be exaggerated, the international community
is likely to accord greater legitimacy to the decisions of tribunals not
beholden to one of the nations interested in the case.
The second advantage is expertise in the particular international
rules to be adjudicated. Supranational tribunals are often (but not
always) specialized bodies with expertise in international trade law,
for example, or international human rights.270 Given the oft-lamented
unfamiliarity of American judges with international law and the
relative lack of emphasis on international law in the traditional
American legal education, supranational tribunals are likely to enjoy
269. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2652 (2004) (rejecting the Bush
Administration’s position that a U.S. citizen held as an enemy combatant could not seek judicial
review of his detention); United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 910 (1996) (holding the
U.S. liable in a multibillion dollar contracts case).
270. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2109 (“Chapter 11 panels include arbitrators from
different countries, with expertise in international law and international trade; areas in which
most domestic judges lack training.”). Some courts may develop special expertise in some areas
while remaining more generalist in others. See, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, Remedies and the
International Court of Justice: An Introduction, in REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA 1, 7 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 1998) (touting the ICJ’s expertise in
boundary disputes, while acknowledging that “[t]he International Court is not a human rights
court” notwithstanding its “long involvement in human rights”).
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a marked advantage in dealing with international sources over U.S.
domestic courts.
Neither legitimacy nor expertise cut in only one direction,
however. The outward legitimacy advantages of supranational
courts—that is, the comparative legitimacy advantage that such
bodies may enjoy in the eyes of the international community—is
likely to be matched by an inward legitimacy deficit in the eyes of the
affected nation that is asked to set aside its own laws or policies in
favor of international principles. In the Breard case, for example, the
Governor of Virginia suggested that his State would accept as
legitimate an order from the U.S. Supreme Court setting aside Mr.
271
Breard’s death sentence but not a comparable order from the ICJ.
Domestic political forces obviously play a much greater role in the
appointment and confirmation (and, in the case of many state courts,
election) of domestic judges, and they often possess tools to hold
those judges accountable through political control of jurisdiction,
budgets, and the like.272 And to the extent we are often also choosing
between the application of international and domestic law, the latter
is likely to enjoy significant legitimacy due to its greater
comprehensibility to domestic audiences and the possibility, in many
273
cases, of democratic override.
A sort of democratic override for international rules exists
through the “last in time” rule—that is, Congress generally may
274
override a rule of international law by passing a contrary statute.

271. See Frank Green, Inmate’s Lawyers File Appeal; Treaty Rights Hearing is Sought in
U.S., RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, April 11, 1998, at A-1 (“Mark A. Miner, a [Governor]
Gilmore spokesman, reiterated yesterday that Gilmore is not looking toward the State
Department or the international court for guidance on Tuesday’s scheduled execution—only the
U.S. Supreme Court.”).
272. See, e.g., McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and
the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1648–49 (1995) (discussing political-branch checks on
judicial decisionmaking).
273. See, e.g., Young, Customary International Law, supra note 177, at 398–400 (sketching
the democratic case against customary international law).
274. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). Some internationalists deny
even this. Critics of Breard, for instance, have equated each ICJ decision with a new treaty for
“last in time” purposes. See Sanja Djajic, The Effect of International Court of Justice Decisions
on Municipal Courts in the United States: Breard v. Greene, 23 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 27, 63 (1999). Others have asserted that treaty rights are “primary” to statutory rules.
Paust, supra note 164, at 692 & n.13. Still others claim that customary international law is
continuously “re-enacted” through practice, and therefore always later in time than a statute.
See Ludwikowski, supra note 169, at 275–76. These ingenious devices for making limits on
international law disappear seem to reflect a basic contempt for such limits. See, e.g., Thomas M.

110305 YOUNG.DOC

2005]

12/19/2005 3:04 PM

GLOBAL INSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT

1209

But the international rule remains binding on the international plane,
and I want to insist that this remaining force is critical. We should
strive for a regime of international rules that we can live with without
having to abrogate their domestic force. That may mean working to
make the development of rules on the international plane itself more
responsive to concerns of democratic legitimacy.
The expertise of international tribunals likewise has a downside.
That expertise flows from specialization; although one occasionally
sees generalist jurists on supranational tribunals—retired judge
Abner Mikva of the D.C. Circuit participated on the Loewen panel,
for example—such tribunals often seek to maximize particularized
expertise. The problem is that many of the most contentious
international disputes arise at the intersection between different sorts
of law. Where free trade law comes into conflict with environmental
measures, for example, a panel composed of trade-law specialists will
likely show a natural bias toward privileging the trade rules over
environmental concerns.275 The American judiciary has long resisted
276
specialization, and one need not presume that supranational courts
should always follow American models to say that the considerations
that have militated against specialized courts in this country may well
be relevant to the establishment of specialized adjudicatory bodies at
the international level.
The structure of some supranational institutions creates
additional liabilities. Others have commented on lack of transparency
and broad participation rights in trade arbitration, as well as potential
bias problems arising from the appointment of the arbitrators by the
277
parties. The chief problem is that panel members are not necessarily
Franck, Dr. Pangloss Meets the Grinch: A Pessimistic Comment on Harold Koh’s Optimism, 35
HOUS. L. REV. 683, 688 (1998) (“[B]y inventing such doctrines such [sic] as the ‘non-selfexecution’ of treaties and the ‘last in time’ doctrine, courts have made Swiss cheese of the notion
that international law is part of the law of the United States.”).
275. See, e.g., David W. Leebron, The Boundaries of the WTO: Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT’L L.
5, 22 (2002) (“The natural inclination of WTO personnel might be to favor the norms
underlying the liberal trading regime (since that is their primary mandate) [over other concerns,
such as environmental policy] and to lean toward results that would prohibit trade barriers.”).
276. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 147–60
(1985) (opposing proposals for specialized federal courts).
277. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 27, at 282–86. Ironically, when Loewen challenged the
Mississippi courts on the grounds that they were elected and potentially biased by the indirect
effect of campaign contributions, it did so before a panel which the parties had actually chosen
themselves. Likewise, Loewen challenged the appeal bond as unduly constraining its right to
appeal in the state courts, but the NAFTA procedure itself provides no appeal right. See id. at
286–88.
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repeat players: “From claim to claim,” as Robert Ahdieh has noted,
“independent and distinct panels are formed and disbanded, with
278
little by way of structure, or even precedent, to link them together.”
This problem compounds difficulties arising from the generally less279
binding nature of judicial precedent in international law. Even a
judge who is not formally “bound” by prior precedent may be
disciplined by the knowledge that she is a participant in an ongoing
project of defining and elaborating the law. Such a judge must ask
whether a principle that appeals to her in the present case (perhaps
because it achieves the “right” result) will be a rule that she can live
with in the next case—perhaps one whose facts engage her sympathies
in a different direction.280 It would be a mistake to assume that this
obligation of forward-looking prudence derives solely from the
likelihood that the particular judge deciding today’s case will also
have to decide tomorrow’s. Nonetheless, that obligation is likely to be
felt considerably less strongly by a panel constituted solely to decide a
particular case.
This ephemerality is troubling for two distinct reasons. The first
281
is that it may incline supranational judges to judicial “activism.” A
supranational judge may be more inclined to reach out and declare
invalid a domestic regulatory regime based on its perceived unfairness
in a particular case if she need not wrestle with the need for a limiting

278. Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2141; see also id. at 2099 (arguing that “repeat players” are
essential if NAFTA panels are to work out a viable relationship with domestic courts). The
particular arbitration procedures for NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes do not establish any
permanent set of arbitrators; panel members are chosen primarily by the parties. See NAFTA,
supra note 119, art. 1123; see also Gantz, supra note 220, at 492 (noting that even under Chapter
20, which does envision a permanent roster of arbitrators for state-to-state disputes, “as of
December 2001, no roster members . . . had been formally designated by the three governments,
presumably because of difficulties in agreeing upon individuals”).
279. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2100 (observing that “[i]n Chapter 11, as in international
law generally, there is no provision for binding precedent,” but that “[t]he function of precedent
as a mechanism of control . . . is essential to the legitimacy of any legal system”); see generally
BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 19 (stating that “[j]udicial decisions are not strictly speaking a
formal source” of international law, although “in some instances at least they are regarded as
authoritative evidence of the state of the law”).
280. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1959).
281. “Activism” is, of course, a contested and sometimes maligned term. I use it here very
broadly to encompass judicial behaviors that tend to maximize the institutional role of the court
vis-à-vis other institutional actors. See generally Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and
Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139 (2002) [hereinafter Young, Judicial Activism].
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282
principle that can discipline future results. Second, and perhaps
more important, one-time-only adjudicators are unlikely to build up
the web of doctrine necessary to mediate the complicated
relationships between supranational and domestic courts. On the
domestic level, such doctrines as justiciability, abstention, and
standards of review have developed slowly and incrementally over
time.283 Panels constituted for a single dispute will have a hard time
participating in this ongoing project.
The last point, which again applies most directly to trade
tribunals, is that the substantive law to be applied bears remarkable
similarities to principles that, in American history, have painfully
revealed the limits of judicial competence. The open-ended
expropriation provisions of NAFTA’s chapter 11 seem to forbid “too
much” regulation of foreign investments. In the early twentieth
century, the Due Process Clause of the American Constitution was
interpreted similarly to bar “unreasonable” regulation of the free
284
market. More recently, the “dormant” Commerce Clause has been
construed to forbid state regulation imposing excessive burdens on
interstate commerce, even where the regulation in question does not
distinguish between in-staters and out-of-staters.285 And the Takings
Clause has occasionally been interpreted to bar “regulatory
takings”—that is, regulation that diminishes the value of private
property interests even without appropriating those interests
286
directly. The American experience here, however, ought to serve

282. One recurrent criticism of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000), has been that the opinion seems targeted to achieving a particular result in the instant
case without binding the Court to similar holdings in similar circumstances in the future. See,
e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, When Freedom Isn’t Free: The Costs of Judicial Independence in Bush v.
Gore, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 265, 281–82 (2003).
283. The incremental development of the Younger abstention doctrine, which forecloses
federal courts from enjoining state enforcement proceedings, is an example. See, e.g., Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53–54 (1971) (stating the basic rule that federal courts may not enjoin
state criminal proceedings); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974) (limiting the doctrine
to pending state criminal proceedings); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611–12 (1975)
(extending the doctrine to certain state civil proceedings); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517
U.S. 706, 731 (1996) (clarifying that Younger abstention only applies to claims for equitable
relief).
284. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down New York’s
regulation of wages and hours for bakers).
285. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 678–79 (1981)
(striking down Iowa’s restriction on the length of trucks on state roads).
286. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), 415–16 (holding that a
state regulation barring removal of some coal from a mine amounted to a taking).
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not as a model but as a cautionary tale. Each of these lines of cases
has been criticized as an illegitimate cover for judicial hostility to
287
regulation. Absent some way to define excessive regulation in a
determinate and apolitical way—a formula that the American courts
288
that grappled with the issue never found —judicial activity in this
area is likely to undermine the legitimacy of the free trade regime
289
and, possibly, supranational adjudication in general.
2. The Problem of Comparison. I have argued that the role of
supranational adjudication ought to be defined in large part by the
relative institutional competence of supranational adjudicators vis-àvis domestic legal and political institutions. The obvious problem is
there is no uniform class of either “supranational adjudicators” or
“domestic legal and political institutions.” A recent overview
observed that the “staggering diversity” of international judicial
bodies “tends to deter comparison across institutions”:
To begin with, they differ in the number of member States, ranging
from universal scope to extremely narrow membership (as in the
case of the Benelux Court of Justice). Some bodies give standing
only to States, whereas others are, to varying degrees, open to other
entities. Likewise, the kind of jurisdiction they exercise is extremely
diverse. . . . Furthermore, differences in size of the staff, budget and
caseload are enormous. Some bodies, like the ECJ, adjudicate

287. See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority for imposing their own views of proper economic theory through the Due Process
Clause); Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64
U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 517 (1997) (stating that “the Lochner era Court read the economic doctrine
of laissez-faire into the Constitution”); Edward J. Sullivan, Substantive Due Process Resurrected
through the Takings Clause: Nollan, Dolan, and Ehrlich, 25 ENVTL. L. 155, 155–60 (1995).
Although revisionist historians have done much to undercut traditional interpretations of the
Lochner era, see, e.g., Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
221, 223–24 (1999), nothing in their account detracts from the central point here: It is simply
very difficult to develop a coherent and persuasive jurisprudence to determine what amounts to
excessive or unreasonable regulation.
288. See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 7 (1998) (recounting the doctrinal disintegration, over
time, of the Court’s freedom of contract jurisprudence).
289. See, e.g., Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings”
Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (2003) (criticizing use of NAFTA to replicate Takings doctrine);
Steve Louthan, Note, A Brave New Lochner Era? The Constitutionality of NAFTA Chapter 11,
34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1443, 1445 (2001) (calling NAFTA’s Chapter 11 “the most
significant evisceration of state police power since the Supreme Court freed the states from
Lochner’s shackles in 1937”).
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perhaps 100 cases each year; others barely hear one each per
decade. Finally, most are active, some are dormant (e.g., the Court
of Justice of the Arab Maghreb Union) and others are emerging
(e.g., the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights or the
290
International Criminal Court).

These differences make categorical comparisons between domestic
and supranational courts difficult: the ICJ has quite different
institutional capacities and limitations, after all, than a NAFTA
arbitration panel.291 As a result, we see not one but many models of
292
the deference that U.S. courts afford to supranational adjudicators.
The problem of institutional diversity gets much more complex,
moreover, when one turns to the domestic side of the comparison. As
William Burke-White has observed, “the quality of justice in local
293
courts differs dramatically.” The domestic judicial system of the
United Kingdom obviously has highly dissimilar competences and
capacities than the domestic institutions of Afghanistan or Liberia.
These differences may be more limited when dealing with aspects of
international law that lack universal scope; institutions such as the
International Court of Justice or the World Trade Organization, for
example, need interact only with the institutions of signatory
countries. But even within such a narrowly limited regime as
NAFTA, supranational adjudicatory bodies must interact with
domestic institutions that vary rather widely in their capacities and
principles of operation.
This problem makes the establishment of doctrines governing the
interface between domestic and supranational institutions far more
difficult than the development of such doctrines for the state and
federal courts in the American system. The U.S. federal courts are
relatively homogeneous in character, with specialized institutions only
for relatively narrow areas like patents or bankruptcy or government
294
contracts. On the state side, one can identify important variations
among the 50 state court systems: some elect their judges while some
290. ROMANO, supra note 12; see also Alford, supra note 11, at 679–82 (noting the wide
variety of international courts).
291. For instance, the ICJ has a permanent existence but can hear relatively few cases; the
NAFTA system relies on one-time-only panels but seems, for that reason, more scalable to hear
many more cases than it currently does if the need should arise.
292. See generally Alford, supra note 11.
293. William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International
Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 16 (2002).
294. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 41–43.
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appoint them; some have a greater reputation for professionalism
than others; and some have different histories of respect or antipathy
for federal rights. To some extent, the rules of interjurisdictional
295
relations have tried to take these differences into account. But by
and large the divergence among state judicial systems has been
sufficiently minor to allow debates about jurisdictional relations to
speak of “state courts” as a relatively homogeneous class of
institutions.296 And much of the Federal Courts canon—the
willingness of federal courts to abstain in favor of state proceedings,
the intrusiveness of federal habeas corpus review of state convictions,
the frequency with which the Supreme Court reviews state law
questions that are antecedent to federal ones, even the scope of
federal question jurisdiction in civil cases—has been built around
explicit or implicit assumptions about the relative institutional
“parity” (or lack thereof) between state and federal courts.297
The generalizations that have made these debates and doctrines
possible in American federal courts jurisprudence are simply
unavailable in contemporary international law. As Roger Alford has
observed, “[C]omparative analysis is unusually difficult, because a
variety of international tribunals should be examined across a variety
of national jurisdictions. While the questions may be the same across
jurisdictions, the answers will be fluid, and will depend on the
particular country involved.”298 Because neither side of the
comparison can be held constant, it is hard to know even how to
begin developing a set of interjurisdictional doctrines to allocate
decisional authority between supranational courts and domestic

295. The 1996 federal habeas reform statute, for example, offered to accord greater
deference to the decisions of state courts in capital cases where the state in question had
adopted certain reforms pertaining to the representation of capital defendants. Inmates in such
states must file their petitions under an extremely strict 180 day statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2263 (2000). No state has yet been found to meet the requirements of the Act.
296. Perhaps the period of greatest divergence involved the unwillingness of state courts in
the South to enforce federal rights during the period of the Civil Rights Movement. This
deficiency was thought to be sufficiently serious to motivate a substantial expansion of federal
court review over state court convictions and, under the Voting Rights Act, nonjudicial review
of state and local political arrangements by the national Department of Justice. 42 U.S.C. § 1973
(2000). Significantly, however, the difficulty was not so much in the capacity of the southern
state courts as institutions but rather in those courts’ lack of respect for uniform national
standards. In any event, the important point is that these sorts of divergences have almost never
been thought to require different interjurisdictional rules for different state judicial systems.
297. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal
Judiciary, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 233, 233–35 (1988).
298. Alford, supra note 11, at 795.
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institutions. This difficulty strongly suggests that interjurisdictional
doctrine must be flexible enough to take account of varying
institutional capacities at both domestic and supranational levels in
different contexts. It also suggests that the rules cannot be uniform
across supranational regimes and domestic legal systems. I develop
these suggestions further in the next Part.
IV. THE ARCHITECTURE OF
SUPRANATIONAL JUDICIAL COOPERATION
It is far easier to criticize current approaches to the
interjurisdictional problem in foreign affairs than to say where we
need to go from here. In this last Part, I hope at least to identify the
most salient considerations, from a Legal Process standpoint, and to
advance a few suggestions about how they might be addressed. The
first question, addressed in Section A, is whether interjurisdictional
problems should be addressed as a matter of each nation’s foreign
affairs law or as a matter of international law. My own view is that a
proper solution must contain elements of both—that is, some issues
should be resolved on the international plane, but nations should
reserve others for resolution as a matter of their own law.
Section B develops, in a very general way, possible relations
between international law and courts and their domestic counterparts.
I organize the discussion around two key questions: First, should
jurisdiction to consider and apply international law be concurrent
between domestic and international courts, or should it be restricted
to international courts only? Second, if we opt for concurrent
jurisdiction, should international courts have the last word on
international law questions or should the views of domestic courts get
equal weight? Section C then turns to the more general question
whether international rules governing these matters need to be
uniform, despite the varying institutional capacities of different
supranational institutions and domestic legal systems. Section D
briefly considers some ways in which current supranational
institutions might be reformed.
Although a primary thesis of this Article is that international law
has not focused adequately on these sorts of issues, it would be a
profound mistake to think they have been entirely ignored. Section E
thus considers some doctrinal resources already extant in
international law for promoting the notion of institutional settlement.
I focus, in particular, on the European Court of Human Rights’
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doctrine of the “margin of appreciation” and the principle of
“complementarity” in the statute creating the International Criminal
Court. Finally, Section F offers some observations on the politics of
judicial globalization.
Two caveats are necessary. First, some of the questions I pose in
this Part may, in at least some contexts, have relatively firm answers
as a matter of international law. Nonetheless, it seems to me that we
are at an early enough stage of judicial globalization to treat these
299
questions as ones of institutional design. To the extent that
suggestions here cut against settled understandings of international or
foreign affairs law, they can be taken as proposals for reform. Second,
it bears repeating that I do not presume to propose anything
approaching a comprehensive approach. The web of accommodations
that mediate the relationship between state and federal courts in the
U.S. has developed incrementally over time, with contributions from
multiple actors—not only courts, but legislatures, executive actors,
and even private litigants. All the usual disclaimers thus apply with
unusual force when we contemplate efforts to forge similar sorts of
accommodations at the even more complex level of supranational
institutions. I mean only to sketch some directions for future inquiry.
A. Foreign Affairs Law or International Law?
Before asking what kinds of interjurisdictional rules should
govern the interface between supranational and domestic courts, one
must consider whether those rules should exist as a matter of foreign
affairs law or international law. The American Law Institute defines
the “foreign relations law of the United States” somewhat unhelpfully
as “international law as it applies to the United States” and “domestic
law that has substantial significance for the foreign relations of the
United States or has other substantial international consequences.”300
It is more useful to sever the two parts of this definition. I thus use the
term “foreign affairs law” to signify the domestic law of each nation
governing how that nation interacts with the rest of the world. The
domestic rules governing the effect of international law in domestic

299. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 147 (suggesting that “the architects of the next
generation of international institutions should focus on how best to structure the relations
between a supranational entity and its domestic counterpart”).
300. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1 (1987).
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courts, or allocating the power to declare war within the institutions
of the national government, are good examples of foreign affairs law.
It follows that each nation has its own foreign affairs law,
301
whereas there is, at least in theory, only one international law. If we
agree that some (perhaps reformed) doctrine of procedural default is
proper in consular relations cases, for example, we must still ask at
which level to formulate that doctrine. The International Court of
Justice could formulate its own standard for such defaults, perhaps as
an interpretation of the Convention on Consular Relations itself, and
apply it to cases arising in all domestic legal systems. But the doctrine
might instead be formulated by the various national courts for
application in cases arising within their respective domestic
jurisdictions, perhaps as part of a set of rules for determining when
ICJ judgments will be honored. This Section offers some observations
about what is at stake in this choice.
The most obvious issues involve control over the force of
international norms. Nations seeking to maximize their own freedom
of action will likely prefer interjurisdictional rules to be a matter of
their own foreign affairs law; in this way, such rules can be used to
limit the impact of international norms as a constraint on national
action. At the same time, nations have strong interests in ensuring
that other nations abide by the commitments that all have entered
into. These interests will often favor fixing interjurisdictional rules at
the international level, so that they can be designed for rigorous
enforcement of the underlying norms. Critics of strong domestic
procedural default rules in the consular relations cases, for example,
have suggested that such rules encourage similar substantive breaches
by other nations that may endanger Americans abroad.302
It is equally plain that the choice to make interjurisdictional rules
at the national or supranational level will bear on those rules’
legitimacy. No matter how reasonable the U.S. rule of procedural
default is, some observers will view it as an attempt to evade the
underlying treaty obligation; that reaction seems considerably less
likely, however, if the ICJ itself were to acknowledge a comparable

301. There are, of course, any number of treaty-based regimes that bind only the signatories.
See infra text accompanying note 311. The point, however, is that it is rare for any international
norm to take different forms within the scope of its applicability.
302. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, When American States Execute Citizens of Foreign Countries:
The Case of Gerardo Valdez, FindLaw’s Writ (July 24, 2001), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
dorf/20010724.html.
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rule of default. On the other hand, parties disadvantaged by the
application of international rules—say, uncompetitive domestic
industries hurt by trade liberalization—are more likely to perceive
remedies for international violations as legitimate if those remedies
303
are controlled by domestic institutions.
To these straightforward dynamics, however, I want to add one
less obvious consideration: unless international law first carves out a
place for national rules on interjurisdictional questions, there is likely
always to be a significant legitimacy cost to casting such rules at the
national level. National rules of deference, abstention, etc., generally
cannot keep a particular action from being a breach on the
international plane. The U.S. procedural default rule may be right as
rain, but we will still suffer a ruling of noncompliance with the Vienna
Convention unless international law acknowledges that rule. To the
extent that institutional settlement is a legitimate value, then, there
are reasons to incorporate that value at the international level—that
is, in the definition of what international law requires—rather than
simply at the stage where domestic institutions determine what to do
304
about a breach of international law.
Another set of considerations stems from the relationship
between interjurisdictional rules and underlying substantive
obligations. By hypothesis, we deal with the enforcement of
substantive international rules; the question is whether the
enforceability of those rules should be constrained and tempered by
national or international rules. I want to suggest that there is some
advantage to enabling judicial institutions to consider both
substantive and interjurisdictional issues together, as part of the same
body of law. Concerns about remedies, for example, may encourage
courts to temper the substantive definition of norms or encourage
305
them to defer to the judgments of political actors. The opportunity
for this interplay is lost, however, where the entities that define
substantive norms are not charged with developing rules for their

303. This is probably why the NAFTA and WTO implementation acts deny any direct effect
to WTO and NAFTA panel rulings. See infra note 314 and accompanying text.
304. See supra Section III.A.
305. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974) (rejecting interdistrict
remedies for school desegregation based on a determination that the constitutional violation
was confined to the central city school district); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218–20 (1978) (noting
that institutional concerns informed the Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez).
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enforcement. Since the underlying norms here are international, that
may favor resolving at least some interjurisdictional questions at the
international level.
The choice of foreign affairs or international law is most
naturally thought of as a matter of vertical separation of powers,
allocating authority between the international community as a whole
and individual nations. But it has horizontal separation of powers
implications as well. In international criminal law, for instance, the
primary actors at the international level are courts;306 likewise, in the
trade area, the “legislative” arm of the WTO can act only with great
difficulty, leaving much of the work of fleshing out trade agreements
307
to arbitral panels. Supranational arrangements frequently feature
institutional components that have recognizable analogs within
domestic separation of powers schemes, but that exist on the
international plane without being enmeshed in a correspondingly
complete system of checks and balances. One of the most telling
objections to the International Criminal Court, for example, is that its
prosecutor is isolated from the web of institutional interrelationships
that ordinarily ensure that such officials are accountable.308
To be sure, national executives and legislatures also act on the
international plane. But it seems fair to say that it is more difficult for
executive and legislative actors to produce law on an ongoing basis on
that plane; inertial barriers to amendment or new treaty making, each
of which requires agreement of many states with divergent interests
and agendas, are simply too great. As a result, assigning
interjurisdictional rules to the international plane likely means that
such rules will be made by courts, with relatively little input from
other sorts of actors. This has some advantages: it suggests, for
instance, that the rules will be made incrementally, case-by-case, and
that seems sensible in light of the complexity of the relevant
309
questions. On the other hand, such rules will have all the usual

306. See Burke-White, supra note 293, at 95.
307. See, e.g., Jeffery Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 451, 467
(2001) (“WTO lawmaking follows the GATT tradition of ‘rounds,’ complex multilateral
negotiations that resemble constitutional conventions more than ordinary legislation.”).
308. See, e.g., John R. Bolton, The United States and the International Criminal Court,
Remarks to the Federalist Society in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 14, 2002), at http://www.state.gov/
t/us/rm/15158.htm (commenting on the dangers of an “unaccountable Prosecutor”).
309. See Young, Judicial Activism, supra note 281, at 1182, 1206–07 (arguing in favor of
incremental decisionmaking by courts).
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countermajoritarian liabilities traditionally associated with judicial
rulemaking.
Finally, I want to identify two issues that I think are not at stake
in choosing the level at which to make interjurisdictional rules. The
first is the uniformity or diversity of interjurisdictional doctrine. I
have already suggested that, if interjurisdictional rules are to respond
to the variations in institutional capacity both among supranational
institutions and among domestic legal systems, those rules must be
310
variable. But I do not think that means that the rules must exist as
part of each nation’s domestic law of foreign affairs. Although we
often speak of “one” international law for all nations, in reality
international law is pervasively multifarious. Some countries join a
particular multilateral treaty, others do not. Some signatories impose
conditions and reservations on their assent that significantly alter
their obligations. Customary international law means one thing to
most countries, but something else to those who have “persistently
objected” to the development of a particular rule. The same is true of
international rules of procedure and jurisdiction: the jurisdiction of
the ICJ, for instance, is generally limited to those countries that have
consented to be bound by its rulings.311 Fixing particular
interjurisdictional rules at the international level will create some
degree of pressure to make those rules uniform, but uniformity is not
a necessary consequence of that decision.
The other issue is the relative authority of supranational or
national courts. Nations may prefer to fix interjurisdictional rules in
their own foreign affairs law as a means of controlling the impact of
international norms on their actions. But deciding to set at least some
interjurisdictional rules as a matter of international law need not
mean that they must be authoritatively determined and interpreted by
supranational courts. The next section considers a variety of
relationships between supranational and domestic courts with respect
to interpreting and applying international law. Although domestic
courts may sometimes be subordinate to supranational ones with
respect to international norms, this need not be the case. Nations
ceding control of interjurisdictional rules by allowing them to be fixed
in international law may regain some of that control to the extent that
their domestic courts retain authority to interpret international law.
310. See supra text accompanying note 298. I discuss the issue of variability further in
Section IV.C, infra.
311. See BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 680–82.
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B. The Authority to Interpret and Apply International Law
The central interjurisdictional issue concerns the allocation
between supranational and domestic courts of authority to interpret
and apply international law. Two issues are critical: First, should
domestic courts have concurrent authority to decide questions of
international law, or should those questions be vested exclusively in
supranational institutions? To the extent that we choose some form of
concurrent jurisdiction, a second question arises: Should the system
have a hierarchy of interpretive authority, so that supranational
interpretations of international law bind domestic courts? Or should
it place domestic and supranational interpretations on a level plane?
1. Concurrent or Exclusive Jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of
domestic courts to apply and interpret international law is often
caught up in a debate over whether treaties should be considered
“self-executing” and, more generally, over “monistic” and “dualistic”
theories of international law.312 These questions determine whether
international law applies within the domestic judicial system of its
own force, or whether the national political branches must take some
further action in order to make international law available for judicial
application. I want to sidestep these questions, however. The
arguments for concurrent jurisdiction here can be taken either as
arguments for self-execution or monism, or as arguments that
national political institutions should take the necessary steps to create
such jurisdiction under a dualist system. I want to focus on the
functional effects of concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction, not the
mechanisms or theory necessary to create one or the other system.
Skeptics of international law in this country have traditionally
resisted the notion that domestic courts should generally be
empowered to apply international rules of decision to the cases that
come before them. The preference has been for domestic political
institutions—chiefly Congress and the President, although
occasionally state-level political institutions as well—to serve as
gatekeepers, so that courts may not apply any given principle of
international law until that principle has first been incorporated into

312. See, e.g., Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir.
1985) (stating that treaties “do not provide the basis for a private lawsuit unless they are
intended to be self-executing”); Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the
Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 530 (1999).
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domestic law by statute or executive action. That preference
motivates the position, most prominently associated with Professors
Bradley and Goldsmith, that domestic courts should not apply
customary international law unless expressly authorized to do so by
313
the political branches.
The same preference for presumptively excluding international
law from the domestic courts seems to undergird the structure of
trade regimes like NAFTA and the WTO. These regimes seek to
protect the domestic legal system by denying to supranational
decisions any direct domestic effect. The American statute
implementing NAFTA, for example, provides that NAFTA panel
decisions have no direct effect absent implementing measures by the
314
U.S. political branches. Failure to take such measures might leave
the U.S. in violation of NAFTA as a matter of international law, but
national political institutions control the extent to which
supranational actors can intervene in domestic law.315
These sorts of arrangements seek to “wall off” the domestic
sphere from the impact of international rules. In so doing, they confer
exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and apply international law on
supranational tribunals. It is not at all clear, however, that this
approach will be effective in protecting the integrity of domestic

313. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of
International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260, 2260 (1998) (“CIL should not be a source of law for
courts in the United States unless the appropriate sovereign—the federal political branches or
the appropriate state entity—makes it so.”). For a critique of this position, see Young,
Customary International Law, supra note 177, at 369–70.
314. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(2) (2000) (“No State law, or the application thereof, may
be declared invalid as to any person or circumstance on the ground that the provision or
application is inconsistent with the Agreement, except in an action brought by the United States
for the purpose of declaring such law or application invalid.”). The WTO agreement has been
implemented similarly. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (2000) (“No provision of any of the Uruguay
Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance,
that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.”); id. § 3512(c)(1)(B)
(prohibiting challenges to government conduct on the ground that the conduct violates WTO
obligations).
315. See, e.g., Samuel C. Straight, Note, Gatt and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute
Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216, 250–53 (1995); see also
William H. Lash III, The Decline of the Nation State in International Trade and Investment, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 1011, 1013–16 (1996) (dismissing sovereignty concerns about the WTO as
“childish and simplistic” based on the same argument); William R. Sprance, The World Trade
Organization and United States’ Sovereignty: The Political and Procedural Realities of the
System, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1225, 1232–33 (1998) (arguing that the WTO does not threaten
U.S. sovereignty because, under the implementing legislation, domestic institutions must act
before WTO tribunal decisions can effect changes in U.S. law).
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institutions. I have argued elsewhere against the assumption that a
supranational ruling that is not binding on internal actors has no
316
effect on domestic political arrangements.
Consider, for example, the Mississippi state court practices at
issue in Loewen. Congress periodically considers tort reform
proposals to change such practices, perhaps by capping punitive
damages or regulating the procedures by which such cases are heard.
When these proposals fail, it is more likely out of political respect for
state autonomy rather than any lack of constitutional power on
Congress’s part to regulate the practices in question.317 The essence of
federalism in most cases, in other words, lies in political dynamics
318
rather than legal constraints. But now consider how those dynamics
change if a NAFTA tribunal orders the United States to pay $725
million on account of Mississippi’s transgression. Although the
NAFTA order does not itself change Mississippi law, the balance of
political forces against federal regulation of state court procedures
may well shift substantially. The instrument of change will be a
federal statute, but its proximate cause will be an order of a
supranational court.319
This is just one example of why it is mistaken to expect that
international law will have no “bite” on the domestic legal system
simply because it lacks direct effect. If international law is “law” at
all, then it should matter domestically if a particular practice is
declared invalid by a supranational court, even if that court depends
on possibly recalcitrant domestic actors for implementation. It would
have been perfectly proper for Governor James Gilmore to have
stayed Angel Breard’s execution out of respect for the ICJ’s order

316. See Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J.
527, 535 (2003).
317. The failure of such tort reform proposals also has a great deal to do with the strength of
the trial lawyers’ lobby. But I have argued elsewhere that the Framers expected such alliances of
convenience between the self-interest of particular interest groups and the institutional interests
of state governments to be an important mechanism for protecting federalism. Ernest A. Young,
Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1308–10 (2004).
318. Cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985) (preferring
political and institutional checks on national power rather than judicial review); Herbert
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558–60 (1954) (same).
319. For discussion of ways the national government might respond to a NAFTA judgment
occasioned by state conduct, see Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2103–04; Lerner, supra note 27, at
279–81.
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even if everyone agreed that both the ICJ and the U.S. president
320
lacked authority to force him to do so. Even in a case like that,
where supranational bodies depend on the persuasive force of their
rulings for domestic implementation, those rulings are likely to
change the domestic debate in important ways.321 Indeed, Professor
Helfer and Dean Slaughter define the ability of supranational courts
to “convince[] domestic government institutions to exercise power on
their behalf,” notwithstanding a “lack of direct coercive power,” as
“the hallmark of ‘effective’ supranational adjudication.”322 If
supranational courts can be effective in this way—and there is every
323
reason to believe that they can —then we need to worry about
whether those courts’ rulings incorporate proper deference to
domestic procedures and decisionmakers in the first instance, and not
simply to rely on the lack of direct effect to shield our domestic
arrangements.
If international law retains both practical and normative force
despite lacking direct effect, then giving supranational courts
exclusive jurisdiction to interpret it seems counterproductive from the
standpoint of national autonomy. American law takes the opposite
approach by presuming that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
to hear claims arising under federal law absent a clear statement of
Congress’s intent to make federal jurisdiction exclusive.324 The Court
has emphasized that the state courts’ power to adjudicate federal
325
claims is an element of state sovereignty. Although state courts are
bound by the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law, the

320. See supra note 105 (discussing the events of the Breard case). The issue is more
complex in Medellin for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, whose discretion to grant relief is
sharply restricted by statute. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 5.
321. See Martinez, supra note 8, at 432 (“Compliance with the decisions of international
courts is not perfect, to be sure, but the reputational and other consequences of noncompliance
are factors that political actors cannot simply ignore.”).
322. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 7, at 387.
323. See, e.g., George A. Bermann, Constitutional Implications of U.S. Participation in
Regional Integration, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 463, 478 (1998) (“Notwithstanding reservations on the
part of Congress, the [U.S.] executive branch has shown its readiness to comply with adverse
WTO rulings.”).
324. See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 467 (1990).
325. See id. at 458 (observing that “under our federal system, the States possess sovereignty
concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the
Supremacy Clause,” and that “we have consistently held that state courts have inherent
authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of
the United States”).
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opportunity to participate in the construction and application of
326
federal law gives states an important voice.
At the international level, Abram and Antonia Chayes have
stressed that the ability to participate in international legal regimes is
327
an element of sovereignty, not a restriction upon it. In both the
domestic and the international context, the power to apply another
jurisdiction’s law is the power to participate in the shaping of that law.
Federal courts explicitly empowered to decide human rights cases
328
under the Torture Victims Protection Act, for example, can
contribute to ongoing international efforts to define what counts as
“torture.” Domestic courts have no role, by contrast, in construing the
NAFTA and WTO agreements; as a result, they have no opportunity
to shape the interpretation of those provisions in ways that are
respectful of domestic law and institutions. This sort of exclusion
seems particularly damaging in situations where the law is left to be
construed by a specialist supranational body with a built-in
institutional bias favoring broad application of particular
international norms. Finally, supranational courts themselves seem
more likely to respect the domestic legal system when that system has
itself made room for the application of international norms.
My own view is that, at least in the short term, the greater threat
to domestic institutions comes not from the application of
international law by domestic courts but from the exalted status that
international lawyers often claim for it in that setting. Advocates for
the domestic incorporation of customary international law, for
example, have not helped their cause by claiming that customary law
trumps state law,329 federal statutes,330 or even the Constitution in

326. See, e.g., Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102–04 (1962) (holding that state
courts with concurrent jurisdiction over federal labor law claims have the authority and
obligation to formulate rules of federal common law to govern such cases).
327. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 81, at 27. But see Anderson, supra note 19, at 1300
(noting the limitations of this definition).
328. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). The TVPA explicitly establishes a federal
cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing, see id. § 2(a)(1) & (2), and it is settled that
the creation of a federal cause of action confers federal question jurisdiction on the federal
courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S.
257, 260 (1916) (“A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”).
329. E.g., Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1555, 1561 (1984) [hereinafter Henkin, International Law]; Brilmayer, supra note 256, at 295–99.
330. See, e.g., Henkin, International Law, supra note 329, at 1563–67 (suggesting that
customary norms should trump federal statutes or treaties where the customary norms develop
later in time).

110305 YOUNG.DOC

1226

12/19/2005 3:04 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:1143

331

some cases. But one need not insist that customary international law
is equivalent to supreme federal law to suggest that domestic courts
should ordinarily have power to apply it; as I and others have
332
suggested elsewhere, there are various ways for domestic courts to
recognize international norms without accepting internationalist
assertions about those norms’ position in the legal food chain. There
is a large excluded middle between the “international law trumps
everything” and the “keep international law out of domestic courts”
positions. And the development of mediating doctrines that limit the
disruption of domestic institutions is most likely when international
law is applied in domestic courts.
This nationalist argument for concurrent domestic jurisdiction
over international law may suggest why internationalists might prefer
333
exclusive jurisdiction in supranational courts. Such exclusivity might
take a different form than the NAFTA implementation act; for
instance, internationalists might prefer a system in which domestic
courts applied international law directly but were required to refer
disputed questions to supranational tribunals. That system might
draw upon the European Union’s “preliminary reference” procedure,
whereby questions of Community law are referred from national
courts to the European Court of Justice,334 or the occasional American
practice of certifying questions of state law arising in federal court to
the state supreme courts for resolution.335 This model would not be
331. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign
Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1090–92 (1985); Ludwikowski, supra note
169, at 276 (suggesting that “any amendment or interpretation of the Constitution, bringing it in
conflict with customary international law . . . would have to be recognized as unconstitutional
itself”).
332. See Young, Customary International Law, supra note 177, at 467–83; Michael D.
Ramsey, International Law as Non-preemptive Federal Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 555, 555–58
(2002).
333. See e.g., Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 1, 51 (2004) (“International law scholars often assume that the best way to enforce
human rights is by establishing strong international institutions that develop the law
progressively and enforce it independently.”).
334. See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Cohen, The European Preliminary Reference and U.S. Supreme
Court Review of State Court Judgments: A Study in Comparative Judicial Federalism, 44 AM. J.
COMP. L. 421, 423 (1996) (discussing the “preliminary reference” procedure as outlined in the
Treaty of Rome).
335. See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75–80 (1997)
(discussing the virtues of the certification procedure); Burke-White, supra note 293, at 94–95
(suggesting that national courts refer questions of international criminal law to the International
Criminal Court). But see Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question . . . , 29
SUFFOLK L. REV. 677, 691 (1995) (criticizing certification procedures on the domestic plane).
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truly “exclusive” in the sense that national courts would be
empowered to apply international law when its content was
uncontroverted, and determining when a question of law is worth
referring to the supranational court might itself involve the domestic
court in construing international law. Nonetheless, the autonomy of
the domestic courts with respect to international law would be
minimal in such a system.
I want to argue against this sort of model, and not just for the
nationalist reason that domestic courts should have power to shape
international law to accommodate national institutions and
preferences. One problem is that many disputes will involve issues of
both domestic and international law, and it may distort decisions to
consider them in isolation from one another. A national court
confronted with an ambiguous domestic statute and a claim under
international law may construe domestic law to avoid the
336
international issue; the potential for such avoidance, for example, is
one reason why American abstention doctrine requires federal claims
337
to be presented to state courts in conjunction with state claims. This
problem may be mitigated by presenting the international issues to
the domestic court and then referring them to supranational
decisionmakers, but consider the converse situation, in which
international law may be construed to accommodate domestic
arrangements. Under the “margin of appreciation” doctrine, for
instance, the European Court of Human Rights accords a certain
leeway to national governments for implementing international
human rights in ways that accommodate national priorities and
institutions.338 A national court that has both domestic and
international law issues before it may have an easier time applying
this doctrine than a supranational court with authority to decide only
the international question.
The more important arguments from the internationalist
standpoint, however, have to do with securing international law’s
acceptance, integration, and enforcement within the domestic legal
336. See, e.g., Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804)
(recognizing a canon of construction of federal statutes to avoid conflict with international law).
337. See Gov’t & Civic Employees Org. Comm., CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366 (1957).
338. See generally HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION
DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996);
Carozza, supra note 31, at 61 (defining the “margin of appreciation” as “the breadth of
deference or error the [ECHR] will allow national bodies before it will declare a violation of . . .
the Convention”).
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system. Domestic forces skeptical of international law may be more
willing to accept it when it is interpreted and applied by domestic
courts. Moreover, concurrent jurisdiction provides an opportunity for
supranational tribunals to build relationships with domestic courts
that may enhance the power of both sets of institutions. Many
observers have remarked, for example, that the European Court of
Justice solidified its institutional position by enlisting national courts
in the development of European law.339 And others have suggested
that the true measure of success for an international tribunal is the
extent to which it can encourage domestic courts to enforce the
international norm on their own initiative.340
For a variety of reasons, national courts will often offer the best
prospects for vigorous enforcement of international law. Professor
Burke-White has noted, with respect to international criminal law,
that national courts are both ubiquitous and “often have the best
access to information, evidence, and testimony about the alleged
events”; international institutions like the ICC, by contrast, labor
341
Likewise, the ICJ—which
under severe capacity constraints.
decided only ninety-nine contentious cases between 1946 and
2001342—cannot hope to police enforcement of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations; that is why controversy in cases
like Avena and Breard focuses on the obligation of national courts to
enforce the treaty themselves. If international law is truly to be law in
the sense of regular application and enforcement touching not only
states but private actors, it must be interpreted and enforced beyond
the bounds of a few specialized tribunals at the supranational level.
This last point suggests a final caution about the nationalist
argument for concurrent jurisdiction that I sketched earlier.
Concurrent jurisdiction is a double-edged sword, simultaneously
strengthening the place of international norms in our legal order
while offering domestic courts an opportunity to moderate and shape
their content. Hard-line nationalists may prefer to eschew this

339. See, e.g., Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 7, at 290–93.
340. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, International Criminal Law and the Role of Domestic
Courts, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 120, 123 (2001); Turner, supra note 333, at 22; Anne-Marie Slaughter,
A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 240, 246 (2000) (“[A]—if
not the—primary function of public international law is . . . to influence and improve the
functioning of domestic institutions.”).
341. Burke-White, supra note 293, at 15; see also Carozza, supra note 31, at 72–73 (giving
reasons why national courts may be better at enforcing human rights).
342. BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 693.
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compromise, accepting the risk that supranational institutions will
construe international norms in ways unsympathetic to American
institutions in order to deny those norms any more of a domestic
343
foothold than they already enjoy. It seems to me, however, that the
hour is growing late for such a strategy. We have embraced
international law on too many fronts to “wall off” our domestic
institutions from its influence. Better to participate, in hopes that
domestic courts can shape international law in ways that
accommodate our domestic arrangements.
2. Supremacy or Shared Law. If national and supranational
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over international law questions,
then the system needs a rule governing the respective interpretive
authority of those courts. In the American system, federal and state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over questions of federal law, but
state courts are bound by the U.S. Supreme Court’s constructions of
that law. The federal courts—more precisely, the supreme federal
court—thus exercises interpretive supremacy over federal law.344
345
Although this aspect of the system was once contested, it is no
longer disputed today.
The American system offers two distinct models for
implementing interpretive supremacy. The norm is an appellate
model, whereby state court decisions interpreting federal law can be
346
appealed from the highest state court to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Court employs this jurisdiction to enforce the supremacy of
federal law against sometimes recalcitrant state courts and, more
often, to promote the uniformity of that law by resolving conflicting

343. Cf. Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2145 (observing that, by exercising restraint in their
infancy, the ECJ and the ECHR were able to undertake much more aggressive assertions of
power later on). Nationalists may well prefer to avoid a similar risk in this country.
344. State courts generally respect the views of federal district and circuit courts on federal
law questions, but they are bound only by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court. Likewise,
all federal courts—including the Supreme Court—are bound to follow the highest state court
when exercising their concurrent jurisdiction over state law questions. See, e.g., Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 204–05 (1956) (referring to cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Vermont in determining how to interpret Vermont law).
345. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 340–43 (1816) (rejecting the
Virginia Court of Appeals’ argument that, while the Supremacy Clause makes federal law
supreme, the state courts enjoyed equal power to interpret that law); HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 15, at 479–81 (describing attacks on the U.S. Supreme Court’s authority before and
after Martin).
346. 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
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interpretations. The effectiveness of the appellate model is limited,
however, by the Court’s capacity to hear less than one hundred cases
347
a year out of thousands of petitions for review.
The Court’s limited capacity to police state courts creates
pressure for a different model of supremacy in areas where state
compliance with federal norms is suspect. The primary alternative in
our system is collateral review, exemplified by federal habeas corpus
review of state criminal convictions.348 Collateral review allows
persons who feel that the state courts have failed to vindicate their
federal rights to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal trial courts,
which obviously can process a great many more cases than the
349
Supreme Court alone. Review takes place as a separate lawsuit
focused on the alleged violation of federal law, rather than an appeal
of the original judgment. And in the U.S. system, strong rules of
deference limit the federal courts’ ability to second-guess state court
decisions, even on questions of federal law.350
Many internationalists will be tempted by some version of
supremacy for supranational interpretations of international law. But
it is difficult to see how either model would work in theory or

347. Moreover, only a relatively small proportion of these cases come from the state courts.
See Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century,
35 IND. L. REV. 335, 353 tbl.1 (2002) (noting that, between 1997 and 1999, the Court heard only
ten to twelve cases a year from the state courts). For a discussion of the Court’s limited docket
as a constraint on its power, see McNollgast, supra note 272, at 1641.
348. It is no surprise that the federal courts first acquired jurisdiction to hear collateral
attacks on state convictions during Reconstruction, Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385,
when Congress did not trust southern state courts to mete out equal justice to African
Americans. For a somewhat different take on the habeas analogy to supranational adjudication,
see Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2068–72.
349. But see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 545 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting
significant limits on the capacity of the lower federal courts to oversee state courts through the
habeas system).
350. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000):
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of
the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States . . . .
See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 385 (2000) (interpreting the standard of review in
§ 2254(d)(1) as “a command that a federal court not issue the habeas writ unless the state court
was wrong as a matter of law or unreasonable in its application of law in a given case”). When
hearing direct appeals from state courts on issues of federal law, by contrast, the Supreme Court
reviews the legal issues de novo. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (conducting
de novo review of a state court’s application of federal law to the facts).
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practice. Perhaps because of civil law influences or simply the relative
dearth of supranational tribunals, international law has not tended to
accord the decisions of such tribunals the same binding authority that
one finds in many domestic legal systems. Article 38 of the statute of
the International Court of Justice, which is generally taken to be an
authoritative statement of the sources of international law, puts
judicial decisions on the same level as “highly qualified publicists” as
“subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”351 Decisions
of the ICJ, moreover, bind the parties on a contractual theory similar
to agreements to be bound by arbitration, rather than as authoritative
statements binding on all other interpreters.352 It would be odd for
supranational decisions construing international law to bind national
courts when international law is itself so ambivalent about the force
of those decisions. To say that American courts are bound by the
ICJ’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention in the Avena case (as
opposed to its judgment as to the particular prisoners involved),
would seem to directly contradict the ICJ statute.
A supremacy-based regime of either appellate or collateral
review would also be difficult to structure. Supranational institutions
like the ICJ or the ICC face similar capacity constraints in policing
international law decisions by national courts to those that the U.S.
Supremes confront in supervising the state courts. The generally
obscure means by which supranational courts are constituted might
likewise come under intense scrutiny and pressure if those courts
were empowered to reverse or vacate decisions by national courts.
After all, how many Americans can name a judge of the ICJ, much
less explain the manner by which she came to have that position?
Finally, in our own system, there are constitutional difficulties with
permitting the decisions of federal courts to be reviewed by tribunals
353
outside the national judicial system.
351. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, art. 38, para. 1, sec. d, 59
Stat. 1031, 1060 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 19 (“Judicial
decisions are not strictly speaking a formal source [of international law], but in some instances
at least they are regarded as authoritative evidence of the state of the law . . . .”).
352. See ICJ Statute, supra note 351, art. 59 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force
except as between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”); see also BROWNLIE, supra
note 26, at 21 (“Strictly speaking, the Court does not observe a doctrine of precedent.”).
353. Article III generally requires that the judgments of federal courts not be subject to
revision by actors outside the judicial branch. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409–14
(1792); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (holding that Congress
could not require federal courts to reopen final judgments); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15,
at 96–107 (discussing Article III’s finality requirement). An appellate model, in which a
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The alternative to a regime of supranational interpretive
supremacy is what we might call a system of “shared law.” Perhaps
the best example is the “law merchant,” a form of private customary
international law recognized by the Supreme Court in Swift v.
354
Tyson. In that case, Justice Story observed that “[t]he law respecting
negotiable instruments” was “not the law of a single country only, but
355
of the commercial world.” As William Fletcher has shown, that law
was shared among the courts of many nations and, within the United
States, among the federal and state courts.356 No single court had
interpretive supremacy over any other, so that just as the federal
courts were not obliged to follow the New York Court of Appeal’s
view of the general commercial law governing negotiable instruments,
neither were the state courts of New York required to accept the U.S.
Supreme Court’s.357 This “general law” regime will seem unfamiliar
and problematic to American readers who cut their jurisprudential
358
teeth on Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. But shared law persists in our
system. A more familiar example is the Uniform Commercial Code,
which is adopted separately by multiple state jurisdictions, but which
nonetheless purports to describe a fairly uniform body of law. The
courts of different states aim to maintain a common set of commercial
supranational tribunal reviews federal court judgments on international questions, would almost
surely run afoul of this principle. A collateral review model that accorded significant deference
to the prior federal ruling, on the other hand, might be less problematic. See, e.g., Tutun v.
United States, 270 U.S. 568, 580 (1926) (rejecting an Article III challenge to the procedure for
petitions for naturalization, which accorded such petitions only a limited res judicata effect in
future litigation). And a form of collateral review that does not attack the original judgment
would probably avoid these problems entirely. The denial-of-justice claim in Loewen, for
instance, did nothing to the judgment obtained by the O’Keeffes in state court; rather, it sought
a penalty against the U.S. This sort of procedure has other liabilities, of course, and it is unclear
whether it could achieve the objective of binding, uniform interpretations of law. In any event, a
complete parsing of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article.
354. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law
Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2354 (1991) (“[T]hroughout the early nineteenth century,
American courts regularly construed and applied the unwritten law of nations as part of the
‘general common law,’ particularly to resolve commercial disputes, without regard to whether it
should be characterized as federal or state.”).
355. Swift, 41 U.S. at 19.
356. William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1517–21 (1984).
357. Id. at 1538–39. See also TONY FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND
ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 40 (1981) (“[N]o one imagined that federal judges
possessed authority over state courts [in cases under the general common law], any more than
state judges had the power to instruct their brothers on the federal bench.”).
358. 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938) (overruling Swift and holding that federal courts must apply
state law in diversity suits).

110305 YOUNG.DOC

2005]

12/19/2005 3:04 PM

GLOBAL INSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT

1233

rules, despite the fact that none can exercise interpretive supremacy
over the others.
Regimes of shared law are even easier to find on the
international plane. In most cases where two nations make a treaty
that imposes obligations but creates no supranational institutions—
that is, most treaties—it will fall to the courts of the two nations to
interpret and enforce the treaty within their respective jurisdictions.
Neither will exercise interpretive supremacy over the other, and there
generally will be no third tribunal to which the two states can appeal
to resolve conflicting interpretations. But notions of reciprocity will
provide powerful incentives for the two nations to interpret the treaty
359
similarly. The treaty’s provisions will thus be shared law between
the two legal systems.
Despite recent proliferation of multilateral regimes enforced by
supranational tribunals, then, the shared law model should be a
relatively familiar alternative to interpretive supremacy. Paolo
Carozza has observed, for example, that “in most contexts, there are
no definitive international interpreters of the normative content of
360
human rights.” Likewise, the ICJ statute recognizes not only the
decisions of supranational tribunals but also national court decisions
361
as evidence of international law. The question is whether shared law
regimes are a normatively attractive alternative to interpretive
supremacy. To assess that question, it may help to consider Judge
Fletcher’s account of why the shared law regime of Swift v. Tyson
worked relatively well for many decades, as well as the reasons that
the system ultimately broke down at the end of the nineteenth
century.362
Judge Fletcher argued that the general commercial law retained
a relatively high degree of legitimacy and uniformity, despite the lack
of either legislative adoption or a supreme judicial interpreter, for
three primary reasons. First, because that law dealt with commercial

359. See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660–61 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that American courts should look to interpretations of a treaty by other signatories’
courts to maintain uniform meaning).
360. Carozza, supra note 31, at 62.
361. See ICJ Statute, supra note 351, art. 38, para. 1, § d; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 26,
at 22.
362. I have discussed the rise and fall of the law merchant in more detail elsewhere, in the
context of inquiring whether state and federal courts might successfully “share” customary
international law in the U.S. as a form of general common law. See Young, Customary
International Law, supra note 177, at 499–503.
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transactions among relatively sophisticated parties that put a
premium on predictability, most actors thought it more important
363
that issues be settled than that they be settled right. Second,
American courts inherited a consolidated corpus of the law merchant
364
And third, although each state
from English jurisprudence.
jurisdiction was in theory the equal of the U.S. Supreme Court on
commercial law questions, in practice a few courts—the state supreme
courts of jurisdictions like New York, and especially the U.S.
Supreme Court—played leading and coordinating roles.365
The reasons that the Swift regime broke down are equally
significant. One problem arose from the broadening of the general
common law’s scope: whereas the Swift regime covered only
commercial matters in its early days, by the end of the nineteenth
century it had spread to engage virtually all the common law subjects,
such as torts and noncommercial contracts.366 Likewise, as Lawrence
Lessig has pointed out, the general common law became increasingly
normative in its content; rather than reflecting the customary
practices of merchants, it came to impose a particular normative
vision held by the federal courts but often not shared by the state
jurisdictions in which they operated.367
This history suggests reasons to worry about international law as
a system of shared law. International law is increasingly pervasive in
scope and normative in content; the latter point is illustrated by the
shift in the sources of customary international law from primary
reliance on customary practice to more normative statements of
opinio juris.368 Many of the issues now embraced by international
363. Fletcher, supra note 356, at 1562–63.
364. Id. at 1565–66.
365. Id. at 1566, 1575.
366. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in
Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1792 (1997); FREYER, supra note 357, at 58.
367. See Lessig, supra note 366 (observing that the “federal general common law” under
Swift “was less the practice of gap-filling for parties to a commercial transaction, and more a
practice of norm-enforcement, covering a substantial scope of sovereign authority. The common
law was no longer reflective, or mirroring of private understandings; it had become directive, or
normative over those private understandings”); see also FREYER, supra note 357, at xii–xiii
(arguing that the general common law became a tool for imposing preferences for laissez faire
government, shared by large national business interests, on state governments); EDWARD
PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER,
AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 65–67
(2000) (same).
368. See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTRL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 89–90 (1992).
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law—a state’s respect for the human rights of its citizens, for
instance—are not the sort of things that many will regard as more
369
important to be settled than settled right. Moreover, much of this
law seems in relatively early stages of development, rather than
amounting to a settled corpus like the “law merchant” principles that
American courts inherited from their English predecessors. As a
result, divergence among jurisdictions seems likely in the absence of
some central authority with power and capacity to enforce uniform
interpretations.
Fortunately, the Swift experience may also suggest ways to
facilitate the sharing of international law among national and
supranational courts in a nonhierarchical system. First, it seems
important to minimize the intrusion of international law into areas of
normative disagreement, either by simply not “internationalizing”
certain areas, or by articulating international norms at a very high
level of generality and leaving more specific development of those
norms to national courts. The latter approach is consistent, for
example, with the framing of many extant human rights conventions
in very general terms.370 It may also be possible to secure somewhat
more agreement on interjurisdictional rules, because such rules
implicate normative disagreements only indirectly.
The second point is that supranational tribunals may play an
important coordinating role. As Judge Fletcher has noted, the volume
of cases on commercial law decided by the Supreme Court, the
prestige of its justices, and its position atop the federal hierarchy
371
made it “primus inter pares.” One might expect supranational
institutions like the ICJ, the ICC, and the WTO appellate body to
perform a similar coordinating function even if national courts enjoy
concurrent jurisdiction and even if the supranational bodies lack
interpretive supremacy. National political actors can likewise increase
the odds for consistent interpretations in such a regime by specifying

369. This may be less true in the area of international trade, which still puts a high premium
on stability, uniformity, and predictability. But the problem in trade law increasingly concerns
its overlap with areas, like environmental law, in which people hold strong normative
preferences.
370. See Carozza, supra note 31, at 58 (“[I]nternational human rights law has been
characterized by a certain normative thinness—an incapacity to specify in sufficiently
determinate ways the content of its requirements—and by mechanisms of supervision and
compliance that leave great latitude to states to implement and enforce the norms as they see
fit.”).
371. Fletcher, supra note 356, at 1575.
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the meaning of particular aspects of international law through treaty
making, or by codifying their understandings of the relevant norms in
372
domestic legislation.
This discussion hardly answers all the questions posed by a
system of concurrent jurisdiction over international law questions in
which no central authority enjoys interpretive supremacy. Many other
questions of judicial architecture are also likely to arise in either a
supremacy or shared law system. For instance, I have said little about
rules of abstention, which encourage some courts to defer decisions so
that other institutions may take the first crack at a question, or
remedies, which may be limited and framed in ways that mitigate the
disruptive impact of international law on domestic institutions. The
point of this Article, however, is to mark out an agenda for future
discussion, not to flesh out what a system of international judicial
cooperation ought to look like.
C. Uniformity or “Double Standards” in International
Interjurisdictional Rules
This Section takes up the question, raised in Part III, whether
interjurisdictional rules governing the relationship between
supranational and domestic courts should be uniform.373 The
judgments involved are analogous to the “parity” question in Federal
Courts law—that is, the degree of deference and finality accorded to
state judicial institutions has depended on our confidence in the state
system’s competence in comparison with the federal courts.374 Rules
embodying similar parity judgments at the interface between
domestic and supranational judicial institutions should be approached
with due regard for the difficulty of comparing institutional
375
competence at that level. The problem with building “wholesale”
parity judgments into the structure of the supranational rules is that
different domestic systems differ wildly in their comparative
competence vis-à-vis the supranational body. And the problem with
making such parity judgments applicable to a broad range of
supranational institutions is that those institutions are likewise highly

372. See, e.g., Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) (codifying a definition of torture pursuant to Congress’s power to “define and punish”
violations of the law of nations).
373. See supra Section III.C.2.
374. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
375. See supra Section III.C.2.
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376
variable in their structure and competence. These two difficulties
can be defined, respectively, as the “vertical” and “horizontal”
dimensions of the parity problem.
If rules of complementarity and deference are to reflect the
variable competence of different domestic legal systems, they will
almost surely have to be made retail rather than wholesale. In other
words, the rules will have to treat different supranational institutions,
and particularly different nations’ legal systems, differently. That
conclusion runs head-on into a deeply entrenched reluctance among
international lawyers to embrace “double standards.” Dean Koh, for
example, has denounced double standards—defined as “when the
United States proposes that a different rule should apply to itself than
applies to the rest of the world”—as the most pernicious form of
“American exceptionalism.”377 This aversion to treating different
nations differently has deep theoretical roots in the doctrine of the
378
sovereign equality of states. For the same reason that Guyana and
the United States have the same number of votes in the United
Nations General Assembly, it is hard for international lawyers to
contemplate rules that give different weight to the determinations of
each country’s domestic judicial system.
One attempt to avoid double standards has been to frame
substantive international norms in a way that sets a uniform but
relatively minimal floor. This sort of approach, which we might call a
“worst case” strategy, would design the interaction between
international and domestic institutions so as to facilitate the
imposition of basic international norms—e.g., of human rights or free
trade—on the countries that are least likely to respect them without
external pressure. This view seems to undergird the pressure to
develop international law into a comprehensive code of human rights;
in some countries, after all, international human rights will be the
only human rights that people have. Likewise, the expropriation

376. See Alford, supra note 11, at 792 (suggesting that because international tribunals have
different institutional characteristics, there should be a “continuum of deference” paid by
domestic courts in different circumstances).
377. Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1485–86
(2003) [hereinafter Koh, Exceptionalism].
378. See Burley, supra note 5, at 226 (observing that international law has refused “to
differentiate between different types of state on the basis of domestic regime type . . . since
Grotius,” and that this view “is grounded in the very concept of ‘sovereign states’ as the equal
and identical subjects of international law, and buttressed by the affirmative norms of sovereign
equality and nonintervention”).
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provisions of NAFTA and many bilateral investment treaties seem to
have been designed with a view toward preventing nationalization of
investments by countries without a sufficiently protective (in the eyes
379
of potential investors) notion of property rights. In each instance,
the worst case perspective counsels that supranational adjudicators
should accord relatively little deference to domestic legal institutions.
And because it is politically difficult to defer to one country’s
domestic institutions but not another’s based on a qualitative
judgment that one country’s domestic courts are “better,” the lack of
deference becomes universal.380
The “worst case” approach purports to finesse the
interjurisdictional problem by framing the substantive norms in such a
way that they (hopefully) will only rarely require interference with
the domestic legal system. This strategy assumes that international
norms are largely duplicative of the rights protected in a wellestablished constitutional democracy like the United States: it is third
world dictatorships that run afoul of the ICCPR, not the United
States, and we can therefore expect, as a practical matter, relatively
381
little international interference in domestic legal affairs. Likewise,
the expropriation provisions of NAFTA and various other investment
treaties are designed to thwart socialist-style nationalizations, not to
interfere with American regulation.
Recent experience suggests, however, that these assumptions
have been too optimistic in expecting that international norms would
simply mirror American principles. In some areas, like the death
penalty, international norms have been more “progressive” than the
382
American people; in others, where rights such as free speech and

379. See Lerner, supra note 27, at 244–45.
380. One might think, for instance, that the procedural default bar to Consular Convention
arguments is more acceptable in a country like the United States, which provides domestic
counsel to indigent defendants regardless of their nationality, than in a country in which it is
either consular assistance or nothing. But it is politically difficult to say that Convention
violations should be treated differently depending on the violating country.
381. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 157, at 1988–89 (observing that Americans have viewed
“the fundamental rights guaranteed by international law” as “rights already enshrined in the
United States Constitution,” but “emphatically resisted” the notion “that international law
could be a means of changing internal or domestic U.S. law”).
382. I am skeptical that the abandonment of the death penalty in many other industrialized
countries represents “progress” rather than simply a different conclusion on a contestable moral
question. One cannot simply assume that political change is in the direction of improvement
rather than decline. See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, Merlin’s Memory: The Past and Future
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freedom from racial oppression may trade off with one another,
383
international and American law have simply made different choices.
Many observers in the trade area have been surprised to see
expropriation provisions such as NAFTA’s Chapter 11 brought to
bear on traditional forms of American regulation.384 In any event, it is
clear that if international law is to be enforced without deference to
domestic legal institutions, American political arrangements and
practices will have to change just like everyone else’s.
Nor is it obvious that international law ought to content itself
with least-common-denominator standards. International law might
demand a relatively high standard of procedural due process for
accused criminals, for example, while recognizing that many quite
different procedural regimes might meet that standard. Indeed, the
international law objective may be met more effectively where the
means can be tailored to local customs, preferences, and
385
innovations. The important point, however, is that even “worst
case” standards may well spark conflicts between international law
and domestic arrangements in systems with well-developed legal
systems. Nondeferential interjurisdictional rules cannot be justified
on the assumption that supranational courts will be dealing only with
undeveloped or low-capacity national court systems.
Fortunately, “double standards” are neither as unusual nor as
troubling as they have sometimes been made out to be. The common
practice of ratifying treaties with reservations creates significant
disuniformities in the international law that applies to different

Imperfect of the Once and Future Polity, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 163, 172–73 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
383. See, e.g., Kevin Boyle, Hate Speech—The United States Versus the Rest of the World?, 53
ME L. REV. 487, 493–97 (2001).
384. See, e.g., Charles H. Brower, II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: A Tale of Fear
and Equilibrium, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 43, 51 (2001) (observing that the U.S. government expected
Chapter 11 “to provide a depoliciticized method of protecting U.S. investors against the
arbitrary conduct of Mexican officials,” but that “the promiscuous use of Chapter 11 to
challenge public regulatory laws in Canada and the U.S. has thrust it into the center of a highly
politicized debate”); Patricia Isela Hansen, Judicialization and Globalization in the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 489, 498–99 (2003) (noting that private
enforcement under NAFTA Chapter 11 has gone further than any of the signatory states seem
to have expected).
385. See Carozza, supra note 31, at 76 (“Transnational unification of law has its price as well,
such as the dampening of potential innovation and the possible severance of the social and
historical roots of the law.”); cf. DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 77–78 (1995)
(collecting arguments that local autonomy improves the implementation of central policy goals).
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386
states, and the international regime tolerates these disuniformities
subject only to the notion that reservations contrary to the “object
and purpose” of a treaty are void.387 Some treaty regimes, moreover,
include express limitations and derogations clauses, which allow
signatories to depart from treaty norms in certain exigencies or in the
interest of certain values.388 Most fundamentally, many crucial
international regimes are not universal; the trade rules applicable to
non-WTO members, for instance, obviously differ from those that
apply to members of the club.
As I discuss in Section E, international law has developed
doctrines designed to accommodate these disuniformities. In
particular, the principle of complementarity, most prominent in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,389 is designed to
impose an international solution only where the domestic legal system
cannot meet the goal of the international regime. This is surely a
“double standard”—international law intervenes in some domestic
legal systems, but leaves others to their own devices—and yet it
carries none of the negative connotations that Dean Koh associates
with such differential treatment. There is thus nothing inherently
American or obnoxious about saying that supranational bodies
should defer more to well-developed domestic judicial systems with
extensive competence to decide international law questions than they
should to domestic institutions that lack resources, experience,
adequate procedural safeguards, or guarantees against political bias.
Likewise, at least some American courts have been willing to
evaluate the comparative institutional competence of domestic courts
in different legal systems—even at the risk of offending international
comity. In upholding an antisuit injunction by a federal district court
against parallel proceedings before a French court, for example,
Judge Posner found that because of “the institutional differences

386. See Carozza, supra note 31, at 60 (arguing that reservations “make[] a certain amount
of state discretion over . . . treaty norms central” and create “the necessity for interpretive
pluralism”).
387. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 167, arts. 20–23, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 337–38.
388. See, e.g., ICCPR Art. 22(2) (stating that treaty rights may be restricted as “necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order . . . the
protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedom of others”); see
also Carozza, supra note 31, at 61 (noting that such provisions entail “greater deference to local
authorities”).
389. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at http://www.un.org/law/
icc/statute/romefra.htm.
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between a federal district court and the Commercial Court of Lille,
the district court provides a more appropriate forum for the
390
resolution of the parties’ dispute.” The court was unmoved by
generic comity considerations, in the absence of specific evidence of
391
harm to international relations. As Anne-Marie Slaughter has
pointed out, similar instances of “adequate forum analysis” occur in a
392
wide range of transnational cases heard by domestic courts. This
willingness to examine the institutional competences of foreign
tribunals, she argues, does not indicate an attempt to wall off the
domestic legal system; rather, it is evidence that courts are taking
legal integration seriously. If courts start from the notion that “the
foreign legal system is not separate and entitled to sovereign
deference, but is rather part of an emerging transnational litigation
space in which litigants move freely and choose different national
courts to resolve their disputes,” then different courts will “scrutinize
each other according to the same criteria that they would apply to
other domestic tribunals in the same circumstances.”393 We will see, in
other words, “judges judging judges.”394
The law should likewise take into account the comparative
institutional competence of supranational tribunals vis-à-vis domestic
courts in different domestic systems. “Sovereign equality” is a fiction,
and while fictions often serve useful purposes, there are also times
when they should not be allowed to eclipse reality. Refusal by
supranational tribunals to defer in many cases to the considered
judgment of sophisticated domestic judicial institutions risks pushing
those institutions toward questioning the legitimacy of international
norms;395 on the other hand, deferring to all domestic judicial actors,

390. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 430 (7th Cir. 1993). Judge
Posner emphasized that “[a]lthough called a ‘court,’ [the Commercial Court of Lille] is
actually . . . composed of businessmen who devote part time to arbitrating.” Id. at 429. Hence,
“the members of the Commercial Court do not have masters, magistrates, law clerks, externs, or
other staff that might enable them to assimilate the voluminous materials that have been
collected in the district court.” Id. Judge Posner was quick to emphasize that “[t]his conclusion
has nothing to do with the relative merits of the French and American procedural systems” in
general, and suggested that in some cases—for instance, where U.S. law would require
arbitration while French law would provide “professional judges,” an antisuit injunction against
the U.S. proceeding would be equally appropriate. Id. at 430.
391. See id. at 431.
392. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 92–93 (collecting examples).
393. Id. at 94.
394. Id. at 91.
395. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
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even institutions that are rudimentary or without guarantees of
political independence, risks significant damage to the efficacy of
international law. Treating different domestic judicial establishments
differently may be the only way to steer between these dangers.
Obviously such “double standards” will be less offensive if they
do not divide the United States from the rest of the world, although
any set of rules stressing the domestic system’s state of development,
sophistication, and institutional independence is likely to implicate
tensions between developing and developed countries, not to mention
396
between democratic and nondemocratic societies. It may help to
state, in advance, the characteristics of a domestic legal system that
will trigger greater supranational deference. This is the approach of
the 1996 habeas statute, which provided certain procedural
advantages to state governments that upgraded their provision of
legal counsel to criminal defendants in state court.397 Such conditions
might have the salutary side-effect of encouraging reform of domestic
legal systems more generally.398
The horizontal problem of varying institutional competence
among different tribunals at the supranational level does not raise the
same concerns about “double standards” and sovereign equality. As
Roger Alford has demonstrated, American law already treats
different supranational and foreign courts differently for a variety of
reasons.399 Here, the best domestic law analogy may be to
administrative law, in which courts accord different degrees of
deference to different administrative agencies in different situations,
depending on the nature of the agency action, the agency’s relation to
the statute it is enforcing, and the agency’s institutional character.400

396. See, e.g., Donoho, supra note 27, at 463–65 (suggesting that the “margin of
appreciation” accorded by supranational courts to domestic interpretations of human rights law
may vary across societies with varying commitments to democracy).
397. See 28 U.S.C. § 2263(b) (2000) (providing that states appointing counsel for indigent
prisoners under sentence of death in state postconviction relief proceedings qualify for certain
advantages: (1) a 180 day, rather than 1 year, statute of limitations for federal habeas petitions;
(2) deadlines for federal habeas courts to rule; and (3) limits on federal stays of execution).
398. See Turner, supra note 333, at 8 (“[T]he complementarity provisions of the [Rome]
Statute have prodded signatory countries to incorporate prohibitions on genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity into their criminal statutes.”).
399. See Alford, supra note 11.
400. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (“The fair measure of
deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with
circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency,
formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”)
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Developing similar doctrines for the interface between supranational
and domestic courts may be a task of considerable complexity, but it
does not seem insuperable in principle.
The differing institutional capacities of different supranational
courts does suggest caution toward proposals for a common approach
to interjurisdictional problems that would be developed and shared
across the jurisdictional boundaries of different supranational
regimes.401 These proposals have a strong intuitive appeal. For one
thing, the lack of developed case law within each supranational
jurisdiction’s own jurisprudence creates strong incentives to borrow
principles and practices from the experience of other institutions. To
some extent, no doubt, this is salutary. But I want to argue for a very
cautious approach to the development of a general “supranational
common law” addressing the relationships between supranational and
domestic institutions.402 Just as domestic legal systems vary wildly in
their competence and sophistication, so, too, supranational
institutions are not all created equal. All the frequently invoked
cautions about transplanting legal rules from one domestic system to
another403 would seem to be equally compelling in the context of
different supranational institutions embedded in different
international legal regimes.
D. Improving Existing Supranational Courts
The same institutional considerations that shape new
interjurisdictional doctrines and arrangements may also suggest
avenues for reforming existing supranational bodies. Specific
proposals for reform should, of course, be developed and evaluated in
the context of specific studies of the particular institutions involved.
All I can hope to do here is to suggest some problematic
characteristics of the current supranational legal system and, once
again, point some directions for further inquiry.

(footnotes and citations omitted); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944)
(determining the degree of deference owed to an agency’s determination based on
considerations of institutional competence).
401. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 8, at 443–44.
402. See Donoho, supra note 27, at 338 (suggesting that international human rights
institutions which are still in the process of maturing will best be served by incremental
jurisprudence that will over time build both credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of
governments).
403. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative
Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L. J. 223, 263–71 (2001).
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It is no great insight to say that institutional design is shaped by
expectations about the authority that the institution is likely to wield.
The one-country, one-vote principle of the U.N. General Assembly
makes some sense if the main concern is to provide voice to the
different nations of the world. If that body were to exercise
meaningful coercive authority, on the other hand, such a voting rule
would be considerably more troubling. Likewise, the role of the
relatively unknown and unaccountable experts at the U.N. Human
Rights Committee in interpreting the ICCPR will be less
controversial if those interpretations are merely advisory than if they
were to become binding. And if the validity of domestic regulation
were to turn on interpretation of the NAFTA or WTO agreements by
supranational arbitral panels, one would expect a loud outcry for the
restructuring of those institutions. Internationalists should thus
recognize the increasing scrutiny that all these supranational
institutions have encountered recently as evidence that international
law increasingly is taken seriously.
Several aspects of our putative supranational legal system
deserve consideration as that system grows in importance. The first is
the sheer proliferation of bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. The interjurisdictional doctrine of American law is
extremely complex, despite the relatively homogeneous nature of the
federal court system. How much more complex must the
supranational counterpart of the doctrine be to accommodate
institutions as disparate as NAFTA tribunals, the International Court
of Justice, and the U.N. Human Rights Committee? Supranational
bodies are also more likely to be perceived as legitimate to the extent
that the peoples subject to their jurisdiction can understand what they
do and how they work; the present hodgepodge, however, is so
variegated that few international scholars seem expert on the
workings of more than a few of the different bodies. Workable and
legitimate interjurisdictional rules are more likely to develop if some
of these various tribunals can be consolidated.
The proliferation of supranational bodies has also given rise to
concerns of excessive specialization. Specialists in particular areas of
international law may have idiosyncratic views that diverge from
404
strong preferences at the domestic level. Moreover, the most
404. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 333, at 23 n.129 (noting that “[a]n overwhelming majority
of international lawyers” oppose the death penalty, while “[o]utside the narrow circle of
international lawyers, . . . many jurists and nonlegal scholars”—as well as domestic
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difficult questions will likely arise at the intersection of different fields
405
of legal regulation. Much controversy over the free trade regime, for
instance, stems from its impact on environmental protection measures
406
that impose burdens on business. Generalist domestic courts will
often be better positioned to balance these competing policy
concerns, and if supranational bodies are to review those sorts of
decisions, then they would do well to be more generalist in character
themselves. Generalist supranational judges may also gain more
legitimacy to the extent that they are not identified with particular
social interests, such as multinational corporations engaged in
international trade.
Some supranational institutions—particularly in the free trade
area—seem likely to need more permanence if they are to develop a
viable set of interjurisdictional rules. NAFTA tribunals as presently
constituted write tickets for this day and train only; they have no need
to contemplate how they will apply today rules to tomorrow’s cases,
and they have at best an abstract interest in developing a working
407
relationship with domestic courts. One need not prescribe the life
tenure of the American federal judiciary to urge greater continuity
for these bodies; indeed, NAFTA itself provides for a standing group
of arbitrators for arbitrations conducted under the state-to-state
provisions of Chapter 20.408 Appointments for more than a single case
would also take the appointments process out of the hands of the
parties to litigation, which would not only offer an opportunity for
greater political accountability but also should reorient the tribunals’
sense of mission away from purely private dispute resolution and

populations—continue to support it). Professor Turner goes on to observe that, “[a]t the
International Criminal Court, . . . debates about the death penalty have been foreclosed because
of the solid consensus among international judges on the issue.” Id.
405. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
406. See, e.g., William Greider, The Right and U.S. Trade Law: Invalidating the 20th Century,
THE NATION, Oct. 15, 2001, at 21 available at http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml
?i=20011015&s=greider) (arguing that NAFTA Chapter 11 and similar provisions represent an
attack on environmental and other regulatory laws); Rubenfeld, supra note 157, at 2025; Public
Citizen, supra note 14.
407. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2099 (describing the lack of “‘institutional’ continuity”
under NAFTA Chapter 11 as “the weakest element of the institutional design”).
408. NAFTA ch. 20, art. 2008, 2009. According to Professor Brownlie, similar concerns
about the oddly named “Permanent Court of Arbitration”—which was not a standing court and
“could not develop a jurisprudence”—ultimately led to the creation of the ICJ. BROWNLIE,
supra note 26, at 677. For recent proposals to create a permanent appellate body for Chapter 11style trade regimes, see Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2142.
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toward greater concern for the public values that are often implicated
in the cases.
Finally, many supranational tribunals lack adequate guarantees
409
of transparency and accountability. These two concerns dovetail to
a large extent: one of the principal constraints on judicial action is the
need to write a reasoned opinion justifying the result and responding
to counterarguments.410 Supranational opinions, however, are often
not readily available and, in many instances, suppress dissenting
opinions and offer only cursory reasons. More important,
supranational bodies tend to lack the accountability fostered by
public and contested appointments on the front end, as well as
mechanisms such as statutory override, jurisdiction-stripping,
budgetary controls, and even impeachment in response to particular
rulings.411 All of these mechanisms become far more difficult to utilize
as means of political control when multiple nations—often many
412
nations—must concur. Ironically, a freestanding court that is not
accountable to anyone may be less powerful, in the end, than a
tribunal whose rulings are legitimized by the existence of democratic
checks on its authority.
The last point is that we already have a bewildering variety of
supranational legal institutions with widely varying characteristics,
and it is inevitable that some will inspire a great deal more confidence
in their institutional competence than others. It may be possible to
reform some of the weaker bodies, and efforts to do so deserve
careful consideration and support. But the possibility—even the
probability—remains that, at the end of the day, responsible national
409. See generally Anderson, supra note 19, at 1301 (concluding that Dean Slaughter’s vision
of global governance through government networks—which includes strong reliance on
supranational courts—“tends to erode the respect for democracy and democratic accountability
with which it began”); Rubenfeld, supra note 157, at 2017–18 (“The existing international
governance organizations are famous for their undemocratic opacity, remoteness from popular
or representative politics, elitism, and unaccountability.”).
410. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1374–75 (1995) (“[T]he true test [of a decision] comes when
the writing judge reasons it out on paper,” and that “[i]t is not so unusual to modulate, transfer,
or even switch an originally intended rationale or result in midstream because ‘it just won’t
write.’”).
411. On the many mechanisms available to the national political branches for responding to
federal court decisions, see generally McNollgast, supra note 272.
412. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 333, at 21 (“Given the limited opportunities available to an
individual state or even a group of states to sanction an international institution acting outside
its delegated powers, national communities have no meaningful ‘voice’ in the oversight of
international institutions.”).
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policymakers will have insufficient confidence in some supranational
institutions to cede to them any measure of authority over our
domestic judicial institutions. Likewise, national courts may well
confront situations in which deferring to a supranational tribunal
seems either extremely unwise or, possibly, simply impermissible
under domestic law. The problem is that in the climate of our present
discourse about international law, any refusal to go along with almost
any supranational proposal is held up as a sign of national disrespect
for international law in general.413
That view, like many of the views I have criticized here, seems to
me not to take international law seriously enough. It is easy to go
along with poorly constructed or conceived international rules or
institutions when one thinks that the subject matter does not matter
or that the enforcement mechanisms will be ineffectual; as Dean Koh
has observed, “[m]any countries adopt a strategy of ratification [of
international agreements] without compliance.”414 Supranational
judicial institutions are designed to put an end to that strategy; their
purpose is to force states that are parties to international agreements
to take international law seriously.415 To the extent that they succeed,
we will have graduated from the period in which it was more
important to convince nations to adhere to the international rule of
law than to worry overmuch about the content of that law. It should
no longer be an independent argument against a particular legal
result that it “did not strengthen the place of international law in the
law of the United States.”416 The question ought to be the same Legal
413. Dean Koh, for example, denounces as equally blameworthy American refusals to defer
to international actors on
[S]uch diverse issues as the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol on
Climate Change, executing juvenile offenders or persons with mental disabilities,
declining to implement orders of the International Court of Justice with regard to the
death penalty, or claiming a Second Amendment exclusion from a proposed global
ban on the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons . . . holding Taliban
detainees on Guantanamo without Geneva Convention hearings, and asserting a right
to use force in preemptive self-defense.
Koh, Exceptionalism, supra note 377, at 1486. These examples raise a wide variety of issues,
many of them confined to the specific context of each action. I do not mean to defend any of
these American actions here—although I think many are defensible—but I do insist that they
must be evaluated on their individual merits and that little can be gained by lumping them
together as signifying some general disrespect for international law and institutions.
414. Id. at 1484.
415. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2088–89 (noting that NAFTA’s arbitration arrangements
are meant to exert “power” over the signatory nations).
416. Henkin, Provisional Measures, supra note 57, at 683 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Breard).
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Process question asked of any other legal result, that is, whether it
reflects a sensible allocation of authority among the various legal
institutions in the system.
E. Doctrinal Resources within International Law
International law has not completely ignored the notion of
institutional settlement, even if it does not generally speak in those
terms. A variety of doctrines and practices reflect the imperative to
defer to national institutions. The problem, rather, is that these
doctrines and practices are both scattered and controversial. They are
often seen as unfortunate but necessary compromises rather than
417
essential features of the system. I want to suggest that these settling
doctrines and practices should be preserved and expanded, and that
they should be explored more systematically as instantiations of a
common principle.
One of the most important ways in which international law
“settles” authority to interpret with national institutions arises simply
from the generality—and thus indeterminacy—of its norms.
Instruments like the ICCPR, for example, define rights in highly
abstract terms. As Professor Carozza has observed,
[D]espite all of the normative developments of international human
rights law over the last half century, it is still characterized less by a
fully articulated normative content than by the interpretive
discretion that it leaves to states through the open-ended nature of
its language, the legal doctrines supporting it, and the political
context of the culturally pluralistic world to which it is intended to
418
apply.

The general lack of strong institutional enforcement at the
419
international level plays a similar role. I want to argue that these
aspects of international law, although frequently decried as
weaknesses or immaturities in the legal order, are in fact beneficial to
the extent that they force respect for national institutions and
autonomy. They are not “bugs,” but rather “features,” of the system.
417. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards,
31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 843 (1999) (observing that international human rights
decisions by supranational bodies “carr[y] the promise of setting universal standards for the
protection and promotion of human rights,” but that “[t]hese universal aspirations are, to a
large extent, compromised by the doctrine of margin of appreciation”).
418. Carozza, supra note 31, at 62.
419. See id.
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This Section canvasses more specific doctrines of international
law that facilitate the settlement of questions in national institutions. I
focus on two examples: the margin of appreciation doctrine
developed by the European Court of Human Rights and the principle
of complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court. Rather than attempt a comprehensive account of these
doctrines, I explore how they fit into the broader paradigm of
institutional settlement that I have already discussed.
1. The Margin of Appreciation. The European Court of Human
Rights originally developed its “margin of appreciation” doctrine in
connection with Article 15 of the European Convention on Human
420
Rights, which provides for derogations from Convention obligations
“in time of war or other public emergency.”421 Although the concept
began as a means to assess permissible derogations, the ECHR has
come to apply the doctrine more broadly, outside the context of
Article 15.422 The Commission has since explained that the margin of
appreciation applies also to national interpretations of the more
open-ended rights provisions in the Convention, as well as to the
choice of “appropriate means to guarantee a [protected] right.”423 The
discretion accorded national governments is not unlimited, however.
The ECHR has explained that “[t]he domestic margin of appreciation
thus goes hand in hand with a European supervision,” and it remains
for the Court to make the final judgment on whether the permissible
margin has been exceeded in a particular case.424
The margin of appreciation doctrine fits well with the
institutional settlement idea that I have been pushing here.
Obviously, this is not the place for a comprehensive account of the
doctrine. Rather, I want to make two points about it: First, the values
associated with institutional settlement provide a defense against
charges that the doctrine undermines the universality of human rights
and also justify the doctrine’s expansion beyond the relatively narrow
contexts in which it presently operates. Second, the principle of

420. European Convention on Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 15.
421. See, e.g., Greece v. United Kingdom, 1958–59 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 174, 174 (Eur.
Comm’n on H.R.) (applying for the first time the doctrine of margin of appreciation).
422. See P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 429–32 (1984).
423. Belgian Linguistic Case, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 4, 28 (1967).
424. Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 5, 23 (1976).
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deference behind the doctrine ought to be extended not simply to the
substantive definition of rights but also to various forms of
interjurisdictional doctrine.
Although the margin of appreciation may strike American
observers as a relatively modest form of deference,425 the doctrine is
nonetheless controversial. The ECHR has been criticized as being too
generous to national authorities in defining the permissible margin,
and the doctrine has been criticized more generally for undermining
426
the universality of human rights. Eyal Benvenisti, for example, has
worried that the margin of appreciation could seriously undermine
“the promise of international enforcement of human rights that
overcomes national policies . . . [and] compromise the credibility” of
supranational courts that adopt “double standards” and “lead
national institutions to resist external review altogether.”427 The
values associated with institutional settlement, however, counsel that
the doctrine should be strengthened rather than narrowed. As the
ECHR has noted, the margin of appreciation rests on an assessment
of the comparative institutional competence of national and
supranational authorities to assess the necessity for departure from
international norms or to give concrete definition to those norms
within a particular domestic cultural and legal context.428 The

425. Consider, for example, the following statement of the American “rational basis” test
for government action that does not implicate fundamental rights or a suspect classification:
On rational-basis review, a classification in a statute . . . comes to us bearing a strong
presumption of validity, . . . and those attacking the rationality of the legislative
classification have the burden to negative every conceivable basis which might
support it . . . . Moreover, because we never require a legislature to articulate its
reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes
whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the
legislature . . . . In other words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or
empirical data.
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
426. See, e.g., VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 422, at 445–46 (criticizing the ECHR’s
jurisprudence); Benvenisti, supra note 417, at 843–45 (criticizing the doctrine more generally).
But see Carozza, supra note 31, at 73 (arguing that the doctrine “merely recognizes that the
specification of general principles of human dignity in concrete political and social situations will
very often require a complex and uncertain balance of values,” and that this balance should be
“taken at the closest level to the affected person as is effectively possible”).
427. Benvenisti, supra note 417, at 844.
428. See, e.g., Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, 569
(1993) (“By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the
moment, the national authorities are in principle in a better position than the international
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competence advantage of national authorities may result not only
from their closeness to the situation but also from the thinness of
consensus on certain international principles, such as some of the
429
more open-ended principles of human rights law.
It is harder to find examples of the margin of appreciation
430
doctrine outside the case law of the ECHR. One critic of the
doctrine notes that “[o]ther international human rights organizations
wisely have avoided this approach thus far,” and urges that “[t]hey
must continue to caution themselves against being drawn to this way
of analyzing the issues they face.”431 This view—which seems to
presume that in the absence of a margin, supranational courts will be
able to impose an effective and universal vision of human rights—
strikes me as short-sighted. The deference entailed by the margin of
appreciation is precisely the kind of accommodation necessary to
incorporate international law into domestic legal systems as operative
law, rather than as a set of universal aspirations. As Douglas Donoho
has noted, “the margin of appreciation doctrine may well provide
international institutions with the flexibility necessary for their longterm development as credible and authoritative decisionmakers.”432
I do want to argue, however, that the margin of appreciation
focuses on the substance of rights while neglecting fruitful avenues of
deference grounded in interjurisdictional doctrine. Professor Donoho,
for example, compares it to “levels of scrutiny” analysis in American
433
The point of that analysis is to balance
constitutional law.
governmental interests in order, morality, and the like with individual
liberty, and the analysis goes to the substantive question whether a
right has been violated in a given situation. These substantive
questions are certainly important, and I have already argued that
international law has sometimes adopted substantive standards that

judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of
derogations necessary to avert it.”); see also Donoho, supra note 27, at 452.
429. See Donoho, supra note 27, at 458–59; see also id. at 466 (offering the margin of
appreciation doctrine as a tool for bridging disputes between the value of universal human
rights and the need to accommodate diverse cultural traditions).
430. See id. at 440 n.140 (“Thus far, international human rights institutions, with the
exception of the E.C.H.R., have made no serious attempt to develop a jurisprudence to deal
with the issues of diversity, multiculturalism and self-governance in the implementation of
rights.”).
431. Benvenisti, supra note 417, at 853.
432. Donoho, supra note 27, at 465.
433. See id. at 447–49.
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434
are insufficiently deferential to national policymakers. One of the
principal insights of the Hart and Wechsler tradition in Federal
Courts scholarship, however, is the importance of interjurisdictional
435
rules in implementing constitutional values. As Dan Meltzer has
observed, “many of the most important questions of American
constitutional law pertain to the jurisdictional, remedial, and
procedural doctrines that together create a framework for the
vindication of rights.”436 This tradition suggests that a “margin of
appreciation” for national institutions charged with implementing
international law may best be achieved through interjurisdictional
doctrines settling the authority to interpret and apply international
law in domestic courts.

2. Complementarity. The most promising interjurisdictional
counterpart to the margin of appreciation is the principle of
complementarity.
Unlike
the
margin
of
appreciation,
complementarity focuses not on the substantive standards applied by
supranational institutions but rather on when those institutions will
decide disputes themselves and when they will allow domestic
institutions to decide. The most prominent example appears in the
statute of the International Criminal Court, which provides that the
ICC will step in only where the domestic legal system concerned is
unwilling or unable to prosecute.437 One might generalize this
principle by stating that supranational institutions should not attempt
to replicate tasks that the domestic legal system is willing and able to
perform; as Dean Slaughter has noted, complementarity “recognizes
national government institutions as a first choice to exercise power
and responsibility even in the design of an international system of
governance.”438 In this sense, complementarity is a principle of
institutional settlement.

434. See supra notes 284–89 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
436. Daniel J. Meltzer, Member State Liability in Europe and the United States, 4 INT’L. J.
CONST. L. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 1, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
437. See Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 389, art. 17–18 (articulating
the principle of “complementarity”). See generally Turner, supra note 333. Professor BurkeWhite notes that “[t]he principle of complementarity has a history dating back to the Treaty of
Versailles” and to “the first proposals for an international criminal court in 1943.” Burke-White,
supra note 293, at 8–9.
438. SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 149.
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439

As I have already suggested, complementarity effectively
creates “double standards” by deferring to some domestic judicial
systems but not others, depending on the willingness and capacity of
each local system to proceed on its own. Indeed, the obvious
advantage of such a principle is that it is scalable to the particular
capacities of whatever domestic system is involved in a given case. If
the domestic system is capable of applying the relevant international
principle (or its domestic analog), then there may be little role for the
supranational court. On the other hand, in domestic systems that lack
the needed capacity the supranational court may play a greater role.
On this view, the supranational tribunal plays a “complementary”
role to whatever judicial system exists at the national level.
Complementarity thus seems a promising response to the disparate
capacities of different domestic legal systems.
The complementarity principle might be strengthened, from the
standpoint of settling authority in domestic courts, by adding two
elements. First, litigants could be required to exhaust their domestic
remedies before appealing to a supranational tribunal. Customary
international law already imposes such a requirement, in at least some
440
cases, under the “local remedies rule.” One can imagine a workable
system without this requirement: in the American system, for
instance, there is no presumption that most federal claims should be
brought in federal rather than state court or (where diversity of
citizenship exists) vice versa; rather, the parties retain a great deal of
freedom to choose the forum.441 But there are advantages to a
presumption in favor of domestic jurisdiction. Encouraging domestic
courts to hear cases under international law will encourage the
domestic legal regime to internalize international legal principles.442
As claims raising those principles become more commonplace,
moreover, exclusive or preferred jurisdiction in supranational bodies
will strain the decisional resources of those tribunals. And domestic
courts are probably better situated to incorporate international law in
ways that minimize disruption to surrounding domestic legal
arrangements and maximize domestic legitimacy.

439. See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
440. See Loewen, supra note 89, ¶¶ 143–57, at 41–45.
441. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 427.
442. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2651 (1997) (book review).
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Second, decisions by domestic courts on issues of international
law could be given preclusive effect in future litigation in
supranational tribunals. Institutional settlement holds that, in at least
some cases, the decision of the body with primary jurisdiction to
decide must be treated as settled, even though other bodies might
have decided the question differently.443 This is not to say that there
can be no review of such decisions—only that there should be some
measure of deference to the domestic outcome. There is little
“settlement,” after all, without some level of preclusive effect on
future litigation. Neither the parties nor the domestic forum itself will
have much incentive to take the international law issues in a case
seriously if they know that those issues are likely to be fully
444
relitigated at a later stage in an international forum.
Although the complementarity idea has much to recommend it,
the principle is not without difficulty in application. There is, for
example, the latent ambiguity in the ICC statute’s reference to
domestic judicial processes that are “unwilling or unable” to apply
international norms themselves. What if, after a thorough review, the
domestic prosecutorial institution determines that there is insufficient
evidence to prosecute? Or what if the defendant prevails on some
“technical” or procedural ground? Are these situations in which the
domestic system has abdicated or failed and the supranational body
should step in pursuant to its complementary role? Or has the
domestic process “worked” and resolved the case, obviating the need
for supranational intervention? As Dean Slaughter acknowledges, “it
will take years of litigation to establish precisely what ‘unable or
unwilling’ actually means, thereby establishing the precise parameters
of ICC jurisdiction in relation to national courts.”445
Complementarity is designed to respect domestic institutions, but
there seems to be little way around the need for the supranational
443. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
444. Article III may pose a constitutional barrier to federal court decisions of international
issues that lack preclusive effect in future litigation. The Court has suggested that some degree
of preclusive effect is a necessary component of the finality requirement under Article III’s
vision of the “judicial Power.” See Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693,
700–01 (1927). However, the reasoning of the leading cases is somewhat opaque, and it is clear
that a judgment may be “final” for Article III purposes even if it lacks the full preclusive effect
that it might have under traditional principles of res judicata. See generally Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); Tutun v. U.S., 270 U.S. 568 (1926). My focus here is on the
practical advantages of preclusive effect; on the constitutional issue, see generally HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 105–07.
445. SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 149.
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tribunal to review the adequacy of the domestic proceedings before
446
determining whether to proceed. The alternative system, in which
the supranational body’s ability to proceed would depend on
something like a certification from the domestic institutions that they
do not want the case, will strike many as too ineffectual to realize the
substantive goals of the international rules being enforced.447 On the
other hand, review of the adequacy of domestic proceedings will
inevitably create considerable frictions between the two systems. No
judge likes to be told that the proceedings in her court were
“inadequate” and will therefore be ignored at a subsequent phase,
and this irritation is likely to be far worse when the reviewing body is
a distant supranational tribunal made up primarily of jurists from
other countries.
The system might evaluate the adequacy of domestic proceedings
in at least two very different ways. The evaluation might occur
“wholesale” in the sense of a general judgment about the adequacy of
domestic legal institutions that is then reflected in the structure of the
supranational process. The First Congress’s decision not to grant
general federal question jurisdiction to the newly established federal
courts, for example, reflected a general judgment that the state courts
were adequate fora for adjudicating most federal statutory and
448
constitutional claims. By analogous reasoning, we might reject a
domestic exhaustion requirement if we thought national courts were
never an appropriate place to adjudicate prosecutions for war crimes.
Or the evaluation might occur “retail” in the form of supranational
review of the adequacy of domestic proceedings in a particular case.
Something like this seems implicit in the Mondev and Loewen
opinions: while both opinions strike me as fairly intrusive in their
review of the state court proceedings at issue, the Mondev panel
seems to have had more confidence in the Massachusetts courts than
the Loewen panel had in the courts of Mississippi.449 Accordingly, the

446. See Turner, supra note 333, at 6 & n.21 (noting that “[c]omplementarity will be
administered in practice through ICC decisions on the admissibility of cases” and that, as a
result, the court retains “the ultimate power to decide whether a country is ‘unwilling’ or
‘unable’ to prosecute a case”); Burke-White, supra note 293, at 9.
447. For example, China and the U.S. both urged that either national courts or the Security
Council make complementarity determinations in ICC cases, but this proposal was rejected by
the drafters of the Rome Statute. Turner, supra note 333 at 10–11.
448. See supra note 15.
449. I cannot help suspecting that this judgment rested, a least in part, on regional
stereotypes.

110305 YOUNG.DOC

1256

12/19/2005 3:04 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:1143

Mondev panel seemed more willing than the Loewen panel to defer to
the state courts’ resolution of the issues.
In the American system, this sort of adequacy determination
takes place most often in the context of habeas corpus review of state
criminal convictions. That regime seeks to mitigate the irritant
produced by the federal courts’ final say over the adequacy of state
450
proceedings by building in quite deferential standards of review.
Those standards are designed to respect both the substance of the
state courts’ determinations and the procedures by which those
determinations were arrived at. By this means, the institutional
settlement of primary decisional authority in the state courts is
451
reconciled with a final right of review in the federal judiciary.
Application of this principle would compel a quite different
approach from that taken by the supranational courts in Medellin,
Mondev, and Loewen. The procedural default doctrine is designed to
give state courts a chance to rule on a litigant’s federal defenses;
extended to the international level, it would require individuals to
present their treaty claims to the domestic courts before their
452
governments could bring those claims before the ICJ. The doctrine
is simply an element of exhaustion, foreclosing supranational
intervention unless the domestic courts—properly presented with the
treaty claim—were unwilling or unable to respect it.453 Reasonable
persons may disagree about whether the current American “cause
and prejudice” standard for overcoming a procedural default is too
high, but that is a question of detail. The ICJ’s seeming disregard for
procedural default in principle in cases like Avena and LeGrand
undermines the principle of complementarity that is necessary to
build a workable relationship between the ICJ and domestic courts.
The NAFTA cases, on the other hand, highlight the element of
preclusion. NAFTA includes a preclusion principle: if a party chooses

450. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (providing for a deferential standard of review on
substantive issues); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2000) (codifying the doctrine of procedural default
in some circumstances).
451. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) (observing that the procedural default
doctrine has “the salutary effect of making the state trial on the merits the ‘main event,’ so to
speak”).
452. In the U.S. habeas scheme, the state court’s resolution of the federal claim does not
have preclusive effect in the federal collateral review proceeding. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 487 (1953).
453. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 (2004) (observing that the procedural default
doctrine is “[a] corollary to the habeas statute’s exhaustion requirement”).
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to present its claim to the domestic courts, then it is not permitted to
454
seek a more favorable answer later on from a NAFTA tribunal. But
the denial-of-justice claim recognized in Mondev and Loewen makes
a mockery of that principle. Rather than relitigate the initial claim
rejected in the domestic courts—state law contract, business tort, and
antitrust claims—the Mondev and Loewen plaintiffs argued that the
domestic courts’ ruling against them gave rise to a new NAFTA
violation in its own right.455 Concern for complementarity, however,
suggests the denial-of-justice claims under NAFTA should be limited
largely to situations in which foreigners are excluded entirely from
domestic courts. In a case like Mondev or Loewen, for example, there
is little reason to believe that the NAFTA tribunal has any
comparative advantage over the domestic appellate system in
detecting errors of domestic law. To paraphrase Justice Robert
Jackson, the NAFTA tribunal is final in such a situation not because
it is less fallible than the courts that have considered the issues earlier,
but simply because it gets the last word.456 The point is not that denialof-justice claims should be eliminated entirely, but rather that the bar
for finding such a denial should be set much higher.
However these issues of institutional detail are worked out,
complementarity seems a promising rubric for protecting and
promoting a strong role for domestic courts in the application,
interpretation, and development of international law. The obvious
irony is that the principle appears in the charter of the institution to
which many proponents of national autonomy have expressed the
457
greatest skepticism. No matter how one feels about other aspects of

454. See NAFTA, supra note 119, Art. 1121(1)(b) (authorizing the filing of a Chapter
Eleven claim only if the claimants “waive their right to initiate or continue before any
administrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party, or other dispute settlement
procedures, any proceedings with respect to the measure of the disputing Party that is alleged to
be a breach referred to in Article 1116”).
455. The Loewen panel thus concluded that “Article 1121 involves no waiver of the duty to
pursue local remedies in its application to a breach of international law constituted by a judicial
act.” Loewen, supra note89, ¶ 164.
456. Brown, 344 U.S. at 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result) (“[R]eversal by a
higher court is not proof that justice is thereby better done. . . . We are not final because we are
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”).
457. See generally Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 89 (2003) (canvassing reasons for U.S. opposition to the ICC). I do not say that
such skepticism is wrong-headed. As Professor Goldsmith notes, “[t]he perceived efficacy of
complementarity and other ICC safeguards turns on the level of trust a nation has toward the
ICC. The United States has little.” Id. at 95. At a time of widespread hostility to the U.S. in the
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the ICC as an institution, however, the complementarity principle
deserves a close look.
F. The Politics of Judicial Globalization
Some of my proposals in this Part may be controversial; they may
require, after all, a fairly significant change in the way we think about
the relationship between international and domestic law. I want to
close by suggesting, however, that any such controversy should not be
political or ideological in nature. Much of our current debate about
the role of international law has a Left-Right cast to it. When we
speak of international human rights, for example, we typically see
political liberals urging domestic application of “progressive”
international principles—such as greater tolerance for gay rights or
less tolerance for capital punishment—and political conservatives
458
resisting such calls. I have chosen my primary examples with some
care, however. When we turn to free trade law, by contrast, we
typically see political conservatives preaching free trade and
globalization while political liberals fear that these trends will
undermine the domestic regulatory state.459 For my own part, I worry
about both scenarios. But the gentle reader can choose the nightmare
that he or she finds most unsettling: the point is that neither political
liberals nor political conservatives should be sleeping peacefully.460
It is also worth remembering the centrist tradition of the Legal
Process School that I have invoked. That School had its origins in
responding to critiques of prior ways of thinking about the law from
Legal Realists on the Left, but it responded by accepting many

international community, that attitude may well be sensible. But the concept of
complementarity itself nonetheless seems worth exploring.
458. Compare, e.g., Koh, World Opinion, supra note 255 (urging reliance on international
law to limit capital punishment), with Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347–48 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting such calls and stating that “equally irrelevant are the practices of the
‘world community,’ whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people”).
459. Compare, e.g., CAFTA’s Benefits, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2005, at A12 (supporting the
latest free trade agreement from a politically conservative perspective, and discounting
“sovereignty” concerns arising from NAFTA-like dispute resolution procedures), with Mark
Engler, The Trouble with CAFTA, THE NATION, Jan. 16, 2004, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040202&s=engler) (making the politically liberal case
against CAFTA).
460. See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 157, at 2017 (“[T]he right is internationalist where
international law pursues a property- and commerce-protecting agenda, while the left is
internationalist where international law pursues an human rights or use-of-force or
environmental protection agenda. In each case, support for international law is adventitious.”).
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elements of those critiques, and it was centrally concerned with
preserving elements of the modern regulatory state that both political
461
liberals and conservatives have come to accept. More importantly,
the incremental nature of the Legal Process approach and its central
tenet of respect for decisions by other actors even in the face of
disagreement on the merits are both conducive to accommodation of
disparate perspectives.
I also want to stress that the approach I have outlined here has
something to offer both nationalists and internationalists. Just as the
web of interjurisdictional doctrine that is the subject of the Federal
Courts field was designed to preserve traditional notions of
federalism and separation of powers while facilitating workable
governance at the national level, the extension of that field would
protect a meaningful role for international law by seeking to mediate
conflicts with domestic institutions. The point is to take international
law seriously as law, by subjecting it to the same sorts of institutional
give and take that have characterized our domestic legal
arrangements throughout our history. Moreover, Dean Slaughter has
demonstrated that developing relationships of mutual respect and
direct communication between national and supranational courts has
462
great potential to strengthen the position of the latter.
Failure to develop thoughtful accommodations between
supranational and domestic institutions will undermine international
law, especially in a community like the U.S. that is already ambivalent
about constraints on national sovereignty. Speaking of cases like
Loewen, for example, Renée Lettow Lerner has observed that “[o]ur
desire for international trade is starting to collide with our unusual
(by international standards) system of civil justice, and that collision
may generate tension that saps support for international trade
463
agreements.” And the U.S.’s recent withdrawal from the Vienna
Convention’s dispute resolution protocol in the wake of Avena
464
demonstrates this risk of backlash in the most concrete way.
Demonstrably workable accommodations, by contrast, should allay
461. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 58, at 693–94; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra note 60,
at xci.
462. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 146, 150.
463. Lerner, supra note 27, at 233; see also Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2043 n.52 (“If Chapter
11 and other investment-review mechanisms do not develop in a careful and sensitive fashion,
there is every reason to fear a backlash . . . .”).
464. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
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fears about the loss of sovereignty and to build public confidence in
international institutions. To be sure, both nationalist opponents and
internationalist proponents of international norms have something to
lose in this sort of compromise. But the benefit of the bargain is a
stronger, if more moderate, international law.
CONCLUSION
International law increasingly features supranational institutions
that interpret, apply, and develop international law. Some of these
supranational judicial institutions are new and some are not; even the
old ones, however, seem likely to play roles that increasingly intersect
with domestic legal arrangements. Robert Ahdieh has thus observed
that “[i]nternational tribunals have become more willing to engage in
the review of national courts in recent years,” and that they have
“growing power to make such review stick.”465 As supranational
courts interact with domestic ones, they will give rise to a host of
interjurisdictional problems involving standards of review, the
allocation of jurisdiction, remedies, and similar issues. It is only a
matter of time before Medellin—or some case like it—returns to the
U.S. Supreme Court, and the trade cases cannot be far behind.
Whatever one thinks of the particular approaches I have suggested
for thinking about these problems, the first central point of this
Article is that it is time to think about them systematically.
The second point is that the Legal Process jurisprudence that has
served Americans well in dealing with parallel interjurisdictional
problems in our federal system can also serve in an era of judicial
globalization. In particular, the notion of institutional settlement—
that authority to decide should be allocated to particular
decisionmakers, and that decisions reached by those institutions
should receive some level of deference from other actors in the
system—seems even more important on an international plane
featuring multiple sovereigns with diverse cultural and legal
traditions. Accepting that notion, of course, still leaves a host of
questions to be answered: In which institutions should authority to
decide in the first instance be settled? How much deference should
these decisions receive from other actors? To ask these questions is
not to challenge the place or status of international law and

465.

Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2148.
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institutions, but rather to take them seriously enough to integrate
them into our other legal arrangements.

